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Despite the consensus among economists that finance plays a critical role in growth and 
development at national/regional and enterprises/household levels, more than 90% of 
Tanzanians are excluded from the mainstream banking. To fill the existing financing gap, 
there has been an explosive growth of microfinance institutions including Saving and Credit 
Cooperatives (SACCOs) during the past two decades. Given the risky segment in which 
SACCOs operate, such an explosive growth may signal either a stairway to economic heaven 
or a highway to micro-financial crisis. Hence, it is necessary to empirically investigate the 
performance (efficiency and sustainability) of the SACCOs. Specifically, knowledge of 
SACCOs’ performance could generate valuable and concrete information for policy makers, 
industry managers and academics. This is of particular interest for the nascent but fast-
growing Saving and Credit Cooperatives industry in developing countries such as Tanzania.  
 
The aim of this study is to conduct an empirical investigation of the performance of SACCOs 
in Tanzania. Specifically the study addressed the following three questions: a) How efficient 
are they? b) Are they sustainable and profitable? c) What drives their performance in terms of 
efficiency and sustainability?  
 
The study employed data envelopment analysis with bootstrap approach to estimate the 
efficiency of the SACCOs. Standard financial ratios were used to assess profitability and 
sustainability. A multiple case study approach was used for an in-depth investigation into the 
drivers of performance in high- and low-performing SACCOs. Secondary data from 103 
SACCOs was collected from the Ministry of Cooperatives and Food Security and the regional 
headquarters of the Cooperatives Audit and Supervision Corporation. Primary data was 
collected from managers, board members and regulators through face-to-face interviews.  
 
The results of the study have been organized into four empirical essays. The first essay 
investigates the technical and scale efficiency of SACCOs using data envelopment analysis. 
The bias corrected results show that average scores are 32%, 43% and 77% for technical, pure 
technical and scale efficiencies, respectively. Since most of the inefficiencies are either 
technical or scale in nature, the study recommends increasing the operating scale for smaller 
firms. Firms operating beyond the optimal scale may need to downsize. The managers from 
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technically inefficient firms may reduce the waste of productive resources by utilizing inputs 
more efficiently.  
 
The second essay estimates the profitability and financial sustainability of SACCOs. The 
results show that approximately 61% of the SACCOs in the sample are operationally 
sustainable and 51% of the SACCOs are both operationally and financially sustainable. The 
average sustainability score was 127%. On average, our results for profitability, measured by 
return on assets, are higher than some of the results reported for standard microfinance in the 
region and globally.  
 
The third essay benchmarks the performance of SACCOs using an efficiency-profitability 
matrix to distinguish best performers from struggling SACCOs. The findings show that the 
majority of the firms (61%) were classified in the low efficiency, low profitability category. 
Only 12% (12 out of 103) of the SACCOs are classified as best performers in both efficiency 
and profitability dimensions. It can be concluded that the performance of SACCOs in 
Tanzania needs a well thought through turnaround strategy to mitigate the problem of low 
performance. For the majority of the SACCOs, both profit- and efficiency-increasing 
strategies are required. 
 
The last essay complements the previous three essays by using a multiple case study 
approach. The essay explores the perceptions of regulators, board members and managers to 
elicit the key drivers of performance in the industry. It emerged that limited capital, low level 
of members’ education on cooperatives, effective governance and leadership are major 
performance constraints common to both high and low performing SACCOs. High 
performing SACCOs tend to have an income diversification strategy, committed and 
dedicated leaders, as well as well-articulated lending processes and procedures which apply to 
everyone including board members and management. In contrast, weak performing SACCOs 
have weak governance and/or management teams, discriminatory lending processes allowing 
management and board members to have special privilege on loan allocations, and a less 
diversified income strategy. A more conservative capital growth strategy that leverages on 
internal capital mobilization, effective oversight of management, members’ education and 
training could foster the prosperity of the industry. 
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In conclusion, it was found that there is a significant potential for performance improvement 
in both efficiency and sustainability. While SACCOs are on average sustainable, the fact that 
about 49% of them are not financially sustainable is a matter of concern. The effort in 
resolving capital constraints, effective regulation, governance and members’ education could 
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It is widely acknowledged that finance plays an important role in promoting economic 
growth, both at macro and micro levels (King & Levine, 1993 a,b). Financial institutions, in 
particular, play a significant role in intermediation between net savers and net borrowers. In 
the process, these institutions make finance available where it is most needed, for example to 
start a business or new projects, scaling up, investing in new technology, unlocking 
entrepreneurial potential and improving managerial competence (Schumpeter, 1911; King & 
Levine, 1993a,b; Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Odedokun, 1998; Wangwe, 2004). It is 
expected that, if finance is used appropriately in spurring investment, then it should translate 
into better economic outcomes, including higher productivity, more jobs and business 
development with a positive feedback to economic growth and development (Aziakpono, 
2011). However, in order to gain most from the process, the users need to trust the stability 
and efficiency of the financial institutions. Specifically, healthy and efficient financial 
institutions are expected to promote more saving and create more loanable funds by reducing 
unnecessary wastage during the intermediation process.  
 
However, the health and efficiency of financial institutions depends on several factors, such 
as size, age, operating environment, governance, managerial competencies and the client 
niche. Against this backdrop, it is expected that a nascent and evolving financial industry 
operating in riskier client niches may be facing myriad challenges in terms of their health and 
efficiency, which calls for a constant review and monitoring of their performance. Tanzanian 
Saving and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), in particular, have recorded explosive growth in 
the past 15 years, but there is limited literature documenting their performance as 
demonstrated in Section 1.3. In responding to such a need, this study aims to explore the 
performance of SACCOs in Tanzania and discern factors driving the performance of the 
industry. Specifically, the performance in this context is proxied by efficiency, sustainability 
and profitability. These indicators will be used interchangeably with performance in the study. 
 
Knowledge to be gained from the analysis on the performance of SACCOs could foster a 
better understanding of the performance of the SACCOs and provides evidence-based inputs 
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for informed policy dialogue and decision-making in the microfinance sectors. The findings 
of such a study could also provide insights needed to formulate long-term policy and 
development of effective management strategy for SACCOs in the country. This is echoed by 
the following statement by Berger and Humphrey (1997) on the importance of performance 
evaluation in financial systems: 
“The information obtained from banking efficiency analysis can be used either: 
(1) to inform government policy by assessing the effects of deregulation, mergers, 
or market structure on efficiency; (2) to improve managerial performance by 
identifying “best practices” and “worst practices” associated with high and low 
measure of efficiency, respectively, and encouraging the former practices while 
discouraging the latter; (3) to address research issues by describing the efficiency 
of the industry, ranking its firms, or checking how measured efficiency may be 
related to the different efficiency techniques employed”(P. 175). 
 
1.2 Background 
As alluded to in the previous section, the financial sector plays an important role in economic 
growth and development through the financial intermediation process. Despite the importance 
of such a service in any economy, the majority of the poor in developing countries are 
excluded from the formal financial sector. In the Tanzanian context, 90% of the population is 
excluded from the classical banking system (FinScope, 2009). The reasons for such 
exclusions include the limited collateral, the relatively high risk associated with high default 
rates, dis-economies of scale and implied transaction costs (Luzzi & Webber, 2006; Haq, 
Skully & Pathan, 2010; Mwakajumilo, 2011).  
 
In response to these challenges, an alternative and flexible lending approach has emerged to 
address the existing credit market failure in the classical banking system. The new lending 
approach, which uses soft collateral and social capital, is being driven by the microfinance 
industry. There are diverse forms of microfinance players, such as donor-, government-, 
profit- (or market-) and member-driven players (SACCOs).This study focuses on SACCOs: 
their widest coverage among the diverse groups of people countrywide are member-driven 
and -owned microfinance institutions. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives (MAFC, 2013), the number of SACCOs has increased from 803 in 
2000 to 5,400 in 2013. This represents an increase of approximately 572% over the past 13 
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years. The number of members and direct beneficiaries increased from 133,134 to 1,153,248 
during the same period. This is a seven-fold growth in membership within nine years, while 
members’ savings have increased from 8.4 billion to 158 billion Tanzanian shillings (TZS) in 
the same period (MAFC, 2013).  
 
While the growth rate is impressive, the speed at which the industry is growing warrants a 
systematic investigation to discern its stability and robustness based on sound and rigorous 
economic analysis. Based on the nascent nature of this industry and the fact that these 
organizations are operating in a niche market with relatively high risk clients (Luzzi & 
Webber, 2006; Nyamsogoro, 2010; Mwakajumilo, 2011), some fundamental questions arise. 
The central question is whether the aforementioned observed growth is supported by 
economic fundamentals or whether the boom is going to burst. These concerns are further 
magnified when one observes mixed empirical evidence on the performances of microfinance 
in other parts of the world. For example, the recent Indian microfinance crisis of 2010/2011 
(Marr & Tubaro, 2011) has highlighted the need for further investigation of the performance 
of microfinance institutions, especially in developing economies. Also experience from other 
regions on the performance of microfinance presents a more pessimistic account of the 
microfinance industry. For example, empirical evidence from South Asia shows a repayment 
rate of less than the minimum requirement of 70% in Nepal (Acharya & Acharya, 2006), and 
another study in Namibia by Adongo and Stork (2005) reveals that almost all microfinance 
institutions are not sustainable. On the other hand, some microfinance institutions, such as 
Banc Sol in Latin America and Credit Unions in the United States of America (USA), Canada 
and Kenya have been successful (WBS, 2013; McKillop & Wilson, 2010). 
 
The mixed evidence on the performance of these institutions implies that context-specific 
empirical evidence is imperative in guiding industry’s management and policy-makers. The 
limited empirical literature and nascent nature of the microfinance industry in most 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, make this research a timely 
undertaking. The political, cultural and economic context in Tanzania has also evolved 
significantly in a unique way that makes it an interesting case study. Some of these landmark 
changes include shifting from a state-controlled economy to a more market-based economy 
that offers more autonomy to enterprises such as SACCOs (Maghimbi, 2010). Other changes 
include financial sector liberalization, increased competition and significant improvements in 
economic growth and regional and global integration.  
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1.3 The gap in the literature  
Apart from the mixed empirical evidence presented in previous subsection, most of the extant 
literature on performance evaluation of financial cooperatives is concentrated in mature 
economies with a focus on mature credit unions and microfinance institutions reported in Mix 
Market database (Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; Berger & Humphrey, 1997). The majority of the 
empirical literature focuses on North America, Australia and Western Europe (Jayamaha & 
Mula, 2011; McKilllop & Wilson, 2011). There are limited studies in developing countries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This is partly explained by the nascent nature of the industry 
in the region, and the limited and fragmented nature of the appropriate data from the industry.  
 
It is important to note that even on a global scale the substantive part of performance 
evaluation of financial sector has focused on the mainstream banking sector (Berger, 1993; 
Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Hughes & Mester, 2010; McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Yet the 
need to explore and understand the issues around performance of financial cooperatives and 
other microfinance is no less pronounced (Worthington, 2010). This is further echoed by the 
recent observation by Labie and Perillex (2008). In their paper titled “Corporate Governance 
in Microfinance: Credit Unions” they argues that, despite the tremendous development 
experienced by microfinance over the last few years, one type of institution has not generated 
all the attention that it could is credit unions. Thus, the current research extends the earlier 
empirical work on efficiency analysis of the financial sector into saving and credit 
cooperatives (SACCOs) using the recent available data from Tanzania. 
 
1.4 Statement and significance of the research problem 
In the past decade, Tanzania has experienced a strong positive trend in the growth of 
SACCOs and other microfinance institutions (MFIs). Such a positive growth trend provides a 
promising future direction for improved access to financial services; promotes investment, 
spur asset accumulation and economic activities at grass root level; and help the poor uplift 
from poverty. As a result, desired economic growth may be achieved by enabling poor and 
low-income people to use financial services to take advantage of economic opportunities, 
invest in their future and protect against economic shocks to their households and enterprises 
(UNCDF, 2002).  
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However, such growth may lead to a microfinance crisis if the performance of these 
institutions is not appropriately measured and monitored as recently evidenced in India (Mar 
and Tarboro, 2011). The fact that these organizations are working in a more risky market 
segment, if constrained by the managerial capacity and scale of operation (URT, 2002; Luzzi 
& Webber, 2006; Labie, 2008; Birchall and Simmons, 2010; Mwakajumilo, 2011) their 
sustainability and future continuity could be in jeopardy. In addition, historically 
cooperatives, in general, have underperformed in Tanzania due to various factors, such as 
political interference, poor governance, inadequate human capital and capital constraints 
(URT 2002; Mwakajumilo, 2011). Such accounts, when coupled with the mixed evidence on 
the performance presented in Section 1.2, demonstrates the need for empirical research to 
understand the level of the performance and related drivers in the industry. Therefore, the 
overarching research theme is empirical analysis SACCOs’ performance in Tanzania. The 
performance is measured in terms of efficiency, sustainability and profitability. 
 
Efficiency, which is basically a question of how well a financial institution allocates inputs 
such as assets, staff and subsidies to produce the maximum output, for example the number of 
loans, financial self-sufficiency and poverty outreach (Bassem, 2008), is an important 
economic parameter. More specifically, efficiency and sustainability are important managerial 
aspects for measuring and monitoring performance in the financial sector. These two 
measures reflect a sound intermediation process and hence their due contribution to economic 
growth and continuity of service delivery (Aikaeli, 2008). Thus knowledge about efficiency 
and sustainability plays a pivotal role in assessing the continuity of financial services. For 
institutions such as SACCOs, which are predominantly small in their scale of operation and 
work mainly with poor and high risk clients, it is important to understand their efficiency and 
sustainability for effective management and responsive policy decisions.  
 
The results from this study are expected to provide a better understanding of the status quo in 
terms of productive efficiency and provide evidence-based inputs for informed policy- and 
decision-making in the microfinance sectors. The study will also add to the current body of 
literature on the efficiency and sustainability of SACCOs in developing countries.  
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1.5 Research questions  
Based on the research problem presented above, the main research question addressed in this 
research is: How are the SACCOs in Tanzania performing? To answer this question, the 
following questions are invoked: (i) How efficient are Tanzanian SACCOs? (ii) Are 
Tanzanian SACCOs financially sustainable? (iii) Who are the top performers and what 
distinguishes them from low performers? Essentially, the study explored and tested specific 
factors that influence SACCOs’ performance in Tanzania. The study started by empirically 
exploring the level of efficiency and sustainability and tested whether they are significantly 
different from zero. Later it used multiple case studies to explore the performance drivers 
among SACCOs. 
 
1.6 Research objectives  
The goal of this research is to investigate the performance of SACCOs in Tanzania. The 
following specific objectives will be pursued:  
i. To analyze the technical and scale efficiency of SACCOs and explore whether there is 
room for improvement; 
ii. To examine the profitability and financial sustainability of SACCOs and the 
implications of these on the health of the institutions;  
iii. To benchmark the performance of SACCOs based on an efficiency and profitability 
matrix; and 
iv. To explore the factors affecting the performance of SACCOs in Tanzania. 
 
 
1.7 Limitation of the study  
The study population used in this study is Tanzanian SACCOs which had available audited 
financial statements during 2011 in four regions. We acknowledge that this could introduce 
self-selection bias especially if only SACCOs with certain characteristics systematically self-
selected to do so. It could be that all high performing and transparent firms self-selected to be 
audited or that struggling firms are voluntarily audited as a requirement for accessing external 
loans. Future studies may consider extending the study to include data from non-audited firms 
and broaden the coverage geographically and over time. This could improve generalizability 
of the results and capture the performance dynamics. 
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For the fourth empirical essay in Chapter 7 the study used self-reported data from 
management and boards of directors to explore factors influencing performance of SACCOs. 
This kind of data is limited by the fact that it is difficult to independently verify. Future 
studies could extend the current work by extending the sampling framework to including 
SACCOs’ members as participants in the research process. Accessing historical data on 
performance of SACCOs over time was difficult because of the fragmented nature of record 
keeping practices among SACCOs. These hurdles will remain important obstacles to be 
tackled by future researchers in this domain.  
 
1.8 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the research problem, 
the background of the study, research objectives and limitations of the study. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the microfinance landscape in Tanzania, while Chapter 3 presents a 
review of economic theory of cooperatives. An empirical essay on efficiency estimation is 
presented in Chapter 4 while Chapter 5 focuses on financial sustainability estimation. This is 
followed by the use of a combination of efficiency and profitability in a classification matrix 
in Chapter 6, in order to develop the best practice in the industry. Chapter 7 presents an 
empirical essay on factors influencing performance among savings and credit cooperatives. 
The overall conclusions and future research directions are provided in Chapter 8. 
 








2.1 Introduction  
Cooperatives have been recognized as an important tool in countervailing the market power 
resulting from imperfect competition, as well as providing services that are not provided or 
are underprovided by the market (Marwa, 2014b; McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Maghimbi, 
2010; Soboh, Lansink, Giesen & van Dijk, 2009). Cooperatives are a special type of social 
enterprise and are owned and controlled by members. In developing countries, and in 
Tanzania in particular, cooperatives play an instrumental role in community economic 
development through the provision of financial services, the marketing of agricultural produce 
and the supply of agricultural inputs to the urban and rural poor (Maghimbi, 2010). However, 
the growth trajectory of the cooperatives industry in the country has demonstrated a rise and 
fall (Maghimbi, 2010), which questions the overall effectiveness of these organizations in 
improving the welfare of their members. Understanding such dynamics facing the industry 
within its local context might be useful for informed policy and management decisions. But 
there is limited literature on this topic. The objective of this chapter is to systematically 
review the historical development of cooperatives in Tanzania, with a special focus on 
financial cooperatives. The chapter also explores the challenges facing the industry and future 
prospects for financial cooperative industry. The chapter set a contextual stage for empirical 
chapters (chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7) which focus on empirical performance evaluation of SACCOs. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the evolution and 
development of cooperatives in Tanzania, while Section 2.3 presents the growth trends of 
SACCOs during the reform period. The role of SACCOs in the financial sector is discussed in 
Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
                                                     
1
 The chapter was further developed into a paper titled “The Rise, Fall and Re-birth of Tanzanian Co-operatives: 
What Does the Future Hold for Financial Cooperatives”. The has been accepted as a conceptual paper to the 
journal Enterprise Development & Microfinance  
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2.2 Evolution of cooperatives in Tanzania 
Cooperative unions in Tanzania have had a long history starting during the colonial era. 
While there is evidence of some presence of cooperatives in pre-colonial times (Birchall & 
Simmons, 2010), this chapter starts from the colonial era (1900s to 1960), and reviews the 
post-independence period (1961-1984) and recent times. The period under review has been 
selected because it is during this time that the industry experienced significant development. 
Furthermore, there is limited availability of information documenting the pre-colonial era 
(Muenkner & Shah, 1993).  
 
According to Birchall (1997:468), the cooperative movement in developed countries has 
historically “evolved autonomously according to the ebb and flow of social movement and 
economic comparative advantage”. In contrast, for most developing countries, including 
Tanzania, cooperatives were promoted and controlled by the colonial government and later by 
the nationalist government after independence. During this era, cooperatives were heavily 
controlled and regulated by the government to protect her political interest. Members did not 
have full autonomy and ownership of their own cooperatives and, in fact, often saw these as 
quasi-governmental agencies that provided a useful service but did not belong to them 
(Develtere, 1994). This was further complicated by structural adjustment programs that 
removed government patronage and exposed cooperatives to the free market. As a result, 
most cooperatives collapsed due to inherent weak management and weak financial positions 
(Birchall & Simmons, 2010; Maghimbi, 2010).  
 
Modern cooperatives in most developing countries evolved organizational structures that were 
inherited from the colonial era. It is also important to note that during the formative stage, 
different colonial masters had different cooperative and institutional structures. For example, 
the British cooperative structure was more centralized, with a top-down approach to 
management and with one centralized cooperative registrar. This structure comprised three to 
four tiers, that is, primary cooperatives, secondary cooperatives at regional or district level, 
and a national federation of cooperatives. The primary cooperatives reported to 
district/regional cooperatives and regional cooperatives reported to a national federation of 
cooperatives (Muenkner & Shah, 1993). The French model was more decentralized, with 
different cooperative registry bodies depending on the focus and nature of a specific 
cooperative. For instance, a fisher cooperative would be registered by the Ministry of 
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Fisheries while housing cooperatives would be registered in a different ministry (Birchall & 
Simmons, 2010).  
 
The ramification of the colonial legacy in contemporary cooperatives is that the current 
cooperative structure is highly influenced by the colonial legal and administrative structure, 
due to past dependence. While there is no good or bad system, the research on colonial 
legacies and institutional set-up has demonstrated that colonial legacies have influence on 
institutional efficiency and related bureaucratic red tape (Walley, 2010; Seidler, 2011). The 
major argument is that British colonies and the British administrative system have less 
bureaucracy and are relatively efficient compared to French-based legal and administrative 
systems (Walley, 2010; Seidler, 2011). Since Tanzania was a British colony, its cooperative 
structures mirror the British cooperative system. The rest of this chapter therefore focuses on 
the British-oriented cooperative system. The next subsections focus on cooperative 
development and its dynamics during the three distinct eras classified by Birchall and 
Simmons (2010): the colonial era, post-independence and post-liberalization. 
 
2.2.1 Colonial period (1920-1960) 
The cooperative movement in Tanzania dates back to 1925, when peasants in Tanganyika 
(now the mainland of Tanzania) started informal (unregistered) cooperatives so that they 
could secure part of the trade profit from their crops. The first cooperative union in the 
country was the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), which was registered with 
11 affiliated primary cooperatives on the 1
st
 January 1933 (Maghimbi, 2010). Since then, the 
cooperative movement has experienced vibrant growth across the country, with widespread 
members in the southern highland, Lake Zone and other parts of Tanzania. The growth was 
mainly influenced by cotton farmers’ cooperatives, which started in the late 1940s out of the 
nationalist campaign (Gibbon, 2001). Around 1958, there were approximately 275 
cooperative societies controlling the cotton market in the country (Birchall & Simmons, 
2010).  
 
2.2.2 Post-independent period/Nationalist period (1961-1985) 
The growth of the cooperative movement continued to flourish after independence, with the 
cooperative sector receiving significant political and financial support from the government 
(Maghimbi, 2010). Most government leaders were brought up under the cooperatives 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
 
movement-based nationalist agenda and had a strong regard for the industry (Spaull, 1965). 
Cooperatives also received support from donors and the international community. The 
government of Tanzania viewed cooperatives as a means towards achieving socialist 
aspirations, while Western bloc donors regarded them as a means towards achieving a market 
society (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). By 1968, Tanzania had the largest cooperative 
movement in Africa and the third largest cooperative in the world in terms of the percentage 
of the market share of agricultural exports (Maghimbi, 2010). During this time, it was 
observed that the cooperative movement in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) was expansive: 
“Cooperatives handle ₤27.5 million worth or 49 per cent of the country’s annual exports. 
Only in Israel and Denmark do cooperatives market a greater proportion of the nation’s 
overseas business” (Maghimbi University Press, 1968:176 cited in Maghimbi, 2010). 
 
During this era, the cooperative movement was dominated by agricultural and marketing 
cooperatives, with relatively weak participation by savings and credit cooperatives 
(Maghimbi, 2010). During the mid-1970s, the government instituted radical changes in 
government policy on cooperatives after the government’s introduction of socialism in the 
economy, as detailed below:  
 
On 14th May 1976 all primary cooperatives were abolished by the government. 
Their crop marketing functions were taken over by communal villages. At the 
same time cooperative unions were also abolished and their functions were taken 
over by parastatal crop authorities, which had to buy crops directly from villages. 
The abolished cooperative unions never bought crops directly from peasants, but 
through primary cooperatives. The other services which were rendered by the 
abolished cooperatives, such as wholesale and retail trade, were taken over by 
state owned cooperatives in Tanzania mainland: Revival and growth companies, 
such as the Regional Trading Companies and District Development Corporations. 
(Maghimbi, 1992:224-225) 
 
After the 1970s, the industry was dominated by political interference from government 
officials, who used cooperatives to achieve their political ends (Muenkner & Shah, 1993). 
Part of the reason for the abolishment of the cooperative movement was the view held by 
President Julius Nyerere during 1976 that cooperatives could not cope with his “quick march 
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to socialism” as they were a capitalist movement (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). The policy 
change led to the near collapse of the cooperative movement in the country. Other challenges 
that weakened the cooperative movement included poor management, incompetent leaders, 
inadequate education about cooperatives among members, corruption, nepotism and 
inefficiency (Birchall & Simmons, 2010; URT, 2002). After a serious economic crisis and the 
failure of the marketing boards in marketing agricultural produce, which led to crises in the 
rural areas, President Julius Nyerere changed his mind and allowed the country’s cooperative 
movement to be re-introduced in 1984 (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). 
 
However, when the cooperatives were reinstated, they failed to recover their old vibrancy. 
There was heavy political interference and government manipulation, which eroded the 
poverty reduction potential of cooperatives (Sizya, 2001). Cooperative debt has risen 
significantly and government confessed that 87% of the debt was as a result of its own 
policies (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). Interestingly, savings and credit cooperatives 
(SACCOs), which were not as numerous as the crop marketing cooperatives during the pre-
abolition period, became more vibrant. Since their reintroduction, SACCOs have grown 
rapidly and, as institutions, have been more stable than the crop marketing cooperatives of the 
period between 1976 and 1984. During the 1980s and 1990s, when most crop marketing 
cooperatives collapsed, SACCOs continued to thrive (Maghimbi, 2006). Section 2.2.3 
explores the possible causes of the surge of SACCOs in detail. 
 
2.2.3 The period of structural adjustment and post-liberalization (1985-1989) 
Many countries around the world were advised by the World Bank, IMF and other donor 
agencies to embark on structural adjustment programs. Tanzania embarked on an economic 
structural adjustment program during 1985 (World Bank, 2014). During this time, the 
country’s economy was transitioning from being controlled centrally to a market-based 
economy. The shift from the socialist ideology was exacerbated by the collapse of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, which further weakened this ideological stronghold. During this 
period, most of the sectors of the economy were subjected to a free market philosophy. 
Having emerged out of government patronage, weak management capacity, troubled balance 
sheets, a low capital base, inefficiency, heavy indebtedness, exposure to market rigour and 
competition (Birchall & Simmons, 2010) led to most of the cooperatives collapsing.  
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2.2.4 The cooperative reform period (1990 to date) 
The government of Tanzania embarked on a major reform of the cooperative sector, starting 
with President Benjamin Mkapa in 1995-2005 to the current President, Jakaya Kwikete. The 
reform focuses on rehabilitating cooperatives into member-owned and member-controlled 
businesses. This emphasis is minimizing government interference and creating a conducive 
environment for prosperity. According to the findings of an in-depth case study by Birchall 
and Simmons (2010), the reform of cooperatives in Tanzania has been credited as one of the 
success stories in developing countries. During the reform period, many cooperatives 
disappeared, many more continued at a survivalist level while some, under strong leadership 
and good management, began to prosper (Wanyama, Develtere & Pollet, 2009). Wanyama et 
al. (2009) argued further that liberalization acted as a sieve that sifted the grain from the chaff 
in the cooperative sector. 
 
According to Sizya (2001), it is evident that the impact of liberalization was disastrous in 
Tanzania, as cooperatives were in a weak position to start free trade reform. The adjustment 
came in an abrupt fashion and cooperatives were not given space to breathe and adjust 
because private traders took most of the viable business. Cooperatives were left with an 
inefficient inherited structure and attitudes that put little emphasis on members’ education. 
Some of them were also turned into private business agents. The government wrote off 
approximately 87.5% of the outstanding debt of cooperatives (TZS 35 billion out of TZS 40 
billion), which was owed by different banks. Most of these debts were exacerbated by 
dishonest managers and committee members (Birchall & Simmons, 2010), with 
approximately 262 cases of dishonesty waiting for the police or court action between 1994-
2000 (URT, 2002). 
 
The reform of Tanzanian cooperatives reached a turnaround point in 1991 with the Reform 
Act. The act recognized the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) principles of 
cooperative independence and members’ autonomy, amongst others. The reform effort was 
supported and guided by the ICA, which provided new identity statements and a new set of 
principles emphasizing the autonomy and independence of cooperatives (Birchall & 
Simmons, 2010). The second milestone was the United Nations (UN) initiating the process of 
developing a law in 2001 that would safeguard the autonomy and independence of 
cooperatives. The purpose of this law was to disengage the government from the internal 
affairs of cooperatives (UN, 2001). The third milestone was the International Labour 
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Organization (ILO) declaring cooperatives as a tool for helping members to create income-
generating activities, gain access to markets and improve their own economic social well-
being while respecting their autonomy (ILO, 2001). This led to the enactment of new laws 
and the repealing of old ones in many countries around the world, including Tanzania 
(Birchall & Simmons, 2010). A new and better understanding of the relationship between 
government and cooperatives is emerging and has started remedying some of the mistakes of 
the past. My personal interview (November 19, 2012) with COASCO director and 
Commissioner of Cooperatives clearly showed that the regulatory agencies are both 
underfunded and understaffed, which handicaps their capacity to deliver desired results. 
 
Despite the reported success stories in the cooperative sector reform in Tanzania, more work 
is needed to develop a better and more effective strategy on cooperative management 
principles; surveillance committees; the incompatibility of board members with the job 
requirements; rules on external and internal financing, as well as on education and training for 
board members, management and employees; regular audits and the settlement of disputes 
(Birchall & Simmons, 2010). Another concern is that too much freedom may lead to a 
dictatorship in terms of obscuring transparency, corruption or the registering of pseudo-
cooperatives for short-term gains (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). The focus should thus be on 
preserving the integrity of the legal form of cooperatives while keeping them from 
unnecessary regulation and providing a supportive environment. Birchall & Simmons (2010) 
have argued that the focus should be on earned autonomy. They further justified the argument 
by a key informant consensus statement, which suggested that there is a need for a grading 
system for cooperatives. It is envisaged that such a grading system would depend on 
performance; cooperatives would be more or less regulated depending on key performance 
indicators, such as transparency, accuracy of accounting and inclusiveness of governance 
(Birchall & Simmons, 2010). 
 
Alongside the challenges stated in the previous paragraph, the Presidential Commission on 
Cooperative Reforms of 2000 identified the following key constraints to the revival and 
strengthening of the development of the cooperative sector: (i) a weak capital base, (ii) poor 
management, (iii) theft, (iv) weak support institutions for cooperatives, (v) insufficient 
education and training, (vi) confinement to too few sectors, and (vii) inappropriate policies 
and legal environment. Based on the recommendation, during 2001 the Department of 
Cooperatives was upgraded to the independent Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing. This 
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was followed by the formulation of the Cooperative Development Policy of 2002. The goal 
was to get cooperatives back onto the development trajectory, while at the same time ensuring 
that they became more responsive to the needs of members (URT, 2002).  
 
During 2003, the Cooperative Societies Act of 2003 was passed. Among other requirements, 
it stated the code of conduct required for a person to be on the board of a cooperative. The 
new code stated that before being elected as a board member, such a person should have been 
an active member of a SACCO for the past three years and should have secondary education. 
Board members were limited to three terms of three years each, after which they would stand 
down. Candidates for the board were also required to declare their personal property during 
each year of their service (Birchall & Simmons, 2010; URT, 2002). Financial cooperatives are 
further required to have the internal capacity to supervise and audit, rather than relying on the 
Cooperative Supervisory and Audit Cooperation Agency alone. A mutual fund for members 
was launched to protect primary cooperative societies against defaults from loans. 
 
All these reforms are implemented by the Cooperative Reform and Modernization 
Programme (CRMP), which was instituted in 2004 by a team of experts from the private 
sector, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), government, the ILO and academia. It aims 
at initiating comprehensive transformation in the cooperative sector so that organizations 
become member-owned and -controlled, competitive, viable, sustainable and with the 
capability to fulfill members’ economic and social needs (URT, 2004). The mandate is 
recognized as urgent and challenging, due to the high level of mismanagement of funds 
among cooperatives (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). The latter has fuelled public mistrust of 
cooperatives, which is aggravated by delays in the handling of cases by the police and courts. 
Another area of improvement that has been highlighted by the literature is the need to 
strengthen patronage cohesiveness, membership governance and improved operating systems 
(Shah, 1996).  
 
The inadequate supply of skilled human resources in cooperative education was pointed out 
as another constraint. Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies 
(MUCCOBS) is the only institution responsible for cooperative education and training, but 
serious capacity building is needed in training and research (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). The 
areas of cooperative supervision and auditing need capacity building and further financial 
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support in order for MUCCOBS to carry out its mandate. During the past decade, MUCCOBS 
has been aggressively expanding in terms of both student enrolment and program portfolio. 
According to the 2012 prospectus, the college offers a total of 41 different academic programs 
in cooperatives management and business studies (eight certificates, eight ordinary diplomas, 
10 Bachelor’s degrees, 10 postgraduate diplomas, 4 Masters and PhD degrees). When taking 
into account the complementary role of other higher education institutions in the country, 
there is a basis for optimism about the future supply of quality human capital in the industry. 
Furthermore, in the past three decades, the number of higher education institutions in 
Tanzania has increased significantly from three public universities in 1990 to 37 universities 
and 21 university colleges (both private and public) in 2015 (TCU, 2015). With the increasing 
number of higher education institutions we expect to have an increasing supply of well-
trained manpower, albeit there is ongoing debate about the quality of graduates produced and 
their relevance to the job market. 
 
2.3 The growth trends of SACCOs during the cooperative reform period (1990 to date)  
The consequence of the 1980s reform was disastrous for agricultural cooperatives. The 
number of primary cooperatives shrunk from 9,000 in 1990 to approximately 4,000 during 
1994 (Birchall & Simmons, 2010). But the picture was not uniformly bad across the sectors. 
SACCOs continued to grow and, by 2000, there were approximately 803 SACCOs 
(Mwakajumilo, 2011). The reputation of agricultural cooperatives has been compromised 
because of the past, but SACCOs seem to continue to grow. According to the Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives Union League of Tanzania (SCULT), there were 4,524 SACCOs in 2007, 
with 758,829 members. In the same year, it was reported that there were only 8,151 primary 
cooperatives in Tanzania mainland (SCULT, 2010). This implies that SACCOs constitute 
over 50% of primary cooperatives in Tanzania. There were 2,670 crop marketing cooperatives 
and the total number of members of registered primary cooperatives was approximately 
1,600,000 in June 2008 (Mwakajumilo, 2011). Based on these statistics, SACCOs are now the 
leading type of cooperative in terms of numbers of cooperatives and cooperative membership, 
with Dar Es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Kilimanjaro, Kagera and Iringa being the regions with 
the highest numbers of SACCOs (Mwakajumilo, 2011). 
 
The growth of SACCOs can be partly explained by the need for the services that these 
institutions provide and the prevalence of financial exclusion by the mainstream banking 
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sector in the country. According to FinScope (2009), more than 90% of Tanzanians are 
excluded from the mainstream banking system. Another explanation for the surge in SACCOs 
is the favourable reforms and government policies geared towards stimulating the growth of 
SACCOs. For example, the incumbent president earmarked TZS 21 billion, dubbed 
‘Kikwete’s billions’, which is to be disbursed as revolving credit through SACCOs in the 21 
regions in Tanzania. However, it may be argued that such government pressure on SACCOs 
to lend out TZS 21 billion may jeopardize the integrity and performance of the microfinance 
system, which might lead to strategic default as people may see this money as a hand-out. In 
fact this is a popular view among cooperative extension officers in the country. 
 
Apart from the government loan mentioned above, the active involvement of international 
donors, international NGOs (such as World Vision, Stromes and Oiko Credit), local pension 
funds and commercial banks, have played a significant role in making wholesale loans 
available for cooperatives. In brief, the recent institutional thickening through the emergence 
of international and local players in the microfinance space may have played a catalytic role 
in promoting the growth of SACCOs. Favourable economic growth, a surge in the number of 
universities and business colleges, and technological innovations such as mobile money 
(Mpesa) are likely to steer the industry towards improved performance. The major channels 
through which such improved performance is expected to occur are economies of scale due to 
the availability of external funds, reduced transaction costs by the adoption of technological 
innovation, and the availability of trained human capital.  
 
A recent increase in the graduate unemployment rate in the country might be a signal of the 
saturation of the formal labour market and an over-supply of graduates given the current level 
of demand from this market. Each year about 700,000 new graduates enter the labour market 
and only 40,000 (less than 6%) find employment (REPOA, 2014). This opens the door for a 
trickle-down effect of such graduates to the semi-formal sector, including SACCOs. The 
increased institutional support from government and the private sector, complemented by an 
increased willingness by the private sector to extend wholesale loans to SACCOs, 
demonstrates the buoyance of supply-side forces in taking advantage of the unfolding 
transformative economic opportunity in the microfinance space.  
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Despite the optimistic view emerging from the previous paragraph, the evidence from the 
recent data as shown in Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the growth of the number of SACCOs is 
almost reaching saturation point. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the growth rate of the number 
of both rural and urban SACCOs seems to be approaching saturation point, at approximately 
2,340 and 3,000 SACCOs for rural and urban, respectively. When combined, the turning point 
seems to be approximately 5,300 SACCOs. The period between 2005 and 2009 accounted for 
most of this growth. The SACCOs growth has slowed down since 2009 as can be seen from 
Figure 2.1. The highest growth rate coincides with the Presidential Special Fund Programme 




Figure 2.1: Growth in the numbers of SACCOs from 2006 to 2013 
Source: Author compilation using secondary data from Ministry of Cooperatives 
 
When decomposed in terms of membership, the growth rate is rising, albeit with the gap 
between male and female members hovering between 33-40%. SACCOs’ membership has 
increased from 291,344 to 1,153,248 between 2005 and 2013. Based on the data, SACCOs in 
Tanzania are still male-dominated, which is not surprising given the strong patriarchal culture 
in the country. Figure 2.2 shows the membership profile over time in terms of gender in the 
left-hand panel, while the right-hand panel shows the evolution of total savings and total 
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On average it seems that, SACCOs’ members save more than they borrow as demonstrated in 
the right hand panel of Figure 2.2. This is a positive signal for the potential stability of the 
industry, and implies that SACCOs could raise capital internally. It can be suggested that, on 
average, the SACCOs industry in Tanzania seems to be savers-dominated. The gap between 
savings and loans is widening over time, which may mean either that SACCOs are recruiting 
more savers than borrowers or that the current members are increasing their level of saving 
over time.  
 
According to economic theory of cooperatives (Smith, 1984), this may have a long-term 
negative impact on borrowers because SACCOs may tend to protect the interests of the savers 
at the expense of borrowers. Such a problem may be magnified, especially when the net 
interest income from loans is paid back to the members as dividends, but it may be less of a 
problem when the interest income is paid back as a loan interest rebate. The question of 
whether savers’ dominance is playing a catalytic role in growth and outreach or is a constraint 
to future growth remains open to further research. 
 
  
Figure 2.2: SACCOs’ membership profile over time by gender (left-hand panel) and the 
evolution of total savings and total outstanding loans in TZS (right-hand 
panel) 
Source: Author compilation using secondary data from Ministry of Cooperatives 
 
When total capital is decomposed into total current assets, shares (ordinary members’ share of 
SACCOs), savings and deposits, it is observed that saving has been increasing significantly. 
While it may be premature to make a conclusion, there is prima facie evidence that SACCOs 
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demonstrated in Figure 2.3, shares and deposits have also recorded steady growth over time, 
but not at the same rate as savings.  
 
Figure 2.3: Growth of shares, savings and deposits in TZS (Y axis) over time (X-axis) 
Source: Author compilation using secondary data from Ministry of Cooperatives 
Despite these positive results, there is concern over whether the performance of these 
institutions can be taken for granted. More importantly, the stability and quality of the 
observed growth is highly questionable, given the industry’s past. While growth is often good, 
if it is not well managed, it can easily lead to microfinance disaster. This is supported by the 
following quotations, which offer anecdotal evidence for the reason to be concerned about the 
performance of the industry: 
 
Kikwete: “For government to help pay coop debts, thieves must be arraigned. 
President Jakaya Kikwete has said that the government will not settle off 
cooperative societies debts owed to various banks unless it is established how they 
came into being and the leaders connected with the embezzlement of the money 
are dragged to court. According to the President, the debts in some cooperative 
societies might be as a result of embezzlement by various officials. ‘Am sorry to 
inform you that I am not ready to okay the debt for your cooperative society until 
it is verified how they came into being,’ the President said. “This is because in the 
past we once squared debts for a number of cooperative societies totaling between 
27bn/-and 30bn/-. I want to get a full report on how this cooperative society 
(TAMCU) got into that debt. I want to know whether it is a real loss or 
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embezzlement,” Kikwete said. He said squaring such debts is like fuelling 
embezzlement of public funds … In early June this year President Kikwete 
directed the Inspector General of Police to conduct thorough investigation and 
take disciplinary action against people alleged to have been involved in the 
embezzlement of cooperative money” (The Guardian, 2014). 
 
The historical narrative presented demonstrated that the SACCOs industry in Tanzania is 
relatively nascent but transitioning towards growth stage. According to the economic theory 
of cooperative life cycle (Cook, 1995) the growth stage comes with its own challenges which 
may end up making or breaking the organization. The major challenges during this stage are 
increased heterogeneity among members and high transaction costs. The increased transaction 
cost is generated by five types of problems: free rider problems, horizon problems, portfolio 
problems, control problems and influence problems as demonstrated in detail in Section 3.2.2. 
These problems, if not well monitored and managed, may lead to the collapse of the 
cooperative. Given the dynamics of life cycle theory and the nascent nature of SACCOs in 
Tanzania, an empirical performance evaluation and monitoring is critical. 
 
 
2.4 The role played by SACCOs in the financial sector 
Financial cooperatives and other microfinance institutions play a key role in providing 
inclusive financial services for the poor and lower income earners. Such a role is even more 
critical for developing countries, where such earners comprise over 80% of the population. 
Based on such evidence it is apparent that the business model of traditional banks is not 
flexible enough to cater for this market segment. This section presents an overview of the 
financial services sector in Tanzania, with a focus on its composition in terms of portfolio and 
membership size, and ending with the overall coverage of financial service provision between 
the formal banking system and financial cooperatives. 
 
The financial sector in Tanzania has undergone substantial structural changes since the 
liberalization of the sector in 1991. The financial landscape in the country is composed 
mainly of banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and microfinance 
institutions. In terms of assets, the sector is dominated mainly by the banking sector, followed 
by pension funds. The banking sector holds 75% of the financial sector’s assets by volume, 
followed by pension funds, which hold 21% of the asset base (Bank of Tanzania, 2010; 
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Shelter Afrique, 2012). The insurance sector, mutual funds and microfinance hold 2%, 1% 
and 1%, respectively. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the composition of key financial sector players 
in the country. 
 
Figure 2.4: Financial sector asset-based composition in 2010 
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2010) 
 
Table 2.1 demonstrates different levels of access to finance by different institutions among 
Tanzanians. Surprisingly, formal financial institutions serviced only 14% of the adult 
population during 2013. In contrast, microfinance, which owns about 1% of the total assets, 
services about 43% of the total adult population. Microfinance, including SACCOs, thus 
plays a significant role in inclusive finance and thereby inclusive growth in Tanzania. Formal 
banking serviced 14% of adult population in Tanzania mainland during 2013 compared to 9% 
during 2009. Nonbanks, which includes SACCOs, Mobile Financial services, Microfinance 
and other semi-formal institutions, serviced about 43% during 2013 compared to 7% during 
2009.  
 
Table 2.1: The trend of financial inclusion in Tanzania between 2009 and 2013 
Year Banks Nonbanks Informal Mechanism Excluded 
2009 9% 7% 29% 55% 
2013 14% 43% 16% 27% 
 
Source: Computations based on FinScope data (2014) 
 
When combining the percentage of the population which relies on either informal mechanism 
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adult population are still excluded from financial services, which presents a significant growth 
potential for financial cooperatives. It is also instructive to note a surge in nonbanks from 7% 
to 43% between 2009 and 2013. Such a surge in services for this segment is mainly accounted 
for by including mobile money as a form of financial inclusion. However, although credit 
facility in mobiles has started recently it is still limited in the volume and the term of the loan. 
If we exclude mobile money, the actual financial inclusion shrinks to less than 30% of the 
adult population, which means that there is a significant growth potential for financial 
cooperatives and other forms of microfinance. 
 
The observed high growth of SACCOs and the large proportion of population served by them 
underscore the importance of assessing their efficiency and sustainability while providing the 
financial service to the people at the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the evolution of the cooperative sector in Tanzania, with a special focus 
on financial cooperatives. According to the evidence discussed in this chapter it is apparent 
that the cooperative industry has since 1925 gone through turbulent times, but is now moving 
towards stability, with financial cooperatives taking the lead. However, there are still 
remnants of the past, such as weak boards of directors and management teams, government 
intervention and low levels of education about cooperatives. Despite these challenges, 
SACCOs are playing a significant role in financial inclusion and have a wider membership 
base than commercial banks.  
 
Financial cooperatives are, however, operating in a precarious environment that exposes them 
to relatively high risk clients compared to those served by commercial banks. Another 
potential disadvantage is that financial cooperatives operate on a smaller scale, which might 
constrain them from enjoying economies of scale. These concerns call for continuous 
monitoring of and research into the performance of the industry, which at present is limited.  
 
In conclusion, there seems to be a promising future for financial cooperatives in terms of 
internal saving mobilization and membership base. However, weak governance and 
management structures, historical hangover, capital constraints and inadequate education 
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about cooperatives among members, act as barriers preventing financial cooperatives from 
realizing their full potential. Policy makers and cooperative management need to develop 







































3.1 Introduction  
Saving and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), also known as credit unions or financial 
cooperatives, are a unique type of financial institution which emerged as an alternative 
solution to provide financial services in the presence of credit market failure (McKillop & 
Wilson, 2011). Like other forms of cooperatives, SACCOs are autonomous member-based 
enterprises with the objective of meeting members’ economic, social, cultural and aspirational 
needs through a jointly owned and controlled enterprise (Rubin, Overstreet, Beling & 
Rajaratnam, 2013; FES, 2012). SACCOs are community-driven businesses which are guided 
by the cooperative values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and 
solidarity (WOCCU, 2015; Birchall & Simmons, 2010).  
 
The members’ belief is founded on ethical ideals of honesty, openness, social responsibility 
and caring for others. Together, the values and beliefs have culminated into seven principles 
of cooperative enterprises (ICA, 1995 cited in FES, 2012). These principles are: voluntary and 
open membership; democratic members’ control; members’ economic participation; 
autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation among 
cooperatives; and concerns for community (Birchall, 2005). Such a unique business model 
and ownership structure of cooperative enterprises, including SACCOs, expose them to 
unique challenges and opportunities which may constrain or foster their performance 
compared to those facing standard business enterprises. 
 
To put things into perspective, a typical SACCO is composed of the following three 
characteristics: (i) a financial institution, (ii) a cooperative, (iii) development finance and 
social enterprise. First, as a financial institution a SACCO receives deposits and savings, and 
offers loans, payment services, investments and other retail products (Aziakpono, 2013). 
Being a financial institution by default it is exposed to problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. If not checked and mitigated such problems could lead to under-performance 
                                                     
2
 This chapter has been submitted as a conceptual paper to the international Journal of Co-operative 
Organization and Management and is currently under review. 
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through increased default rate and agency cost. Second, as a cooperative, a SACCO operates 
under values and principles of cooperatives including democratic membership control and 
multiple objectives of meeting economic and social goals. Such a structure might have far-
reaching ramifications on performance evaluation and the governance structure of SACCOs. 
Third, as development finance institutions, SACCOs operate mostly where there is market 
failure due to high risk or cost (Aziakpono, 2013).  
 
Moreover, because of the relative size of SACCO enterprises, such institutions are placed in a 
unique operating environment which might lead to challenges of weak regulatory 
environment, low skill and training, poor utilization of modern technology and low 
management capacity. These factors are likely to influence the performance of these 
institutions. As such, the knowledge about the interplay between the cooperative business 
model and how it might influence behaviour of the members is critical for performance 
evaluation of cooperative enterprises. Thus, understanding the implication of these features in 
SACCOs’ performance evaluation is important. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter 
explores different theoretical and empirical approaches which have been adopted in extant 
literature in evaluating the performance of financial cooperatives in the presence of these 
challenges. The chapter starts with the overall historical evolution of credit union from the 
global perspectives followed by a review of the different theoretical approaches to 
performance evaluations. The empirical performance evaluation strategies are presented and 
the choice of the approach adopted for the empirical modeling is justified. The chapter sets 
the stage for the empirical strategies employed in Chapters five and six.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the evolution and 
typology of financial cooperatives, key characteristics of financial cooperatives and their 
implication for the management and performance evaluation of financial cooperatives; 
Section 3.3 discusses the major approaches used in empirical literature in performance 
evaluation of SACCOs; Section 3.4 presents a detailed economic approach to performance 
evaluation; and the conclusion is presented in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Evolution and typology of financial cooperatives 
This section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection presents the evolution of 
financial cooperatives and their prevalence around the world, and the second subsection 
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presents the growth path and typologies of financial cooperatives globally and their 
implication on financial performance. 
 
3.2.1 The evolution of SACCOs 
Historically credit unions emerged as alternative solution for credit market failure due to their 
ability to operate where banks cannot (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). The literature reports that 
the actual cooperative movement dates further back to 1844 when Robert Owen, who was 
driven by humanitarian concerns, experimented at New Lanark. At this time, Owen was 
concerned with helping workers to escape from poor working conditions created by the 
industrial revolution. The focus of his approach was on creating an equitable society 
(Macpherson, 2007). Although Owen’s experiment failed, it remained instrumental in 
spreading the cooperative ideology (McKillop & Wilson, 2011).  
 
The second attempt, which was a lasting and practical cooperative model, was the Rochdale 
Cooperatives Store in Great Britain which started during 1844. The members of Rochdale 
jointly raised capital to buy goods and sell them to members at a saving. While Rochdale has 
a consumer cooperative orientation it does not differ much from a credit union except that in a 
credit union the good traded is the money itself. The key difference between the two initial 
experiments is that the Rochdale model was interest-bearing and the residual was distributed 
proportionate to use of the service (McKillop & Wilson, 2011), while Owen’s approach used 
the surplus for the entire community which made it vulnerable to the classical problem of free 
riders. 
 
About a decade after the formation of Rochdale, a German by the name of Friedrich Wilhelm 
Raiffeisen formed the first rural credit cooperatives in 1864. The structure of rural 
cooperatives was similar to that of Rochdale but focused on helping farmers. During the 19
th
 
century two types of institutions merged giving rise to the modern form of credit union 
(McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Since then, the credit union movement has expanded 
significantly, spreading to the rest of Europe, North America, Australia, Asia and Africa.  
 
To date, there are about 57,000 credit unions spread across 103 countries and serving about 
208,000,000 members (WOCCU, 2015). What is common in the financial cooperative 
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movement globally is their role as alternative institutions for providing financial access where 
traditional banking fails to offer such a service. In other words they are a special variation of 
member-driven development finance institutions which have emerged in response to the 
existence of credit market failure. They have a unique advantage of operating where banks 
cannot because of their distinct economic advantage over banks for certain segments of the 
borrowers (Nyamsongoro, 2010; McKillop & Wilson, 2011). In contrast to traditional 
banking, their knowledge of the members and local economic conditions reduces the 
information cost and increases the screening efficiency (Guinnane, 1994). 
 
3.2.2 Typology of SACCOs along the growth path 
The typologies or classification of financial cooperatives draws insights from the 
organizational life cycle theory (LCT). According to LCT financial cooperatives evolve 
through three distinct phases: formative (nascent) phase, transition phase and mature phase 
(Grashuis & Cook, 2013; McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Greiner, 
1972). The specific attributes which characterize various financial cooperatives in each 
category were documented by Ferguson and McKillop (2000, 1997). 
 
The credit union in formative (nascent) stage is mostly characterized by small asset size, tight 
common bond, and heavy reliance on volunteers, and it provides basic savings and loan 
products (Ferguson & McKillop, 2000). Financial cooperatives in the transition stage tend to 
exhibit the following characteristics: large asset size, flexible common bond, high level of 
product diversification, less reliance on volunteers and greater emphasis on growth and 
efficiency. The maturity phase is characterized by large assets, loose common bond, 
diversified portfolio product, professionalism of senior management, centralized services, 
adoption of electronic technique and deposit insurance.  
 
Based on the unique characteristics of each growth phase as predicted by the life cycle theory 
it is expected that financial cooperatives in different stages of life cycle will face different 
challenges. While some of the performance challenges may be common in all the stages, such 
as the role of effective leadership, there are also unique specific challenges depending on the 
stage of development of an individual organization. The nascent stage is mainly characterized 
by undercapitalization, high growth and increasing heterogeneity among members which 
might lead to an increase in transaction cost and reduced performance. The increase in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
transaction cost is inflated by the five major problems inherent in cooperative enterprises as a 
result of vaguely defined property rights (Cook, 1995): free rider problem, horizon problem, 
portfolio problem, control problem and influence cost problem (Ortmann & King, 2007; 
Hansmann, 1996; Cook, 1995). Each of these problems is explained in detail later in this 
section. But before we explain these problems the next four paragraphs present a digression 
with a focus on the property rights problem and its implication on the performance of 
cooperative enterprises.  
 
A property rights system is defined as method of assigning to individuals the authority to 
select the final use of a specific good among different alternative uses (Vera, Ugedo & Lario, 
2010). The concept of property rights can be traced back to the seminal paper of Coase 
(1937). The existence of a well-defined property right is central to well-functioning and 
sustainable systems. This is attributed to the role played by property rights in protection 
against the use or misuse that other people could make over an asset that they do not own 
(Alchian, 1977; Furubotn & Richter, 2000; O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, 2006) cited in Vera 
et al., 2011). The property rights theory focuses mainly on allocating the property rights 
among individuals such that the problem which might arise due to incomplete contracts are 
mitigated (Klein, Crawford & Alchain, 1978; Vera et al., 2011). 
 
The role of property rights in resource allocation is further justified by inherent transactions 
involved in the production process. Such costs results from informational search cost, 
incomplete contracts, cost of enforcing and monitoring compliance (Coase, 1937; Royer, 
1999; Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999). Due to the existence of incomplete contracts, the theoretical 
prediction is that assets should be re-allocated to those uses which yield the highest return. On 
the other hand, if contracts were complete, then re-allocation will be redundant, as it would 
clearly point out what actions should be carried out due to any contingency that could arise 
and what compensation each part would receive (Vera et al., 2011).  
 
However, most of the contracts are incomplete and in practice contracts are guided by the 
group verifiable decisions. The non-contractible decisions are not realised if not specified a 
priori and if their occurrence is not known with certainty. In such situations if anything 
should happen it needs to be negotiated among the parts, and if agreement is not possible, the 
decision relapses on the part that possesses the control rights on the implied assets (Royer, 
1999). The implication of this classical problem is that the ownership of an asset implies 
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control over the residual flows that it generates. Therefore, the owner of the assets is the one 
who has the incentive to use it effectively, involving himself or herself in investment 
decisions. 
 
Based on the argument above, it follows that, the owner of the asset is the one who has to 
decide what to do with it when circumstances arise that were not included ex ante in a 
contract (Tarjizán, 2003 cited in Vera et al., 2011). Cook and Iliopoulos (1999) argue that in 
the case where a person does not have clear possession of an asset, he or she will not have any 
incentive to protect its value. In addition, if property rights cannot be transferred, the 
probability that the asset is finally owned by the person who will use it best is reduced. It 
turns out that most of the property rights in cooperatives enterprises are vaguely defined, 
which exposes them to the four property right problems mentioned in paragraph three of 
Section 3.2.2. The next five paragraphs explain such problems in detail. 
 
The free-rider problem in financial cooperatives emerges due to inherent weak property rights 
which are untradeable, insecure, or unassigned (Cook, 1995), and is linked to patronage 
residual claimants instead of investment-based residual claimants. In the patronage-based 
approach both new members and older members receive the same patronage and residual 
rights as existing members without making upfront investments proportionate to their use. 
The ramification of this approach is the creation of disincentives for existing members to 
invest in their cooperative because of the dilution of their returns (Ortmann & King 2007; 
Vitaliano, 1983; Royer, 1999). Although most of the literature was anchored in the context of 
agricultural cooperatives, the free rider problem is also likely to be common in financial 
cooperatives. The direct consequence of this problem from a financial cooperative perspective 
is on the long-term capital accumulation and investment in financial infrastructure which 
requires upfront investment. Because of the open nature of the cooperative enterprises model, 
the incumbent members will not have an incentive to invest into the project with longer term 
income streams because they may be diluted by new incoming members who will share the 
same patronage. 
 
The second problem linked to weak property rights is the horizon problem, which arises as 
result of non-tradability of the property rights. This is more critical when a member’s residual 
claim on the net income generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset 
(Cook, 1995). In such situations members will tend to under-invest in long-term projects due 
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to a myopic focus on short-term returns which are limited to the horizon over which the 
member expects to patronize the cooperative (Vitaliano, 1983; Royer, 1999). Thus the 
management is always under pressure to maximize current returns instead of focusing on 
long-term investment, and this may affect the leverage which could have been realized from 
long-term investments. 
 
The third challenge is the portfolio problem, which emerges due to the lack of a secondary 
market of cooperative shares. This limits the members from diversifying their individual 
investment portfolios according to their personal wealth and preferences for risk-taking 
(Royer, 1999). The diversification of the portfolios will be conditioned by the possibility of 
purchasing or selling the shares. This limitation leads to sub-optimal decisions because it is 
not possible to satisfy the risk preferences of all members, leading to inefficient risk sharing. 
In addition, members have to accept a risk that could be avoided by diversification, resulting 
in a decrease in their welfare (Vera et al, 2010)  
 
The fourth issue is a control problem which occurs because board and members of the 
cooperatives are not able to monitor the managers’ performance effectively compared to 
profit firms, and because of the lack of information and external pressure compared to those 
imposed by publicly traded equity instruments. It is argued that the cooperative’s board 
members are handicapped by incomplete search and monitoring information devices they 
need to mitigate agency problems (Cook, 1995). Thus co-operatives cannot use this option 
due to the absence of an equity market for evaluating the performance of cooperative shares 
(Royer, 1999). 
 
The fifth problem due to incomplete property rights in financial cooperatives is the influence 
costs issue. The influence costs in an organization emerges when the organizational decision 
affects the distribution of wealth or other benefits among the members (Cook, 1995), i.e. 
when a certain group, in pursuit of its selfish interests, attempts to influence the decision to its 
benefit. This is a classical problem of new borrowers or net savers as articulated by Smith 
(1984). Thus, in financial cooperatives this problem is likely to result between net savers and 
net borrowers.  
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The problems mentioned are more likely to occur to a different degree at the end of the 
nascent stage and when cooperatives move into the transition phase, but they may also happen 
at any point in time during the organizational life cycle.  
 
As the organization progresses along the life cycle trajectory, and specifically during the 
transition stage, financial cooperatives start to recognize the challenges which may lead to a 
strategic turnaround decision. Such decision might lead to exit, tinkering or re-inventing the 
ownership structure. There is a diverse geographical distribution of different categories of 
financial cooperatives. Most of the nascent industries are primarily found in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and the former Soviet Union bloc (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Financial 
cooperatives in these regions are used as an instrument for poverty reduction within a more 
general framework of microfinance. Australia, Ireland and Canada could be viewed as having 
a mature financial cooperative industry, while Poland and Latvia are examples of financial 
cooperatives in transition.  
 
Financial cooperatives in Tanzania re-emerged in the past three decades and are still in a 
nascent stage. Applying the classification above, Tanzanian financial cooperatives are 
expected to exhibit the formative stage and are more likely to face the challenges of 
undercapitalization, economies of scale, heterogeneity, restrictive common bond and heavy 
reliance on volunteers. These factors are likely to have a drag on SACCOs’ performance. In 
addition to these factors, the next subsection discusses the theory of financial cooperatives 
followed by the empirical approaches to performance evaluation.  
 
3.3 Economic theories of SACCOs  
The inherent uniqueness of financial cooperatives limits the application of standard 
theoretical models of financial intermediaries and cooperative enterprises in modelling their 
behaviour (Smith, Cargill & Meyer, 1981; Bonin, Jones & Putterman, 1993; McKillop & 
Wilson, 2011). In a typical firm or financial intermediary the objective is clearly stated as 
maximizing the value of the shareholders, i.e. profit maximization (Smith et al., 1981; 
Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2010). But in financial cooperatives members are both owners and 
consumers of the service, which implies that the organization cannot simply seek to maximize 
the profit generated by member’s transactions irrespective of the price and quantities of those 
transactions (Smith et al., 1981). The ramification of the dual nature of ownership and 
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consumption is that the model of traditional financial firms based on profit maximization 
cannot be directly applied to financial cooperatives.  
 
Typically, financial cooperatives take deposits from members and offer loans to members. 
Since financial cooperatives conduct their business only with their members, there is an 
overlap of both ownership and consumption. As a result, there is always a potential conflict 
between borrowing members and saving members (Rubin et al., 2013; Smith, 1984; Taylor, 
1979). Borrowing members prefer lower interest rates on loans in order to minimize the cost 
of borrowing, while saving members prefer higher interest on loans so as to maximize their 
net dividends. This behavioural approach is not consistent with the standard banking model in 
which there is a separation between owners and users of the service. 
 
Thus the objective of financial cooperatives is not the same as maximizing the value of 
shareholders as the standard neoclassical theory of the firm predicts. Financial cooperatives 
seek to maximize the benefits of the members whose goals may be opposed to each other 
depending on whether they are savers or borrowers. The central issue which the theory of 
financial cooperatives tries to deal with is how to resolve this conflict and maximize the 
overall welfare of all the members (Fried, Lovell & Eeckaut, 1993; Smith, 1984). Gambs 
(1981) argues that the existence of financial cooperatives presents a problem in the way 
economists think i.e. individuals are supposed to maximize utility and firms are supposed to 
maximize profit, yet a financial cooperative looks like a firm but does not seem to maximize 
profits. Thus, the major concern of theoretical and empirical modellers of financial 
cooperative behaviour is how to achieve equilibrium between the interests of borrowers and 
savers and how external factors may disrupt such equilibrium. 
 
The earlier theoretical and empirical pioneers in cooperative performance measurement 
focused on a static approach to analyze the behaviour of financial cooperatives (Taylor, 1971, 
1977, 1979; Carson, 1979; Smith et al., 1981, 1984; Spencer, 1996). However, some recent 
advances have focused on building on the seminal paper of Smith (1984): they have extended 
a static theoretical model of financial cooperatives by taking inter-temporal behavioural issues 
such as inter-temporal equity retention and rate policy into the traditional static model (Rubin 
et al., 2013). However, the dynamic approach is still new and developing, which limits its 
empirical application in extant literature. The dynamic co-operative behavioural theory needs 
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further testing before it can be widely adopted for empirical evaluation. Therefore, the rest of 
the discussion will focus on the static modelling approach which is widely used in the 
literature for empirical modelling of financial performance. 
 
Taylor proposed a series of models with the 1979 model being the most developed form of the 
behavioural model of financial cooperative (Spencer, 1996). In his analytical model he 
emphasized that the profit motive is absent for financial cooperatives operating on behalf of 
all the members. However, he insisted that for a savers-dominated financial cooperative there 
will be a restriction of new savers to maximize the net returns. For a borrower-dominated 
financial cooperative there will be a restriction on new borrowers to minimize the average net 
cost of the loan. He assumed that the supply of the new loanable funds depends on the 
dividend rate, while the demand of the loan depends on the long-run average cost.  
 
According to Taylor the equilibrium level will vary according to the initial level of reserves. 
The equilibrium condition will be the ideal situation when net savers are almost equal to net 
borrowers. Once one group dominates the other group, the dominant group will tilt the 
balance towards its preference. This model fails to take into account the endogenous effect of 
the current period reserve on the balance sheet which is important for growing or declining 
organizations. Spencer (1996) extends the model to account for this effect by including 
reserves in the model.  
 
Another widely used model in the empirical literature was developed by Smith (1984) in his 
seminal paper “A theoretic framework for the analysis of credit union decision making”. In 
his modelling framework, the objective function is to maximize pecuniary gains to members 
by a market rate comparison. The members are said to enjoy net gains if the loan rate is lower 
than the market comparison and if the dividend rate on savings is higher than the rate 
available elsewhere with comparable accounts. Thus, members’ borrower-saver preferences 
influence loan and dividend rates along with other factors such as inherited balance sheet 
portfolio, operational cost, and regulatory constraints. There has been very little work done to 
develop the theory of financial cooperatives beyond this seminal paper which remains a 
benchmark for most of the empirical work in modelling financial cooperatives (Rubin et al, 
2013).  
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In addition, it is also acknowledged that financial cooperatives are successful if they can 
provide the members with a superior service than if they acted individually or outside 
cooperatives (Smith, 1984), thus financial cooperatives are supposed to play a key role as 
price leaders and stabilizers. The members of SACCOs collectively decide on the interest rate 
to charge on loans and interest to be paid on deposits/savings. Depending on the agreement 
reached and whether the preference is inclining towards net savers or net borrowers, the profit 
margin may be high or low respectively. Theoretically we expect neutral cooperatives where 
there is a balance between net savers and net borrowers and the profit margin may converge 
to zero (Smith, 1984). If this happens, then the benefit among the members would have been 
maximized. This result inherently makes profit not a predictable measure of performance in 
some cases. Based on this anomaly, the standard theory of the firm which emphasizes profit 
maximization becomes limited when analysing cooperative behaviour empirically. Most of 
the empiricists have adopted cost minimization as the objective of cooperatives to mitigate the 
problem (Rubin et al., 2013). 
 
3.3.1 Approaches to empirical performance evaluation in SACCOs 
The empirical evaluation of financial cooperatives is contentious due to the inherent complex 
structure resulting from multiple features and objectives of SACCOs as discussed in Section 
3.1. Practically, performance evaluation of financial cooperatives is difficult to implement to 
capture all the dimensions (Fried et al., 1993; Soboh, Lansink, Giesen & Van Dijk, 2009). 
Specifically, performance evaluation of cooperatives requires taking into account social and 
economic objectives (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Thus, a fair performance evaluation of 
SACCOs entails measuring both social and economic goals. The social benefits include social 
cohesion, social bonds among members and local economic development. However, 
measuring social performance is a new territory for many SACCOs and other development 
finance institutions (CUCC, 2012). Some performance measurement has been uncharted 
territory because of the unavailability of social performance data and the inherent complexity 
in quantifying such measures (Rubin et al., 2013; CUCC, 2012; Soboh et al., 2009). 
 
It is further argued that social performance evaluation was not taught in business schools, 
which led to a systematic knowledge void among managers on how to measure and report 
social performance (CUCC, 2012). As result, most of the performance evaluation literature in 
financial cooperatives focuses on economic performance evaluation. Despite the limitations 
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of the economic approach in performance evaluation in capturing social dimensions, the 
approach still serves as a good proxy of organizational performance in the absence of social 
performance data. Due to data limitation our study uses the economic approach to evaluate 
performance of SACCOs. The next section presents a review of economic and empirical 
approaches used in performance evaluation of financial cooperatives in the extant literature.  
 
3.3.2 Economic approaches to performance evaluation 
The economic approach to performance evaluation in financial cooperatives is divided into 
three categories. The first category, which is widely used in the industry and practice, is the 
accounting ratio approach. The second approach uses the frontier method to estimate the 
efficiency of financial intermediation institutions. The third category, which is a hybrid, 
combines efficiency and ratio based approaches and is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The 
rest of this section will focus on the two major categories: ratio and accounting based 
approaches. While the ratio approach is easy to understand, it has been criticized for being 
atheoretical and for its inability to capture multiple dimensions of performance (Jayamaha & 
Mula, 2011; Soboh et al., 2009; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Salmi & Martikaienen, 1994; 
Diewert, 1992). Thus most of the recent academic literature is focused on the frontier method, 
which is based on the neoclassical producer behaviour theory and can accommodate multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs in the analyzing the performance of organizations (Jayamaha & 
Mula, 2011; McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Soboh et al., 2009; Berger & Humphrey, 1997).  
 
3.3.3 Empirical evaluation of performance of financial cooperatives 
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the extant empirical literature on performance evaluation of 
financial cooperatives is grouped into two categories: those which use accounting ratios and 
those which use the economic efficiency frontier approach. Despite the limitation of the 
accounting approach highlighted in Section 3.4, Shubik (1996) argues that financial ratios are 
necessary to account for the dynamic reality of organizations’ status and activities. The most 
commonly used ratios are profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, solvency ratios and efficiency 
ratios, and in practice the ratio approach has dominated the industry’s practitioners. The 
popular performance evaluation ratios are the PEARLS (Protection, Effective financial 
structure, Asset quality, Rates of return and costs, Liquidity, and Signs of growth) and 
CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capacity, Earnings ability, and 
Liquidity) methodologies recommended by the World Council of Credit Unions.  
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While CAMEL and PEARLS methodologies are popular performance evaluation tools among 
practitioners and consultants, their application in academic literature is limited. Instead, the 
recent trends in academic literature are shifting towards the economic efficiency approach 
using frontier methods. The limited applications of the PEARLS and CAMEL methodologies 
in the empirical literature can be explained by some of their limitations mentioned in the 
previous section. The dominance of economic efficiency performance evaluation using the 
frontier approach in academic literature is explained by the theoretical foundation of the 
approach. The efficiency approach is embedded within neo-classical producers’ theory and is 
flexible in accommodating the multi-dimensionality of the performance index (Coelli, Rao, 
O’Donnell & Battese, 2005; Diewert, 1992).  
 
Within the frontier modelling approach there are different variations of frontier methods 
including parametric methods and non-parametric methods. The commonly used methods are 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) for those adopting a parametric approach and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for those adopting a non-parametric approach (Marwa & 
Aziakpono, 2015; Haq, Skully & Pathan, 2010; Soboh et al., 2010; Fried et al., 1993). In 
theory there is no clear consensus about which method is superior because each methodology 
has its own strengths and weaknesses (Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; McMillan& Chan, 2006; 
Coelli et al., 2005; De Borger, Moesen & Kerstens, 1994). However, some data settings and 
contexts might lead to a preference for one method over the other. For example, in the case of 
a small sample design, the non-parametric approach has been playing a dominant role because 
of its distribution-free properties. Also the DEA approach has been widely used in handling 
multiple input and multiple output production and service organizations. On the other hand, in 
the presence of a relatively large data set and price information on inputs and outputs SFA has 
been widely used to model allocative and economic efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). It is 
instructive to note that there is some progress towards extending SFA methodology to include 
multiple outputs frameworks (Collier, Johnson & Ruggiero, 2011). 
 
Most of the existing literature on performance evaluation of financial cooperatives is 
concentrated in mature economies with a focus on mature credit unions and microfinance 
institutions reported in MIX Market data base (Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; Berger & 
Humphrey, 1997). The majority of the empirical literature focuses on North America, 
Australia and Western Europe (Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; McKilllop & Wilson, 2011). There 
are limited studies in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This is partly 
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explained by the nascent nature of the industry in the region, and the limited and fragmented 
nature of the appropriate data from the industry.  
 
It is important to note that even on a global scale the substantive part of performance 
evaluation of financial sector has focused on the mainstream banking sector (Berger, 1993; 
Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Hughes & Mester, 2010; McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Yet the 
need to explore and understand the issues around performance of financial cooperatives and 
other microfinance is no less pronounced (Worthington, 2010). Such information will provide 
important insights in monitoring, regulating and managing the process of organizational and 
structural change in the industry.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
The objective of this chapter was to discuss the key characteristics of cooperatives and their 
ramifications for financial cooperatives’ performance evaluation. In addition, the chapter 
presented a concise review of economic theory of financial cooperatives and empirical 
evaluation approaches to financial cooperatives’ performance. It was established that the 
uniqueness of financial cooperatives arising from multiple objectives (economic and social 
objectives) and coincidence of consumers (borrowers) and producers (savers) limits the 
standard theory of the firm in modelling the behaviour of financial cooperative organizations. 
To address this problem many attempts have been made to develop a theory of financial 
cooperatives, with Smith’s (1984) seminal paper laying the foundation of the widely used 
theory in empirical literature. 
 
An unresolved challenge emerging from the empirical literature is how to translate multiple 
objectives into modelling the behaviour of financial cooperatives. It is further complicated by 
the fact that there is conflict among the multiple objectives. For example, savers would want a 
higher interest rate while borrowers would like a low interest rate. The debate and theoretical 
development around this conflict are still far from being settled, which leaves empirical 
modellers with limited alternatives. 
 
Most of the existing empirical literature adopted overall cost minimization or benefit 
maximization as the central objective in modelling the performance of financial cooperatives. 
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Given this objective, empiricists have used either financial ratios or the economic efficiency 
approach in measuring performance. Recent trends are shifting to an economic approach to 
modelling performance using either data envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) due to the inherent limitations of the ratio approach.  




TECHNICAL AND SCALE EFFICIENCY OF SAVING AND CREDIT 




4.1 Introduction  
In line with objective one in Section 1.6, this is the first empirical chapter which is devoted to 
evaluating the performance of SACCOs from efficiency dimension. The efficiency is 
decomposed into three components i.e. technical efficiency which captures overall efficiency 
in resources transformation, scale efficiency and pursue technical efficiency. Technical 
efficiency which captures overall efficiency in resources transformation, pure technical 
efficiency captures the managerial effectiveness and scale efficiency captures the optimal 
scale of operation. The next paragraph introduces the role of finance in economic 
development and growth and justifies the need for performance measurement and monitoring.  
 
The financial sector plays a critical role in economic growth and economic development 
(Beck & Levine, 2004; Levine, 1998). However, the positive impact of the financial sector on 
economic growth is realized if the sector is efficient and well developed. As a corollary, if the 
financial sector is not effectively monitored and regulated it may lead to an economic crisis. 
As argued by Sufian (2011), the health of a financial sector is critical for the health of the 
economy at large. Given the relationship between the financial sector and economic growth, 
knowledge about the efficiency of financial institutions and the underlying factors that 
influence their efficiency is crucial. Such knowledge is necessary to provide insights to 
managers, regulators, policy makers and other stakeholders to formulate policies to improve 
the efficiency of the financial sector.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the earlier empirical work on efficiency analysis of 
the financial sector into saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). More specifically, the 
study investigates the technical and scale efficiency of SACCOs in Tanzania. Such analysis 
could foster a better understanding of the performance of the SACCOs and provides 
evidence-based inputs for informed policy dialogue and decision-making in the microfinance 
                                                     
3
 This chapter has been accepted for publication as an empirical paper in the Journal of Developing Areas and 
has been published as Economic Research South Africa working paper No: 510. Available online at 
http://www.econrsa.org/publications/working-papers/technical-and-scale-efficiency-tanzanian-saving-and-credit-
cooperatives  
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sectors. The findings of such a study could also provide insights needed to formulate long-
term policy and development of effective management strategies for SACCOs in the country. 
 
SACCOs are among the fastest growing microfinance institutions but often less explored in 
empirical literature. Among others, the limited data availability and poor governance might 
have acted as red tape preventing academic research in this area. Most of the empirical 
literature on microfinance performance modelling is based on Asia and Latin America with 
some focus on credit unions from North America and the UK (Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; Haq 
et al., 2009; Qayyam & Ahmad, 2006; Gregoriou, Messier & Sedzro, 2005; Nghiem, 2004; 
Fried et al., 1993). The MIX market
4
 dataset has been a dominant source for most of the 
recent empirical work on microfinance performance (Louis & Baesens, 2013; Arrassen & 
Avouyi-Dovi, 2013: Haq et al., 2009: Bassem, 2008). Unfortunately the MIX market data 
does not include most small microfinance institutions such as saving and credit cooperatives. 
This has led to structural omission of this segment of microfinance in empirical research due 
to data problems. The current study explores this frontier and makes an attempt to explore the 
data challenges and solve the existing knowledge gap on the performance of these institutions 
in the Tanzanian context. 
 
Despite the dearth of empirical work, the sector plays a significant role in bridging the gap 
left by credit market failure in developing countries and Tanzania in particular. In fact, the 
financial sector in Tanzania is highly underdeveloped, with a private sector credit to GDP 
ratio of 20%, and about 90% of the population excluded from the mainstream financial sector 
(World Bank, 2013; FinScope, 2009). As a result of such market failures, SACCOs and other 
microfinance institutions have emerged as an alternative solution. SACCOs particularly have 
experienced strong growth as an alternative financial service provider for the poor. According 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC, 2013), the number of 
SACCOs increased from 803 in 2000 to 5,344 in 2013: an increase of about 565% over nine 
years. The number of members and direct beneficiaries has increased from 133,134 to 
1,153,248 in the same period, which is about a sevenfold growth rate within nine years. 
Members’ savings have increased from 8.4 billion to 158 billion Tanzanian shillings (TSHS), 
equivalent to about a 19-fold growth in the same period. 
                                                     
4
 Mix Market (Microfinance Information Exchange) is an online data base portal for microfinance around the 
world. It is important to note that most of the small microfinance organizations, such as SACCOs from poor 
countries, are not included in the data base. The data set can be accessed at http://www.mixmarket.org/. 
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While the growth rate is impressive, the speed at which SACCOs are growing raises many 
questions about their performance. The fact that most of these institutions operate on a 
relatively small scale and in a high risk environment with low potential for cost and loan 
recovery (at least in theory) complicates the issue further. Hence, despite the odds, the 
observed growth record makes a systematic investigation of their performance a timely 
undertaking.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Distinguishing features of financial cooperatives  
It is important to review the concept of financial cooperatives and show how they differ from 
the conventional banking sector in setting the stage for a further literature review on 
efficiency modelling. Cooperative organizations are a special type of economic entities whose 
objective is to maximize the members’ welfare/benefits. In a typical cooperative organization, 
members are also users of the service(s). In some financial cooperatives, the services may be 
exclusively for members, who have a common bond through an associational, occupational or 
residential relationship. Prospective clients need to be qualified members before they can take 
advantage of saving or borrowing services from the cooperative (Fried et al., 1993). The 
implication of this unique and voluntary model is that the objective of a typical cooperative 
may not necessarily reflect the standard neoclassical assumption of profit maximization 
theory of a firm. Instead, the objective of the cooperative is to pursue both economic and 
social objectives.  
 
In its simplest form, a financial cooperative is both a producer cooperative and a consumer 
cooperative. It is a producer cooperative when accepting savings from the members, and a 
consumer cooperative when it is providing loans to the members. This suggests that profit 
maximization may not be the main objective since there are no non-members to exploit (Fried 
et al., 1993). As such, SACCOs are treated as if they are seeking to maximize benefits to the 
members, where the maximum benefit is defined as service provision (loans and deposits 
mobilization) subject to resources available and given operating environments.  
 
In the Tanzanian context SACCOs are very diverse in terms of membership, size and 
affiliation. But they all operate under cooperative principles, and are managed by 
democratically selected managers and a board of directors. The limitation of being guided by 
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democratic principles and owned and run by members is that, for small or less diverse 
SACCOs, they may not have a large enough pool of competence and skills to select from 
internally. However, as SACCOs grow bigger and become more diverse, there is an 
increasing tendency to hire external managers and accountants based on their experience and 
competence. As a result their cost of operation may increase due to the premium paid to more 
competent employees. 
 
4.2.2 Review of analytical literature 
Theoretical and empirical literature evaluating organizational performance is dominated by 
the use of frontier models. There are diverse frontier models, including parametric and non-
parametric models. Despite their diversity, they share common characteristics in modelling 
relative efficiency as a quantitative measure of performance. In its simplest version, the 
efficiency of the decision-making unit (DMU) is defined as its ability to produce maximum 
possible output(s) with minimum possible inputs relative to its peers, subject to resource 
constraints and operating environments (Sufian, 2011; Coelli et al., 1996; Banker, Charnes & 
Cooper, 1984). When evaluating the relative efficiency of different firms, the best practice 
frontier function is estimated using the most productive units which share a common 
technology.  
 
The dominant model under the parametric approach is the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA). In the non-parametric approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is widely used in 
the theoretical and empirical literature. The SFA approach assumes the specific production 
function which is then used to map the relationship between the inputs and outputs to estimate 
economic efficiency, which is further decomposed into pure technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency (Fried et al., 1993). The advantage of this approach is its ability to 
control for the stochastic error component in its econometric estimation, but it suffers from 
being data intensive. Another downside of this approach is the possibility of mis-specification 
of the production function and the unresolved issues of the actual probability distribution of 
the random component which may lead to biased results (Drake, 2001). 
 
The DEA method developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) has become an 
increasingly popular approach for efficiency estimation in banking literature. The method 
uses a piecewise linear programming procedure in identifying the empirical production 
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functions based on the actual data. DEA compares all the similar units in a given population 
by taking several dimensions of the output and inputs into account simultaneously. Every unit 
is considered as a DMU which transforms inputs into outputs.  
 
The DEA model developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes abbreviated as CCR (Charnes et 
al., 1978) and the model developed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper or the BCC (Banker et 
al., 1984) are used in this study. The two models are similar except that the BCC model takes 
into account additional constraints to accommodate variable returns to scale. Because of the 
flexibility of DEA and data limitations the current study employs DEA in efficiency 
estimation. It is important to note that DEA has been criticized for generating upward bias of 
the efficiency score. To mitigate this problem Simar and Wilson (2000) proposed the use of a 
bootstrap approach to correct for inherent bias. Section 4.3.1 presents a detailed discussion on 
DEA with bootstrap.  
 
4.2.3 Empirical literature on efficiency estimation 
The focus of the empirical literature here is on DEA studies. DEA has been extensively used 
in modelling efficiency in diverse fields including the banking, microfinance, health and 
agriculture sectors, to mention just a few. According to Lee and Ji (2013) there are over 446 
empirical works which have used the DEA approach, mainly published in operations research, 
management science, production analysis, applied economics, etc. Of interest to this chapter 
is the empirical work on efficiency estimation in the banking and microfinance literature. 
There is extensive empirical research on the efficiency of financial institutions; however most 
of the literature is clustered around the banking sector with limited work on microfinance. 
When assessing the geographical distribution of the existing literature, most of the work is 
skewed towards North America and Europe with some notable work in Asia and Latin 
America but little in the African region. Among others, the existing empirical literature on 
banking performance in North America, Asia and Latin America can be accessed in 
Fukuyama (1993), Berger (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), 
Drake and Hall (2003), Berger (2007), Delis and Papanikolaou (2009), Tahir, Abu Bakar and 
Haron (2009), Saez-Fernandez and Picazo-Tadeo (2011), Sufian (2011) and Charles, Kumar, 
Zegarra and Avolio (2011). 
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In sub-Saharan Africa the empirical work on banking performance focuses on Kenya, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Uganda, and South Africa and some traces in other countries. The most 
comprehensive study which provides a comparative analysis of sub-Saharan African 
commercial banks is the study by Kiyota (2011). However this study focused more on profit 
and cost efficiency using the stochastic frontier approach. Kamau (2011), Aikaeli (2008), 
Oberholzer and van der Westhuizen (2009) and Moffat (2008) investigated the efficiency of 
commercial banks in Kenya, Botswana, Tanzania and South Africa respectively. 
 
Most of the empirical literature on microfinance performance analysis is based on Asia and 
Latin America with some focus on credit unions from North America and the UK (Jayamaha 
& Mula, 2011; Haq et al., 2009; Qayyam & Ahmad, 2006; Gregoriou et al, 2005; Nghiem, 
2004; Fried et al., 1993). The MIX market data set has been a dominant source for most of the 
recent empirical work on microfinance performance (Louis & Baesens, 2013; Arrasen & 
Avouyi-dovi 2013; Haq et al., 2009; Bassem, 2008). Unfortunately the MIX market data does 
not include most of the small microfinance institutions such as saving and credit cooperatives. 
Such structural omission of SACCOs in a MIX Market might be a possible explanation of the 
limited empirical research in this domain due to data problems. The current study tries to 
explore this frontier and makes an attempt in exploring the data challenges and solving the 
existing knowledge gap on the performance of these institutions. 
 
The overall finding from the empirical literature is that the average relative technical 
efficiency of the banking sector ranged between 60%-94% for OECDs (Favero & Papi, 1995; 
Delis & Papanikolaou, 2009). For the sub-Saharan African banking sector, the average 
efficiency ranges from 60%-90% (Kamau, 2011; Moffat, 2008; Aikaeli, 2008; Oberholzer & 
van der Westhuizen, 2009). In the domain of microfinance, the technical average efficiency 
estimates range between 14.5% and 69.0% (Kipesha, 2013; Jayamaha & Mula, 2011; Haq et 
al., 2009).The observed inter and intra region heterogeneity of efficiency scores is expected 
due to the differences in firms’ specific factors and operating environments. Apart from the 
environmental factors, the choice of variables included as inputs and outputs have been 
documented to influence the empirical results on efficiency. More discussions on the different 
approaches which have been used by the previous studies and the justification of the selection 
of the variables in banking literature are presented in the next section. 
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4.2.4 Specification of inputs and outputs 
The specification of inputs and outputs in efficiency modelling is an important decision to be 
considered. In banking literature there are three major approaches which are useful in guiding 
the specification of inputs and outputs (Nghiem, 2004; Qayyum & Ahmad, 2006; Moffat, 
2008): production, intermediation and assets based. Under the production approach, financial 
institutions are considered as the producers of deposits and loans. The number of employees 
and capital expenditures are important inputs in this approach. The second approach considers 
financial institutions as intermediaries, and as such they have the responsibility of transferring 
financial assets from the savers (surplus unit) to the investors (deficit unit). In this approach 
the inputs can be defined as labour, capital cost and interest payable on deposits, while the 
loans and financial investments are considered as outputs. Finally under the assets approach it 
is assumed that the basic function of any financial institution is the creation of credit (loans), 
and the value of assets of financial institutions acts as output. 
 
Depending on the approach adopted, the choice of the inputs and outputs may be different 
(Moffat, 2008; Drake and Hall, 2003), and the empirical results may be sensitive to the choice 
of inputs and outputs. Favero and Papi (1995) posit that there is no simple solution to the 
problem of input and output specification since reasonable arguments can be made in all the 
approaches. Hence, the nature of the study and data availability plays a significant role in the 
final choice of the input and output variables. Since the intermediation approach closely 
matches the main objective of SACCOs, i.e. mobilizing savings and offering loans, this study 
adopts the intermediation approach in selecting the inputs and outputs. The choice of the 
intermediation approach for this study is also partly influenced by the data issues. In the 
intermediation approach SACCOs are treated as financial intermediaries between the savers 
and borrowers. They seek to maximize the outputs (total loans and other incomes) given the 
input levels: deposit, labour and capital (Sufian, 2011). 
 
Another challenge of efficiency estimation is the choice of the orientation, that is, input or 
output orientation. Input orientation has been recommended for cost minimization focused 
policies, while output orientation has been recommended for impact maximization policies 
(Cooper, Seiford & Zhu., 2011). On the other hand it is argued that the orientation choice 
must be made according to the quantities of inputs and outputs that the managers are able to 
control (Coelli et al., 2005). In our case, managers are more able to control the inputs 
(personnel, total assets and total costs) than the outputs (demand for loans and returns on 
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assets) which are subject to external market forces. Therefore, in this study we adopted the 
input orientation and intermediation approach. 
 
4.3 Methodology  
4.3.1 Estimation technique 
DEA is used for estimation under constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale 
assumption. Basically, DEA derives the data envelopment surface by joining those points in 
the input–output space such that it is no longer possible to produce more output with the same 
input or the same output with less input. In the case of constant returns to scale the frontier 
will be linear, and for variable returns to scale the frontier will be convex hull (Luzzi & 
Webber, 2006; McKillop, Glass and Ferguson, 2002; Favero and Papi, 1995). Once the data 
envelopment surface is established it is then used as a benchmark to measure the relative 
efficiency or inefficiency of all other firms outside the envelopment surface.  
 
Technical efficiency is estimated by measuring the ratio of the distance between a reference 
point’s distance to constant returns to scale frontier and an inefficient firm’s distance from the 
same frontier. The distance measured can be either in the input space or output space 
depending on input orientation. It is possible to decompose technical efficiency into scale 
efficiency and “pure” technical efficiency (Lee & Ji, 2013). Pure technical efficiency (PTE) is 
measured as the ratio of the distance between inefficient points to variable returns to scale 
(VRS) efficient frontier. Also a firm may be further categorized into the three scale 
categories: increasing returns to scale, decreasing returns to scale, or constant returns to scale. 
 
In a multiple outputs and inputs settings with large number of firms, DEA can be formulated 
either as constrained maximization or minimization objective function under the general 
framework of linear programming. Since the maximization (multipliers) formulation is 
cumbersome to solve numerically, the alternative minimization (dual) formulation is often 
used because it is mathematically tractable (Coelli et al., 2005). The study used the 
minimization approach but for completeness both maximization and minimization problems 
are illustrated below.  
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First the key notations are defined, and then followed by the mathematical presentation of the 
optimization problem. Assume there are data on N inputs and M outputs on each of I firms. 
Let xi and qi represent inputs and outputs for i-th firms respectively. The N*I input matrix, X, 
and M*I output matrix, Q, represents the data from all I firms. The DEA problem is to obtain 
the optimal solution of the weighted sum of outputs over inputs, such as u’qi/v’xi, where u is 
M*1vector of outputs weights and v is N*1 vector of inputs weights. The optimal weight is 
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Using duality in linear programming the maximization problem can be derived into the 
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where   is the efficiency score of ith firm; q is column vector of outputs, Q is M*I output 
matrix; x is column vector of inputs and X is N*I input matrix for all DMUs and 
 
is I*1 
vector of weighting coefficients. Following Coelli et al. (2005), this study uses the 
minimization approach due to its mathematical tractability. 
 
The value of   computed is the efficiency score for the corresponding DMU. It ranges from 0 
to 1 with the value of 1 indicating a point on the efficiency frontier and hence a technically 
efficient DMU. All efficient firms will be connected by a continuous locus to form an 
efficient frontier. The efficiency score for every DMU will be measured by how far it deviates 
from the frontier.  
 
The conventional DEA technique specified above is still widely used in the empirical 
literature, however it suffers from several criticisms. The major criticism about the standard 
DEA approach is the lack of statistical properties of the estimated efficiency which may lead 
to biased DEA estimates (Wijesiri, Viganò & Meoli, 2015; Simar & Wilson, 2000). The point 
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estimates for efficiency generated by the standard DEA model fails to elaborate discussion on 
the uncertainty surrounding the estimates due to sampling variation (Simar & Wilson, 2000). 
To address the lack of statistical properties, Simar and Wilson (2000) in their seminal paper 
proposed a homogeneous bootstrap algorithm. The algorithm is based on the bootstrap 
approach (Efron, 1979) by repeatedly simulating the data generating process and applying the 
original estimator in each simulated sample. Then the empirical distribution of resampled 
estimates can be used to generate the bootstrap confidence interval (Wijesiri et al., 2015; 
Simar & Wilson, 2000; Lothgren, 1998). We estimated both standard DEA and DEA with 
bootstrap approach but for consistency only bias corrected results will be presented in detail 
and interpreted. When necessary, standard DEA results will be presented for comparison 
purposes only. 
 
After estimating efficiency scores, one sample t test is used to test if average technical 
efficiency, scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency scores were statistically significantly 
different from 1. Since the efficiency scores may be exhibiting positive skewness, the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (a non-parametric alternative of the one sample t test) is used to 
check the robustness of the results. The efficiency estimation process was implemented in R 
version 3.1 using the FEAR programme. The rest of the analysis was conducted using 
STATA version 11. 
 
The data sets were further decomposed into four quartiles based on the loan size to probe the 
variation of efficiency scores across different firm sizes. Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical 
Efficiency and Scale Efficiency scores were evaluated in each quartile. The median spline 
plot was used to plot the median scores of technical efficiency over different loan sizes. The 
box plot was used to study the distribution of different efficiency scores in each quartile.  
 
4.3.2 Data source 
The study used secondary data from annual audited financial statements for 2011. The 
auditing is done on an annual basis by the government agency called Cooperative Auditing 
and Supervisory Cooperation (COASCO). The major objective of the auditing is for 
supervision and regulatory purpose by a third party. While the original data was not collected 
for performance evaluation, it provides rich information based on the financial statements 
which could be leveraged for performance evaluation.  
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The data was collected during November 2012 – March 2013, at which time this was the 
latest audited financial statement data available. The SACCOs included in the study were 
from four regions
5
: Dar Es Salaam, Mwanza, Kilimanjaro and Arusha. In total the information 
from 139 SACCOs was collected but only 103 had complete information and was used in the 
analysis. The key variables extracted from financial statements are: Total Cost, Total Fixed 
Assets (a proxy for capital), Total Deposits, Total Revenue and Total Loan Portfolio, all in 
TZS. The first three variables were used as inputs and the last two were used as outputs in the 
analysis. Table 4.1 provides a detailed breakdown per region. 
 
According to Charnes and Cooper (1990), the rule of the thumb suggests that the minimum 
sample size required for DEA is three times the sum of total number of inputs (X) and the 
total number of outputs (Y), that is, N = (s+m) *3 where s is the total number of inputs and m 
is the total number of outputs. Further empirical studies using simulation data demonstrated 
that as the sample size increases, the DEA frontier converges to a true relative efficient 
frontier for a specific industry under study. The improvement follows a negative exponential 
trend with the optimal sample size being between 50-160 observations (Zhang & Bartels, 
1998). Based on this literature our sample size is considered reasonable for DEA. 
 
4.4 Empirical results and discussion 
Results reported in the rest of the thesis are based on bias corrected results, but for 
completeness the conventional and bias corrected efficiency scores are reported in Table 
A.4.1 of the Appendix.  
 
Descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation) are presented in Table 
4.1 for total loans, total expenditure, total deposits, total revenue and total assets. In the lower 
part of the table the ratio of average total deposit, average total revenue and average total 
expenditure to average total loans is presented in the last column. Such a proportion is useful 
                                                     
5
 The four regions were selected based on the concentration of SACCOs with audited financial statements. By 
law all SACCOs should be audited by the Cooperative Auditing and Supervisory Corporation (COASCO). 
However in practice less than 10% of 5,300 SACCOs are audited countrywide. COASCO is severely constrained 
in terms of manpower and financial resources. Due to these challenges, the regions were ranked according to 
total number of audited SACCOs. All SACCOs with audited financial statement were included in all the top four 
regions. We considered SACCOs with audited financial statement because of the data consistency and feasibility 
of the study. We couldn’t feasibly collect data from four regions due to time, logistical challenge due to 
geographical dispersion of the regions, and financial constraints. In total the four regions constitute 32% (1,717) 
of the total audited SACCOs in the country. The remaining 70% are spread across more than 18 regions. 
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for checking the percentage of external funding and the percentage of total cost to loan 
portfolio. Based on the summary statistics, the average total loan portfolio outstanding during 
2011 was TZS 869 million. The average total deposits and total expenditure are 555 million 
and 61.2 million respectively. The percentage of the average deposit to average loans is 64%, 
implying that on average about 36% of the total outstanding loans is being financed by 
external funding sources. It is also important to note that on average SACCOs’ total 
expenditure is around 7% of their loan portfolio. 
 














       Arusha 25 22 518 729 3.5 2,540 
Dar Es Salaam  85  57  1,120  1,430 0.94 7,460 
Kilimanajaro  11  10  491  567 11.7 1,700 
Mwanza  17  14  656  779 18.8 2,010 














869 1,190 0.94 7,460 
Other Assets 
 
126 243 1.50 1,590 
Total Deposits 
 
555 1,020 2.05 7,160 
Total Revenue 
 
116 154 0.26  813 
Total Expenditure 
 
61.20 94.90 0.46  586 
 
Note: Upper table used data from all SACCOs and lower table used data from only 103 SACCOs with 
complete data 
Source: Computed by author 
 
The efficiency scores (technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and 
returns to scale classifications) were estimated for each firm. The ideal situation is to have all 
three efficiency scores as close as possible to one. In the case of returns to scale the desirable 
situation is to have as many firms as possible under constant returns to scale space.  
 
A firm is said to be technically efficient if it produces maximum outputs at the minimum 
possible inputs compared to its peers. The technical efficiency (TE) scores are further 
decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). The 
decomposition provides more insights into the sources of inefficiencies. Pure technical 
efficiency measures how a SACCO utilizes the resources to produce output under exogenous 
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environments. Scale efficiency measures whether the SACCOs are operating at their optimal 
scale. The returns to scale helps determine whether the SACCOs have been operating at the 
most productive scale size (constant returns to scale), increasing returns to scale (IRS) or 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). The performance ranking is reported based on the 
composite efficiency score (Technical Efficiency). 
 
To make sense of the individual scores the results were aggregated into average scores for 
technical, pure technical and scale efficiency as reported in Table 4.2. The results under the 
conventional approach of efficiency estimates reveal that 9 firms were technically fully 
efficient (had a score of 100% under technical efficiency), 24 firms had a score of 100% 
under pure technical efficiency, and 14 firms had a score of 100% under scale efficiency. The 
average technical efficiency score is about 42%. However after correcting for bias none of the 
SACCOs are technically efficient under both pure and technical efficiency. Only 10 SACCOs 
achieved 100% scale efficiency. This implies that on average the SACCOs only needed 32% 
of the inputs currently in use to produce the same amount of output after correcting for bias. 
The estimated average efficiency score is relatively low compared to what is observed in the 
banking industry in Tanzania (about 80%) as reported in Aikaeli (2008). However, average 
efficiency scores reported here are higher than Tanzanian microfinance efficiency score of 
14.5% as reported by Kipesha (2013) using MIX market dataset. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of efficiency estimates with total number of DMUs  
Item Standard Estimate Bootstrap Estimates 
Number of DMUs 
 
103 103 
Number of Efficient DMUs under  TE 9 0 
 
PTE 24 0 
 
SE 14 10 
Average  TE 0.42 0.32 
 
PTE 0.52 0.43 
 
SE 0.76 0.77 
% of DMUs in the Returns to Scale  CRS 7.8%  10% 
 







IRS 76.7%  64% 
Note: TE is technical efficiency, PTE is pure technical efficiency, Scale is scale efficiency score, CRS 
is constant returns to scale, DRS is decreasing returns to scale; IRS is increasing returns to scale 
 
Our results are quite close to the findings from cooperative rural banks reported in the study 
of Jayamaha and Mula (2011) for Sri Lanka. Jayamaha and Mula found that the average 
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technical efficiency scores dropped from 66% during 2003 to 53.2% in 2005. The decline was 
mainly attributed to decreasing pure technical efficiency because the scale efficiency recorded 
positive growth during the same period. When compared with the results reported by Haq et 
al. (2009) using MIX market data for developing countries using an intermediation approach 
(47%), the performance of SACCOs seems to be relatively lower. On other hand our results 
are better than the recent SACCOs results reported by Tesfamariam, Tesfay and Tesfay 
(2013) in which they found the average technical efficiency of Ethiopian rural SACCOs to be 
21.3%.  
 
The percentage distribution of SACCOs across constant returns to scale (CRS-optimal scale), 
increasing return to scale (IRS-too small) and decreasing returns to scale (DRS-too large) is 
presented on the lower part of Table 4.2. In fact about 90% are operating in sub-optimal scale, 
that is, either they are too small or too large when the bias is corrected. Only 10% of SACCOs 
are operating in the optimal scale while 28% firms were operating beyond the optimal scale 
after correcting for the bias. From a policy and managerial perspective this means that those 
firms operating below the optimal scale may need to scale up and those operating beyond 
their optimal scale may need to improve their performance by scaling down.  
 
When efficiency scores were tested to see if they were significantly different from one as 
reported in Table 4.3, all the three efficiency measures were found to be significantly lower 
than one. This implies that on average the industry is operating below the desired efficiency 
level as demonstrated by the negative and significant test statistics based on both one sample t 
test and one sample Wilcoxon signed rank test approach. In an effort to understand the 
sources of the inefficiency, TE scores were decomposed into PTE and SE. When comparing 
the magnitude of t statistics, on average the SE seems to be relatively good compared to PTE. 
This is in line with the results reported in Table 4.2 with average scores of 32%, 55% and 
77% for technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies respectively after correcting for the 
bias. This implies that most of the inefficiency is contributed by inefficient allocation of the 
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Table 4.3: Parameter estimates for hypothesis testing on efficiency scores  
 
T test (one sample)  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Text 
Variable  Test Statistics Pvalue  Test Statistics Pvalue 
TE -33 < 0.0001  -8.81 < 0.0001 
PTE -26 < 0.0001  -8.81 < 0.0001 
SCALE -9 < 0.0001  -8.72 < 0.0001 
Note: The left hand panel of the table represents one sample t test results for different 
efficiency scores and the right hand panel represents one sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test of efficiency scores  
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the behaviour of TE across firm size using loan size as a measure of 
DMUs. The results show that TE follows an inverted U shape with two optimal solutions. The 
first sub-optimal solution is the first half of the inverted U curve, which represents the 
SACCOs whose loan size is below 1 billion (65%). The second sub-optimal solution 
represents the SACCOs whose loan size is above 1 billion. The implication of these results is 
that on average medium-sized firms and larger firms are more likely to be efficient, while 
smaller firms and very large firms are likely to be inefficient.  
 
However, the relationship between efficiency and size seems to be non-linear in nature. The 
possible explanation of the observed inverted U shape is that the small firms may be incurring 
higher fixed costs in offering the services and may not afford to attract the best talents in 
running their operations effectively. On the other hand relatively large firms are more likely 
to operate in diseconomies of scale and suffer stiff competition with commercial banks. As 
pointed out by Coase (1937), large firms are more likely to suffer from resource 
misallocation, planning cost and cost of lack of motivation by the employee. Based on the 
results reported in Figure 4.1, the optimal firm size seems to range between TZS 2.5 billion to 
TZS 6 billion. The range is wide which implies that, contrary to neoclassical economic 
theory, there is no single optimal point but there is a band of points which stretches between 
the ranges specified above.  




Figure 4.1: Median spline of technical efficiency scores across sizes of SACCOs 
 
Our findings are in line with McConnell and Stigler’s illustration of the cost minimization 
curve of the firms in reality (cited in Canbäck, Samouel & Price, 2006). According to 
Canbäck et al. (2006), such a cost curve with a wide range of optimal output reconciles with 
several real world observations. The implication from such an inverted U-shaped efficiency 
curve with a stretched “saddle point” is the possibility of a wide range of output levels which 
can be produced within that range for which the unit cost per output is somewhat constant. 
This implies that small, medium and large SACCOs can co-exist at the same time without 
compromising on efficiency and competitiveness. However, when the firm is too small or too 
large, it may become counterproductive. Such flexibility is particularly important in SACCOs 
because they can easily converge to their maximum growth capacity due to their upper ceiling 
resulting from their inherent localized operations and ownership structure. 
 
When the technical efficiency score is decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency it becomes apparent that the major source of inefficiency emanates from PTE rather 
than SE. While there is room for improvement for SE, the need for improvement in PTE is 
even more critical. To understand how the three efficiency scores are distributed across the 
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A close look at Figure 4.2 reveals that the TE score mimics a weak U shape. The U shape can 
be inferred by loosely connecting the median point of the corresponding box plot of the TE of 
each quartile. The observed U shape implies that the smaller firms and larger firms are 
relatively more efficient than the medium firms using loan quartiles as classification of firm 
size. The fourth quartile has the highest TE scores as demonstrated by the median scores in 
the box plot. The results for PTE show the same pattern but with a more pronounced U shape, 
with the fourth quartile almost fully efficient. This demonstrates that smaller firms and large 
firms are leading by efficiently utilizing the inputs under their disposal to produce the same 
amount of outputs. In contrast, the SE shows an inverted U shape. This can be observed by 
loosely connecting the median point of each corresponding box plot. The third quartile has the 
highest SE score followed by the fourth quartile. Based on the observed behaviour for SE it 
appears that the optimal scale size for SACCOs is within the third quartile. Comparing the 
results from Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it appears that the inverted U shape results demonstrated by 
the TE scores are mainly influenced by SE.  
 
The breakdown of firm size by quartile reveals a very interesting pattern which may have 
important managerial and public policy implications. The observation that pure TE scores are 
higher in smaller firms (quartile 1) and larger firms (quartile 4) is critical. The implication of 
this observation is that as firms grow in size they start struggling with internal managerial 
challenges and this makes them become inefficient in allocating their inputs to produce the 
maximum possible outputs. In the context of SACCOs the results may support the practice 
whereas as SACCOs grow bigger they tend to shift from using member-based managerial 
skills to hiring external managers. However, they can afford to hire managers of a certain skill 
and education level which can be outgrown by the managerial challenges of the organization 
as it grows further. The process remains iterative and depends on SACCOs’ financial muscle 
to compensate, attract and retain appropriate candidates for the position. 
 




Note: bc in Figure 4.2 above stands for bias corrected technical (TE), pure technical 
(PTE) and scale (Scale) efficiency respectively. The isolated dots represent outlier 
observations; the diamond sign indicates the median. If our efficiency scores were 
normal, the line (the median) would be in the middle of the box (the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, Q1 and Q3) and the ends of the whiskers (the upper and lower adjacent 
values, which are the most extreme values which within Q3+1.5(Q3-Q1) and Q1-
1.5*(Q3-Q1) respectively) would be equidistant from the box. But box plots for our 
efficiency scores show positive skew (TE) and negative skew (SE and PTE) i.e. the 
median is pulled to the low end and upper end of the box respectively. 
Figure 4.2: Box plot for Technical Efficiency (TE), Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) and 
Scale Efficiency (SE) scores across different categories of loan size 
 
Furthermore, while people with low levels of education and financial literacy can manage to 
lead small SACCOs well, a slight increase in size may outgrow their managerial capacity. A 
corollary of this argument is that, as the firm grows beyond a certain threshold, in our case as 
they move from quartile 3 to quartile 4, their financial muscle increases, the total number of 
their members’ increases and diversity increases. The interaction of these factors is likely to 
generate a new complex pattern which may lead to strong oversight, more willingness to hire 
external managers to manage the organization, and an increased ability to afford such 
services. This may possibly explain the observed higher scores of PTE in the fourth quartile. 
Also as firms grow bigger, they tend to improve their SE by cutting down per unit cost, as 
would be predicted by neoclassical economic theory. However, such scale advantage occurs 
only up to a point, beyond which it starts to become self-destructive. Based on our results, the 
optimal scale is reached in quartile three as demonstrated by Figure 4.2. 
 
 Further analysis demonstrates that the optimal scale advantage can be reached as low as TZS 
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side, the optimal PTE is achieved around TZS 2.3 billion and there is little gain beyond this 
point (see Figure 4.3) 
  
Figure 4.3: The median spline plot for PTE and SE score over the loan size 
 
The observed declining efficiency in large SACCOs despite the highest scores of PTE is 
rather surprising. The possible explanation may be that, as SACCOs grow larger, they are 
likely to become more specialized and start attracting the lower end of the middle income 
clients and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). By operating in such a space, 
they are exposed to a stiff competitive environment with the sophisticated commercial banks. 
If this happens they are likely to lose through at least two channels. The first channel is that 
commercial banks are highly sophisticated and enjoy economies of scale which are relatively 
superior to those of large SACCOs. The second channel is that since the large SACCOs are 
attracting clients on the bottom of middle income clients and MSMEs, they are more likely to 
succumb to the riskier segment in this income category. If this happens, it means that large 
SACCOs are likely to increase their loans portfolio but with more risky clients.  
 
4.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
This chapter investigated the technical efficiency of 103 saving and credit cooperatives from 
Tanzania. The data used were collected from audited financial statements of 2011. The 
intermediation approach and input orientation was employed within a Data Envelopment 
Analysis framework to estimate efficiency scores in terms of technical efficiency, scale 
efficiency and pure technical efficiency. The empirical findings show that the average 
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efficiency was 77%. Most firms are struggling with how to efficiently utilize their resources 
to maximize outputs. Smaller firms and larger firms seem to suffer from lack of economies of 
scale and diseconomies of scale respectively, while medium SACCOs experienced a 
significant increase in scale efficiency but a significant decrease in technical efficiency. 
Medium firms struggle with how to effectively manage and make effective decisions in 
resource allocation. Large SACCOs experienced high levels of technical efficiency but 
seemed to struggle with the scale problem. Large SACCOs may be exposed to a more 
competitive market space where they are forced to compete with large commercial banks. The 
majority of SACCOs (90%) were operating in the sub-optimal scale. About 28% and 64% of 
the SACCOs were operating at decreasing and increasing returns to scale respectively. This 
implies that about 28% of the SACCOs were too large to operate efficiently and about 64% of 
the SACCOs were too small to operate efficiently. Since only SACCOs with audited financial 
statements were included in our study, there is a possibility of self-selection bias, therefore 
our results may not be generalized to SACCOs without audited financial statements. 
 
The policy implication of our findings is grouped into regulatory and management 
dimensions. The regulators (Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
Cooperative Banks, Cooperatives Audit and Supervisory Corporation) and academia need to 
work closely with SACCOs to create a supporting environment for small SACCOs to increase 
their size and managerial capacity. This may include the design of an in-service certificate 
course in SACCO management and accounting to improve managerial capacity and 
competence, constant monitoring and supervision, technical support and wholesale lending to 
increase their size of operations. There is a great potential for recruiting potential managers 
from cooperative universities that have a diverse portfolio of programs for cooperatives and 
business studies. 
 
In terms of SACCOs’ management, they need to be more careful in the way they manage 
their inputs in producing the outputs. With a better usage of available resources there is room 
to improve technical efficiency by 68%. Small SACCOs operating in the increasing return to 
scale space may wish to merge with other smaller ones or with larger and efficient ones. With 
the introduction of mobile banking such as M-Pesa it should be easy to operate satellite 
offices virtually. Such technological innovations may be adopted by merged SACCOs to 
reduce overhead costs but still maintain accessibility. Large SACCOs may need to spin out 
(demerger) since they have grown too big for efficient operation. Another option is for large 
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SACCOs to merge with a commercial bank and operate as a microfinance satellite branch of a 
commercial bank. 
 
Future studies may wish to upscale the study to widen both the geographical coverage and 
non-audited SACCOs. This will help to validate the study using more data. If data allows it 













5.1 Introduction  
The poor, who constitute the majority of the population in developing countries, are always 
excluded from mainstream banking. Financial exclusion from the classical banking system in 
sub-Saharan Africa is about 88%, and for countries such as Tanzania it is about 90% (CGAP, 
2013; FinScope, 2009). To bridge this financing gap, microfinance has emerged as a powerful 
tool for poverty alleviation through increased financial access to the poor. While the surge of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) has been unprecedented in the past three decades, their 
performance and sustainability is still a contentious debate. Maybe the most authoritative 
statement during our time is that by Jonathan Morduch (2000) in his paper on microfinance, 
where he argues that less than 1% of MFIs are sustainable and no more than 5% will ever be. 
While the statement was issued in the context of NGOs and donor-funded MFIs, it shed some 
light on the challenges facing the industry in general. However, the empirical research done 
by Gonzalez (2005) using MIX market data shows that at least 50% of MFIs become 
sustainable after 5-10 years of operation. Based on this controversy in the literature, it is clear 
that more empirical work is needed to investigate the performance and sustainability of 
different microfinance schemes.  
 
This chapter focuses on empirical estimation of financial sustainability and profitability of 
SACCOs in line with objective two as articulated in Section 1.6 and the need for multiple 
performance measurements as alluded in Section 3.3.2. The chapter employs the same dataset 
described in Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4) to explore the profitability and sustainability of 
SACCOs and extend the existing empirical debate on the performance and sustainability of 
microfinance. SACCOs (credit unions) are a special type of microfinance institution which 
are governed by democratic principles: the members are the owners and users of the service. 
The interest in this group of microfinance is fourfold: first, the institutions have recorded 
explosive growth in the past two decades, which makes one wonder whether they are on the 
                                                     
6
 This chapter has been accepted for publication as an empirical paper in the International Journal of Social 
Economics and Economic Research South Africa working paper series No: 529 available on online at 
http://www.econrsa.org/publications/working-papers/financial-sustainability-tanzanian-saving-and-credit-
cooperatives. 
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stairway to economic heaven or on the highway to financial crisis. In other words, is it a long-
lived innovative growth in microfinance or a boom which is going to burst? Second, in the 
past the Tanzanian government exerted excessive political interference in the cooperative 
movement which dwarfed their performance and led to the collapse of the sector (Maghimbi, 
2010; URT, 2002). However, since the 1990s a new wave of cooperatives, including 
SACCOs which are less subject to political pressure and intervention, has emerged, but there 
is a dearth of empirical literature on their performance. Third, the unique ownership and 
governance structure based on social capital within SACCOs is likely to moderate the 
behaviour of both borrowers and savers, which may in turn lead to a superior performance 
outcome compared to standard microfinance. Fourth, the empirical literature on the 
performance of financial cooperatives in Africa is scanty. Thus, the motive behind this study 
is to understand how SACCOs perform and whether they are sustainable. This chapter 
extends Chapter 4 by looking into another dimension of performance measures which look 
into the long-term longevity of the operations of financial cooperatives. 
 
Understanding the performance and sustainability of SACCOs is important for two reasons: it 
is a necessary condition for institutional longevity and lasting services to the poor, and it is an 
important barometer for researchers, policy-makers, regulators and shareholders in guiding 
the industry in the desired direction. Therefore the objective of this study is to estimate 
profitability and financial sustainability of SACCOs in Tanzania. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First it provides the context of the study focusing on the 
role of finance in economic growth and the existing credit market failure by a conventional 
banking system. Section 5.3 presents both a theoretical and empirical literature review on 
microfinance sustainability. The methodology is presented in Section 5.4, followed by the 
results and a discussion in Section 5.5. The conclusion and recommendations are presented in 
Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Context  
It is acknowledged that access to finance plays a significant role in economic growth and 
development by efficiently channelling resources from the surplus unit to deficit units. More 
importantly, it plays a key role in the provision of the capital necessary for starting and 
expanding businesses, and innovating and reducing unnecessary transaction costs 
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(Marwa,2014b; King & Levine, 1993a,b; Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Odedokun, 1998). 
Further literature shows that access to financial services can increase household welfare 
through the increased ability to accumulate assets, unlocking their productivity potential and 
an increasing capability to deal with risks (Akpandjar, Quartey & Abor, 2013; Dercon et al., 
2006; Wangwe, 2004). Yet the majority of the economically active population is excluded 
from mainstream financial services in most developing countries. In Tanzania about 90% of 
the population is excluded from the mainstream banking sector (FinScope, 2009).  
 
Such market failure in the mainstream financial institutions can be explained partly by credit 
rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Luzzi & Webber, 2006; Mwakajumilo, 2011) and partly by 
inherently risky environments facing the poor. The major reasons for such exclusion 
advanced by mainstream financial institutions are high transaction cost per borrower, lack of 
collateral, information opacity, high risk of default, and low rate of cost recovery (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981; Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Mori, Richard, Isaack & Olomi, 2009; Beck, 
2007; ACCA, 2009). As a result of such failure in financial markets there has been a 
financing void for the poor and their microenterprises in most developing countries. 
 
In response to such financial market failure, microfinance institutions have emerged as an 
alternative solution by targeting the poor through innovative lending approaches, including 
group lending, progressive lending, regular repayment schedules, and collateral substitutes 
(Thapa, 2006). Tanzanian saving and credit cooperatives in particular have gained popularity 
recently as one of the fastest growing microfinance institutions. Despite the existing view that 
these institutions suffer from high transaction costs due to their small size and their exposure 
to relatively high risk clients, saving and credit cooperatives have recorded unprecedented 
growth during the past 15 years. Their growth in numbers has surged from 803 in 2000 to 
5,400 during 2013, their membership increased by 584%, and savings increased by 1780% in 
the same period (BOT, 2013; MAFC, 2013). According to industry experts from Tanzania’s 
Ministry of Cooperatives, the growth is a mixture of organic growth and the increased supply 
of loanable funds targeting SACCOs by pension funds, commercial banks and government 
agencies. Such a high growth rate, especially in the last 10 years, calls for rigorous scrutiny of 
their performance and sustainability. 
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SACCOs are owned and operated by members based on democratic principles. A typical 
SACCO in Tanzania has more than 20 members bonded together by community or 
occupational bonds. The service is offered only to members who usually start by saving 
before they are qualified to borrow. The current industry consensus is that a member is 
allowed to borrow up to three his/her total investments (through saving or/and shares) to the 
organization. Some SACCOs limit it to two times total investments. The main composition of 
their funding is from members saving, members’ equity and loans from other financial 
services and pension funds. The unique ownership and governance model of these institutions 
exposes them to unique opportunities and challenges.  
 
The opportunities which come along with this type of business model include information 
advantage and peer monitoring which help to mitigate the default risk. Because the members 
are the active participants and owners of the organization, the business is run like a family 
business which may lead to unique social structures which may have a positive impact on 
members’ loyalty. On the other side, the key challenges are that growth of these institutions 
may be limited and jeopardize the potential gains from economies of scale. Small SACCOs 
may also be limited in terms of the talent diversity and managerial capacity to run the 
business properly (McKillop & Wilson, 2011).  
 
5.3 Literature review and theoretical framework 
5.3.1 Objectives of financial cooperatives   
Cooperative organizations are member-based organizations governed by democratic 
principles. The members decide on a voluntary basis to join the organization of their choice 
with common goals of achieving both economic and social objectives. Normally the members 
are owners and users of the services with a common bond such as associational, professional 
or residential (Fried et al., 1993). The implication of this model is that the objectives of a 
typical cooperative may not necessarily reflect the typical profit maximization objective under 
the neoclassical theory of the firm (Fried et al., 1993). Since these members are owners and 
users of the service sharing a common bond, it is likely that they know each other and operate 
based on trust and social capital: they treat the business as a family business which dampens 
the problem of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Thus it is expected that transaction 
costs of financial cooperatives would be lower than in standard microfinance institutions. 
Normally, the members of SACCOs can only borrow between two and three times their 
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deposits, thus the loan offered is at least 33% secured which also reduces the credit risk 
significantly. 
 
According to principle number 7 of the seven principles
7
 guiding cooperatives, these 
institutions are supposed to offer sustainable development services for their communities 
through the policies approved by the members (CDA, 2014), thus they focus on both 
economic and social development. This unique business model of financial cooperatives 
comes with both opportunities and challenges. Opportunities emanate from the common bond 
and common goals through shared values, understanding and social capital which make the 
members feel like insiders of the organization. According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000) in 
their work on identity economics, when members of the organizations feel that they belong to 
an organization and own part of the organization, as “insiders” they behave differently 
compared to “outsiders”. Behavioural economics predicts that “insiders” are likely to go the 
extra mile to protect and patronize the interest of the organization (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). 
Based on this prediction we expect that ceteris paribus the performance of SACCOs is likely 
to be superior to that of standard microfinance organizations. However, SACCOs operate in 
an institutional context which is less favourable than standard MFIs in terms of size, client 
segments, transaction size, location, and management quality, which may impose extra costs 
and jeopardize performance and sustainability. 
 
These organizational structures come with certain challenges: since they are joined by a 
common bond they may be excessively exposed to a systematic risk due to the homogeneity 
of the members. Also, the common bond may be a stumbling block toward further growth and 
may negatively affect the gains from economies of scale and their ability to garner a 
significant talent pool for management and oversight of the institution. 
 
5.3.2 Sustainability concepts  
Sustainability is defined as the ability of an entity to continue a defined behaviour indefinitely 
(Filene, 2011). In other words, it is the ability of an organization to meet its goals or target 
over the long term. In the context of financial institutions and for firms, this requires private 
                                                     
7
 The seven principles of cooperatives are: 1.Voluntary and open membership, 2. Democratic member control, 3. 
Members’ economic participation, 4. Autonomy and independence, 5. Education, training and information, 6. 
Cooperation among cooperatives, 7. Concern for community. See https://www.ncba.coop/7-cooperative-
principles for details of these principles. 
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profitability: a return on equity (ROE), net of subsidy that exceeds the private opportunity 
cost of resources (Schreiner & Yaron, 1999). Self-sustainability can be measured in terms of 
both financial and economic sustainability. Financial sustainability means the smooth 
operation of financial institutions with the necessary profitability, having adequate liquidity to 
overcome any challenges of bankruptcy. In other words, financial sustainability means that 
the SACCO is able to cover all its present costs and the costs incurred in growth, if it expands. 
Economic sustainability can be gauged from an easily quantifiable proxy of the impact of 
microfinance on low income group financial intermediation in lieu of a full cost benefit 
analysis (Yaron, Benjamin & Charitonenko, 1998).  
 
The term ‘sustainability’ has broad dimensions, including financial sustainability, institutional 
sustainability, mission sustainability, programme sustainability, human resource 
sustainability, market sustainability, legal policy environmental sustainability, and impact 
sustainability (Sa-Dhan, 2010). A concise and detailed explanation of these concepts is 
presented in Sa-Dhan (2010). Despite the importance of each component of sustainability, this 
study will focus on financial and operational sustainability of SACCOs due to data 
availability and the role which financial sustainability plays on other sustainability measures, 
at least in the short run (Sa-Dhan, 2010).  
 
5.3.3 Sustainability of microfinance institutions 
The contemporary debate on financial sustainability in microfinance institutions is dominated 
by the welfare and institutional schools of thought on whether it should be a performance 
indicator or not. The welfare proponents argue that microfinance was established to reduce 
poverty through empowering the poorest of the economically active poor (Nyamsogoro, 2010; 
Brau & Woller, 2004), therefore their success should be measured based on the depth of their 
outreach (how many poor clients they are able to reach). Thus, the proponents of the welfare 
approach put less emphasis on the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions. They 
argue that if more emphasis is devoted to financial sustainability it may lead to a trade-off on 
depth of outreach by serving richer and less risky clients and charging high interest rates. 
They suggest that the social objective should be a priority and if there is a loss made during 
operation, the government, social investors and the donor community should balance it 
(Woller, Dunford & Warner, 1999).  
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Based on this thinking, financial sustainability is not treated as one of the major goals. The 
critics of the approach argue that donor funds are volatile and unsustainable and that ignoring 
financial sustainability may erode the quality of the revolving fund and jeopardize the future 
availability of the service. The implication is that if financial sustainability is not one of the 
major goals, microfinance institutions may collapse in the long run: as Schreiner (2000:425) 
says, “unsustainable microfinance might help the poor now, but they will not help the poor in 
the future because they will be gone”. 
 
Proponents of the institutional approach argue that the main objective of microfinance is to 
create sustainable financial intermediation for the poor. Their argument is founded on the 
understanding that sustainable microfinance will provide lasting services to the poor and 
deepen the financial system (Nyamsogoro, 2010; Brau & Woller, 2004; Woller et al., 1999). 
But the critics of this approach argue that emphasizing financial sustainability may lead to 
mission drift by microfinance moving away from the social objective of poverty reduction 
(Aubert, Janvry & Sadoulet, 2009; Copestake, 2007).  
 
Despite the disagreement between the two views on the success indicators of microfinance, 
recent debates are oriented towards financial sustainability and commercial viability of 
microfinance institutions (Nyamsogoro, 2010; Schreiner, 2000; Havers, 1996). The shift is 
driven by the fact that sustainable microfinance is able to attract funds from the markets, 
increase in size, enjoy economies of scale and widen their outreach. Also, if there is seed 
funding (initial capital) from donors and government initiatives, such seed can be guaranteed 
in terms of its future ability to revolve and the longevity of the services offered. The shift is 
further buttressed by the empirical observation that most of the microfinance which was 
operating based on a welfare approach has been relatively underperforming (Nyamsogoro, 
2010). This underperformance has led to some prominent microfinance institutions, such as 
Grameen Bank, coming up with the Grameen II innovation which is more institutionalism-
oriented (Nyamsogoro, 2010). The current study is informed by the institutional view that 
microfinance needs to be commercially viable and financially sustainable or working towards 
that goal. 
 
In terms of profitability of financial institutions different ratios may be used. The commonly 
used ratios are ROA and ROE (Nyamsogoro, 2010; Tucker & Miles, 2004). Due to data 
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limitation, the current study uses return on assets as a measure of performance and 
profitability. Return on assets (ROA) measures the overall profitability and reflects both the 
profit margin and how efficiently the institution is using the total assets to generate revenue 
(Sa-Dhan, 2013; Brealey et al., 2006). ROA is calculated as the ratio of the net revenue to the 
total assets. We acknowledge that using ROA as the single measure of profitability of social 
enterprises has its own limitations. Most social enterprises have dual objectives that are socio-
economic development of the community on one side and financial viability on the other side 
(URT, 2002; McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Rixon, 2013). Thus, focusing on the profitability 
dimension alone may lead to biased conclusions on the actual performance of these 
enterprises.  
 
5.3.4 Empirical literature on financial sustainability and performance of microfinance  
Despite the fast-growing trend of different variants of local microfinance, especially in Africa, 
there is little empirical literature on the sustainability of microfinance institutions. The 
available empirical work is limited to relatively large and/or international microfinance, 
where data is accessible from the online microfinance database (MIX Market).  
 
The existing literature on the profitability and sustainability of microfinance offers mixed 
results. For example, findings from Namibia concluded that almost all microfinance 
operations are not sustainable (Adongo & Stork, 2005). A study on Nepal showed that most 
rural microfinance institutions are not sustainable (Acharya & Acharya, 2006). Using MIX 
dataset, Thapa (2006) found that MFI in all the developing regions except Africa were 
sustainable. Further analysis by Thapa (2006) showed that MFIs from South East Asia are 
fairly sustainable while the South Asian MFIs are not. Nyamsogoro (2010) found that, of 424 
observations, 80.2% of the rural microfinance institutions in Tanzania were financially 
sustainable. Using data from 47 MFIs from Kenya and Tanzania, Mori and Olomi (2012) 
found that the average sustainability of MFIs was 98% and concluded that on average these 
MFIs are working towards achieving the sustainability goal. Most of these studies use the data 
from large MFI reported in MIX market. Our study extends this literature by adding empirical 
evidence on financial cooperatives which are not normally reported in major databases such 
as MIX Market and are less explored in empirical studies. Our study extends Nyamsogoro 
(2010) who focused only on financial sustainability of rural microfinance by exploring both 
efficiency and sustainability using rural and urban SACCOs.  
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Based on these results it appears that the microfinance sector in Tanzania is relatively 
promising. However, the overall trend in empirical literature in sub-Saharan Africa has 
limited coverage of SACCOs. The current study will add to the limited empirical literature in 
this area by exploring the financial sustainability of saving and credit cooperatives. These 
institutions are unique in their structure, governance and ownership. Most of them are 
positioned towards the lower end of the financial system continuum which might expose them 
to different operational challenges. For example most of them are quite small, servicing 
homogeneous clients with relatively high risk and low income compared to conventional 
financial institutions, including larger MFIs. Such heterogeneity across financial service 
providers might limit the extent to which the empirical results might be compared across 
financial institutions. The plausible scenario would be to perform a comparative analysis of 
our results across similar studies using SACCOs. But due to limited empirical literature on 
SACCOs, intra-industry comparison is challenging. Hence, most of the comparison will be 
across the microfinance industry with acknowledgement of the potential heterogeneity across 
the industry. 
 
5.3.5 The determinants of sustainability  
Previous studies have broadly categorized the determinants of financial sustainability into 
institutional characteristics, agency cost, environmental/governance and business strategy 
(Aveh, 2013; Aveh, Krah & Dadzie, 2013a; Kinde, 2012; Nyamsogoro, 2010). Institutional 
characteristics include efficiency, capital structure, age, size, and interest rate charged. 
Organizational cost includes sources of finance, subsidy dependence, branches, enforcement 
procedures, and lender-borrower relationship. Business strategy includes screening 
mechanism, group or individual collateral, dealing with default rates, and peer monitoring. 
Environmental and governance factors include geographical location, gender of the borrower, 
job creation, competition, quality of board of directors, quality of staff and regulatory 
framework (Aveh, Krah & Dadzie, 2013b; Kinde, 2012; Nyamsogoro, 2010; Woller, 2000; 
Gonzalez-Vega, 1998; CGAP, 1996). Detailed discussion of these factors and their impact on 
performance is articulated in the next two paragraphs. 
 
More efficient financial institutions tend to have relatively lower expenditure and higher 
revenue generated per unit. In other words, efficiency affects sustainability positively through 
two channels: cost reduction and revenue increase (Nyamsogoro, 2010). SACCOs with high 
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leverage ratios are relatively less sustainable because of the increased cost of capital and the 
likelihood of ex-post moral hazard (Kinde, 2012; Bogan, 2012; Nyamsogoro, 2010). Age has 
been mentioned as an important factor because of the accrued incremental learning through 
trial and error in business, overhead costs, learning curve and relationship building. 
According to Gonzalez (2005), on average it takes about five years for at least 50% of 
microfinance to become sustainable (based on the MIX Market dataset).  
 
Effective screening methods and rigid group collateral, including forcing the group to pay on 
behalf of the borrowers, has shown a positive impact in reducing moral hazard and improving 
the repayment rate (Richman & Fred, 2010). Some studies have shown that the gender of 
borrowers is important. Women are generally believed to have a higher repayment rate than 
men because of their skills in budgeting and handling household cash (D’Espallier, Guérin & 
Mersland, 2009). However, some empirical studies from Ghana reported that men are less 
likely to default than women (Richman & Fred, 2010). Other factors, such as increased 
competition, group-based lending, high quality of staff members and board of directors, have 
also been documented to have a significant positive effect on financial sustainability (Aveh, 
2013). Cost per loan portfolio has been reported to be an important factor. According to 
ACCION (2004) a cost per loan portfolio greater than 20% should be a matter of concern (Rai 
& Rai, 2012). 
 
In summary, previous empirical and theoretical studies have suggested different sets of 
important determinants of financial sustainability for microfinance institutions. Different 
studies have used different variables depending on the research question(s) asked and the data 
availability. The current study uses return on assets, technical efficiency scores, loan size and 
deposit mobilization, and cost per loan portfolio as independent variables due to the data 
limitation. 
 
5.4. Methodology  
5.4.1 Estimation of sustainability  
The study used secondary data from annual audited financial statements as documented in 
Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4). Financial sustainability is measured according to UNCDF (2002) 
where institutional sustainability is measured in terms of operational self-sufficiency (OSS) 
and financial self-sufficiency (FSS). OSS measures the extent to which the institution is able 
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to cover its operating expenses with its operating income, and FSS measures the extent to 
which operating profits cover an institution’s costs. When calculating OSS the expenses 
include all cash and non-cash expenses from the income statement, such as depreciation and 
loan loss provision expenses, as well as any costs of funds, such as interest and fees paid on 
debts or to savers with voluntary deposits (UNCDF, 2002). For comparative purposes a 
different version of OSS, which excludes the cash cost of funds from total operating expenses, 
may be preferred. The latter approach mitigates the penalty imposed on an institution by the 







OSS   ............................................................................................ (5.1) 
FSS is given as the ratio of adjusted operating income and adjusted operating expenses. The 
adjustment is crucial to show how the financial picture of an institution would look on an 
unsubsidized basis, where funds would be raised on the commercial market, rather than 
through donor grants or subsidized capital. Customer deposits and debt must also be adjusted 
to reflect market rates on loans and deposits. Since the inflation rate erodes the value of 
equity, financial equity balances must be adjusted to account for inflation. Other income, such 
as subsidies and in-kind cash, is also adjusted. FSS is computed as follows: 
 
xpenses    
evenues    
EOperatingAdjusted
ROperatingAdjusted
FSS    ................................................................. (5.2) 
Since our data was cross-sectional, the current study did not adjust for inflation but took loan 
loss provision into account. The original data did not include loan loss provision. We adopted 
a conservative value of 5% of the total loan portfolio as the rate of loss provision. The 5% 
loan loss was selected based on discussion with a subject matter specialist from Tanzania 
cooperative auditing and supervisory committee. The figure is close to the industry average in 




A regression model is used to explore the effect of efficiency scores, return on assets, deposit 
mobilization and loan size on financial sustainability. Other key variables, such as age, 
governance, interest rate charged and others (see Section 5.3.5) could play a significant role 
but were not included due to data limitation. Efficiency scores are borrowed from Chapter 4. 
In summary, technical efficiency, which is a measure of the effectiveness of transformation of 
                                                     
8
 Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions by Micro Rate: 
 http://media.microfinancelessons.com/resources/tech_guide_IADB_portfolio_quality.pdf. 
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inputs into outputs, was estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA)
9
. Since technical 
efficiency is the product of the two and provides a more comprehensive measure of 
efficiency, it will be used as a proxy for efficiency measure in this chapter. The remaining 
variables are defined in Table 5.1. 
 
Following Nyamsogoro (2010), who investigated financial sustainability of rural 
microfinance in Tanzania, the current study uses a linear regression model which follows the 
general form below:  
  XY  ................................................................................................................ (5.3) 
where Y represents financial sustainability scores, B is a vector of regression parameters, X is 
a vector of control variables, and ԑ is the error term. The estimation was done sequentially. In 
the first step, a bivariate regression was fitted by regressing financial sustainability scores 
against each of the following: return on assets, TE scores, loan size and deposit mobilization, 
and cost per loan portfolio. Loan size was transformed into a logarithmic scale because of the 
difference scale. It was not possible to do a log transformation of RoA because of the 
existence of negative values. Both, the classic regression coefficients and standardized 
regression coefficients were reported in multivariate regression analysis. The standardized 
regression coefficient was used to ascertain the most influential variable in the model 
(Gujarati, 2012).  
 
The IMTEST test and residual plots were used to check for normality assumption. 
Studentized residuals were used to check for outlier observations. As rule of the thumb, any 
residual with a value higher than two was further investigated using Cook’s distance to check 
the overall influence on regression results. A cutoff point of 4/n was used for Cook’s distance 
to eliminate influential observations. Five observations were eliminated because they were 
found to exhibit extreme values with a significant influence on the regression results. 
Therefore 98 observations out of 103 observations were used for the final regression analysis. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) test was used to check for the presence of multi-
collinearity. All the VIF values were less than 2, which is far less than the standard cut-off of 
10. IMTET, developed by Cameron and Trivedi (2009), was used to check for normality and 
                                                     
9
 Both constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale were employed to estimate the technical and pure 
technical scale efficiencies respectively. Following input oriented DEA and intermediation approach (deposit, 
total cost and total fixed assets) were treated as inputs and (total loan and total revenue) were treated as outputs. 
More details and theoretical debate around this is presented in Chapter 4. 
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homogeneity of variance. While the normality assumptions were violated, the histogram plot 
for residual seems well-behaved, which implies that the deviation is not far from normal and 
may be a problem of small sample size (see figure A.5.3 for additional diagnostic plots). We 
used robust standard errors to take the problem of heteroscedasticity into account. The test for 
omitted variables was significant, implying that there are some important variable(s) missing 
in our model. One possible solution is to use instrumental variable regression. As we could 
not get the appropriate instruments to control for this problem, the field work was done to 
complement the evidence on the key drivers of performance in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 5.1 demonstrates the variables used in the current study, their definitions and 
measurements and their a priori expectations based on theory and previous empirical 
evidence. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of the variables 












Relative efficiency scores computed using 
data envelopment analysis* 
TE + 





Size   Total loan portfolio Size + 
Deposit 





* For details see Chapter 4. 
 
 
5.5 Results and discussion 
Table 5.2 presents the key descriptive statistics for return on assets, financial sustainability, 
technical efficiency and deposit mobilization. The first half of the table shows the entire 
dataset and the second half of the table presents the results for 98 observations (after 
excluding the outlying observations). On average the ROA ranges between -1.79 to 0.86 and -
0.18 to 0.86, with and without outlying observations respectively, and the average return on 
assets is 6% and 7% respectively. Generally the ROA reported here is almost twice the figure 
reported by Nyamsogoro (2010) for rural-based microfinance in Tanzania. The difference 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
might be explained by the fact that the majority of SACCOs included in our study (the ones 
with audited financial statements) are urban-based. Given the heterogeneity in institutional 
thickness and support system between rural and urban SACCOs, the later might enjoy 
reduced transaction costs and a superior support system.  
 
According to ACCION (2004), the optimal range for return on assets in microfinance is 3% 
and above. Based on this benchmark, on average the SACCOs included in our study are doing 
well in terms of profitability. The mean financial sustainability is 133% and 127% 
respectively. Compared to the recommended minimum threshold (100%), our results indicate 
that on average the SACCOs included in the study are sustainable. However, the findings are 
slightly lower than those reported by Nyamsogoro (2010) for rural microfinance in Tanzania 
where he found an average financial sustainability of 156%. The average technical efficiency 
and deposit mobilization (a ratio of total savings and deposits to total loans) after excluding 
extreme values are 32% and 79% respectively. This implies that on average many SACCOs 
are relatively less efficient and about 21% of their funding is financed from external sources. 
It is important to note as mentioned earlier that our sample data may suffer from self-selection 
bias, because only SACCOs with audited financial statements were included in the study. 
They may have submitted their records for auditing because of current or future expectation 
for seeking external funding. 
 
The summary statistics indicated that lowest quartiles (bottom 25%) had an average of 26% in 
deposit mobilization, implying that about 74% of their loans are externally funded, whereas 
the subsequent average deposit mobilization were 60%, 81% and 114% for the second, third 
and fourth quartiles respectively. Deposit mobilization for the top 25% was 114%, and 60% 
and 81% for the middle lower and middle upper 25% SACCOs respectively. When compared 
with loan size, larger SACCOs had lowest deposit mobilization compared to small ones. This 
could be explained by the economies of scale and potential effect of diversified membership 
in terms of savings and borrowing requirement. However the observed low rate of deposit 
mobilization for the lowest 25% should be a concern as a high level of leverage could lead to 








Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics 
103 Observations    98 Observations (excluding Outliers)  
Variable Mean 
Std. 




Dev. Min Max 
RoA 0.06 0.23 -1.79 0.86 
 
RoA 0.07 0.11 -0.18 0.86 
FSS 1.33 1.12 0.02 9.77 
 
FSS 1.27 0.74 0.03 5.14 
TE 0.32 0.20 0.00 0.74 
 
TE 0.32 0.20 0.07 0.74 
DM 1.23 4.50 0.02 45.71 
 
DM 0.79 0.81 0.02 7.51 
 
Note:  RoA: Return on Assets;  FSS: Financial Sustainability Score;  TE: Bias corrected 




About 84% of SACCOs had an operational cost to loan portfolio of less than 20% which is 
the recommended threshold according to international best practices (ACCION, 2004). When 
financial sustainability scores are plotted against loan size (as proxy of firm size) as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.1, financial sustainability seems to exhibit a non-linear relationship. 
Firms whose loan size was between TZS 1.8 billion and TZS 4.7 billion had the highest 
sustainability scores. The smallest firms and largest firms had lower financial sustainability 
scores. The results are consistent with what we found in Chapter 4 when analyzing efficiency. 
The practical implication of the observed behaviour could be explained by the effect of fixed 
cost and high cost of operation due to the small size of operation which constrains them from 
enjoying economies of scale. On the other side, with large SACCOs it is likely that they are 
too large and are likely to suffer the economies of scale and be exposed to stiff competition 
with commercial banks. The results from the box plot show that there are more variations in 
financial sustainability in smaller SACCOs (Quartile 1) than medium and larger SACCOs. 
The SACCOs with loan size in the range of quartiles 2-4 seem to have less variation in their 
financial sustainability scores. However, the average median sustainability scores seem to be 
similar across SACCOs of different sizes as demonstrated by the right hand side panel of 
Figure 5.1. The median is indicated by a horizontal line crossing the central box in each 
quartile. 
 




Figure 5.1: Left-hand panel: Financial sustainability and loan size 
Right hand panel: Box plot for financial sustainability by loan quartiles  
 
It appears that financial sustainability has a positive relationship with ROA. SACCOs with a 
negative ROA showed quite low financial sustainability scores, which suggests that their 
performance is quite low as they are not able to produce enough profit to cover their costs. 
They are generally performing poorly, hence they cannot cover their operational costs and 
their efficiency in transforming inputs at their disposal to outputs is relatively low. It might be 
that these organizations are relatively new to the business and they are trying to find their 
way. Also it may be that these SACCOs have invested excessively in long-term investments 
such as real estate which may take longer to realize returns on investment. It is important to 
note that once ROA approaches a positive territory, the corresponding values of financial 
sustainability scores increase sharply, with a turning point around 4.7% (indicated by the red 
line in Figure 5.2). As observed in the distribution of financial sustainability, the return on 
assets across quartiles seems to have similar patterns. The smaller SACCOs have a higher 
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Figure 5.2: Left hand panel: Financial sustainability and return on assets  
Right hand panel: Box plot for return on assets by loan quartiles 
 
 
Table 5.3 presents the results of five different bivariate regressions. Based on the bivariate 
regression results for each independent variable against financial sustainability, the findings 
show that ROA, technical efficiency, deposit mobilization, cost per loan and loan size had a 
statistically significant positive influence on the sustainability of SACCOs. ROA is the single 
most important variable, explaining about 71% of the variation in financial sustainability 
alone. Based on R
2
, technical efficiency is also an important variable. The magnitudes of 
regression parameters for the two variables mentioned (ROA and technical efficiency) are 
relatively large compared to other parameters. ROA and technical efficiency have a positive 
sign, implying that they have a positive influence, as would be expected in theory. Cost per 
loan portfolio has a negative sign as predicted by theory. The implication of these results is 
that in order for the firms to improve their financial sustainability they must reduce their cost 
per loan and increase their net income. These results are in line with the theory and support 
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Return on Asset 6.55(7.78) 
    Deposit Mobilization 
 
0.05(0.64) 
   Technical Efficiency* 
  
1.56(4.27) 
  Log (Loans) 
   
-0.03(-0.69) 
 Cost per loan 
    
-0.21(-1.08) 
Intercept 0.83 (17.54) 1.19(12.02) 0.74(7.89) 1.77(2.17) 1.26(17.87) 
N 98 98 98 98 98 





Kurtosis = 8.58 
(Pvalue =0.00) 
Heteroskadasticity = 
46.76 (Pvalue= 0.00)  
 
Kurtosis = 2.35 
(Pvalue =0.12)**       
Heteroskadasticity 
= 2.90 (Pvalue= 
0.23)  
Kurtosis = 2.8 
(Pvalue =0.13)**             
Heteroskadasticity 
= 14 (Pvalue= 
0.00)  
Kurtosis = 2.17 
(Pvalue =0.14)**             
Heteroskadasticity 
= 4 (Pvalue= 0.13) 
  
Kurtosis = 2.33 
(Pvalue =0.12)**             
Heteroskadasticity = 
0.42 (Pvalue= 0.81) 
 
 
*Bias corrected technical efficiency  
** Regression parameters with t statistics in the brackets 
*** The residual diagnostic are derived from IMTEST. The results show that the model in the first 
column and third column suffers from Heteroskadasticity problem. Robust standard was used to 
control this problem. Normality is not problem for most of the models except the model presented in 
column one. Further residual plot revealed that the distribution of the residual is relative well 
behaving (see figure A.5.4). 
 
Table 5.4 shows the multiple regression results for the factors explaining financial 
sustainability of SACCOs. The variables included in the models explain about 75% of the 
total variation in financial sustainability scores, which is a reasonably good fit. After 
controlling for deposit mobilization, technical efficiency and cost per loan, the results still 
show that ROA is consistently the most significant factor determining financial sustainability. 
This is further echoed by its largest value of standardized regression coefficient as indicated 
in table 5.4. The influence of technical efficiency is also statistically significant in a multiple 
regression model. This confirms the theoretical expectation that, high efficient firms are more 
likely to have higher score of financial sustainability due to cost savings and higher level of 
profits in their operations (Nyamsogoro, 2010). In addition, we expect a positive relationship 
between return on assets and efficiency, which means that firms with a higher ROA are more 
likely to be efficient as indicated by the significant positive association between the two 
variables (see Table A.5.1 in the Appendix for more details).  
 
Surprisingly, deposit mobilization influences financial sustainability scores negatively. In 
theory it would be expected that high deposit mobilization would lead to lower cost of capital 
and hence a high level of financial sustainability, but the empirical evidence suggests 
otherwise. The observed discrepancy may be explained by the possibility that SACCOs with 
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high deposit mobilization might be situated in the areas where there is a low level of 
institutional thickness, adverse operating environment and low linkages with other financial 
institutions which might lead to high transaction cost. Alternatively this may be due to the 
relative weight of savers/borrowers which leads to a low borrowing rate resulting in low 
income. The cost per loan portfolio has a negative influence on financial sustainability but not 
statistically significant. The literature recommends that the SACCOs whose cost per loan 
portfolio is above 20% needs to design innovative solutions to cut costs based on their 
operating environment (ACCION, 2004). 
 
Table 5.4: Multiple regression analysis results on financial sustainability 
  
Standardized Robust 
    FSS Coef. Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t [ 95% CI ] 
Return on Asset 6.73 0.85 0.76 8.88 0.00 5.12 8.43 
Deposit Mobilization -0.13 -0.15 0.06 -2.29 0.02 -0.25 -0.03 
Technical Efficiency* 0.26 0.08 0.15 1.70 0.09 -0.21 0.43 
Cost per unit loan -0.00 0.00 0.31 -0.00 0.99 -0.60 0.60 
Constant 0.81  0.06 12.55 0.00 0.76 1.00 
N                          98       
R Square  0.75    
 Kurtosis = 9.6 (Pvalue =0.00)**             Heteroskadasticity = 56 (Pvalue= 0.00) *** 
Note:    * Bias corrected technical efficiency 
 ** Kurtosis chi square test statistics for normality derived from IMTEST that the 
residual is not normally distributed but the histogram plot (see figure A.5.3 in 
appendix) shows that the distribution is by large extent what well behaving. The non-
normality can be attributed by the small sample size problem. 
Test for Heteroskadasticity based on IMTEST show that our residual suffer from 




It is important to note that some important control variables, such as age and interest rate 
charged, are missing, and this may lead to omitted variable bias. The empirical test for 
omitted variable bias was significant at 5%, which implies that our parameter estimates 
should be interpreted with caution. Previous studies have shown that younger microfinance 
operations are less sustainable than those which have been in operation for longer. Based on 
the MIX market data, this time is estimated to be between 5-10 years. Other variables such as 
age, geographical location, business model, and portfolio at risk (> 30 days) might have an 
important influence on performance. However the data for these factors were not easily 
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Microfinance, including saving and credit cooperatives, plays a significant role in mitigating 
the credit market failure by providing financial services to the poor and low income earners. 
However, offering such a service to the poor is associated with high transaction costs, 
relatively high risk and a low rate of return. Based on these challenges it is imperative to 
investigate and monitor the financial sustainability of these institutions. In an effort to 
contribute to the current debates on sustainability of microfinance, this study investigated the 
financial sustainability of the fast-growing saving and credit cooperatives in Tanzania. 
Understanding the performance and sustainability of these institutions is important for two 
reasons: it is a necessary condition for institutional longevity and lasting services to the poor, 
and it is an important barometer for researchers, policy-makers, regulators and shareholders in 
guiding the industry in the desired direction.  
 
Based on our sample, the results show that average return on assets is 7% and average 
financial sustainability is 127%. Overall the performance is satisfactory compared to 
international standards. The optimal return on assets for microfinance based on international 
best practice is 3% and above, the recommended operational sustainability is 100% and the 
recommended financial sustainability is 110%. In both measures, our sampled SACCOs are 
doing relatively well. Based on our data, the key determinants of financial sustainability are 
return on assets, deposit mobilization and technical efficiency. Of 103 SACCOs included in 
the study 61% were operationally sustainable and only 51% were both operationally and 
financially sustainable. Our results demonstrate that the financial cooperative model may 
yield better results than standard microfinance. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the sample used in this study may lead to upward bias in 
the estimation because only audited SACCOs were included. Future studies may wish to 
include non-audited SACCOs and data on other key variables such as age, portfolio at risk 
and geographical location. 
 





EFFICIENCY AND PROFITABILITY OF TANZANIAN SAVING AND 





During the past three decades, Tanzania has witnessed a surge in the growth of Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs). They have increased in number by 565% between 2000 and 
2013 (MAFC, 2013; BOT, 2013). These institutions play an important role in economic 
growth and development by bridging the existing financing gap due to market failure in the 
mainstream financial market. To put it into context, in Tanzania about 90% of the population 
is excluded from the mainstream financial system (FinScope, 2009). Despite the significant 
role which SACCOs might play in the economy, the performance and viability of the 
emerging industry remains unexplored. The smaller size and relatively risky operating 
environment of these institutions in terms of client composition and type of businesses 
supported may affect the profitability, efficiency and sustainability of these institutions, which 
in turn might affect the overall viability of the industry.  
 
On the other side, since SACCOs are member-owned and -controlled mutual organizations, it 
might become easier to control the information asymmetry problem, lower the cost of 
screening and monitoring, and reduce transaction cost through peer pressure and monitoring 
(McKillop & Wilson, 2011). As a result, the combination of these factors may help to dampen 
the moral hazard problem, and instill an organizational culture which holds members 
accountable and prudent as to how they manage and use the financial resources. If this 
behaviour dominates, then these organizations may become efficient and commercially 
viable. However, which force may dominate remains an empirical question. In extending 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter evaluates and classifies the performance of 
SACCOs through joint analysis of efficiency and profitability dimensions. 
 
Specifically, the study employs the efficiency and profitability matrix to characterize the 
performance of SACCOs based on efficiency and profitability scores. The matrix linking the 
                                                     
10
 This chapter has been published as an empirical paper in the Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, 
2014, 6(8):658-669. 
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two performance dimensions is intended to capture the complex nature of organizational 
performance and help to develop the best performers (stars) and hence potential candidates for 
industry best practice. The findings from this study will provide insights into performance 
management and policy strategies for managers, regulators and policy makers. Moreover, the 
study provides a contribution to the empirical literature about the performance of financial 
cooperatives in a developing country context. This chapter combines the results from Chapters 4 
and 5 to develop a multiple dimension performance index by using efficiency profitability matrix. This 
approach combine the strength of each of the two approaches and identify the SACCOs which are 
performing better in both dimension and which could be used as industry best practices. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the literature review, 
Section 6.3 presents the methodology, and the results and conclusion are presented in 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively.  
 
6.2 Literature review  
6.2.1 Definition of profitability and performance evaluation based on profitability 
analysis 
Measuring profitability is the most important measure of the success of the business because a 
business that is not profitable cannot survive (Hofstrand, 2009). Profitability can be measured 
either from accounting perspectives or from economic perspectives. According to accounting 
perspectives, profit is measured as excess revenue over expenses for a transaction (Stickney & 
Weil, 2000; Edmonds, McNair, Millam & Olds, 2000). In other words, the accounting 
definition of profit can be defined as net income gained for a given transaction. It can be 
further expressed as ratio of net income over total financial revenue. Others studies have used 
more informative measures by using net income over assets, also known as return on assets 
(ROA). Depending on the objective of the research and the context, the net income to equity 
ratio is sometimes also used as a measure of profitability (Nyamsogoro, 2010). According to 
an economic perspective, profit is viewed as a net income after transactions plus the 
opportunity cost of the resources used to generate it (Bodie, Merton & Cleeton, 2009). Since 
we are using the data from audited financial statements, it is difficult to implement economic 
profit because it can be challenging to quantify the opportunity cost of resources; therefore the 
accounting profit approach is adopted.  
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Within the accounting approach we could use ROA or ROE or both. However, since some of 
the SACCOs are funded mainly by external loans and others are funded mainly by equity, this 
study will use ROA as a measure of profitability to avoid over-compensating the SACCOs 
with favourable access to external financing. In theory, financial institutions including 
microfinance generate revenue from loans, non-interest fees and other services such as 
insurance, money transmission, investing and factoring services (Nyamsogoro, 2010). Due to 
the nascent nature of the SACCOs industry, the major sources of income come from interest 
income and non-interest income. Other services such as insurance, money transfer and money 
market investments are limited or virtually non-existent. 
 
From a management perspective, understanding the profitability patterns of SACCOs and 
microfinance is increasingly becoming an important endeavour since it is a crucial part of the 
sustainability equation of the industry. Also such information is important for industry 
regulators and shareholders for monitoring and evaluation of the industry performance. 
 
6.2.2 Efficiency and performance evaluation 
According to the classic definition, efficiency is the ability to produce the maximum output 
possible at a given level of input (Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell & Battese, 2005). It is measured as 
the ratio of output to input in a simple production setting in which a high ratio implies high 
efficiency levels. In a more general setting, where multiple inputs and multiple outputs are 
concerned, the efficiency becomes a scalar derived as a ratio of weighted sum of outputs and 
inputs (Vincent 1968 cited in Daraio & Simar, 2007; Lovell, 1993). The problem with the 
classic definition of efficiency is that it fails to distinguish between efficiency and 
productivity, which is also measured as a ratio between outputs and inputs (Daraio & Simar, 
2007). In fact some authors have used the two concepts as synonymous without making any 
difference between the two (Sengupta, 1995; Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2000). Daraio and 
Simar (2007) define efficiency as the distance between the quantity of inputs and outputs of a 
given firm compared to the distance of inputs and outputs for peer firms along the best 
possible frontier.  
 
The current study will adopt Lovell’s (1993) definition of efficiency in which efficiency is 
defined as the difference between the observed inputs and outputs for a given firm as 
compared to optimal values of its inputs and outputs. In our case, since we have multiple 
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inputs and outputs, efficiency is defined as a ratio of the weighted distance between outputs 
and inputs as compared to the best practice frontier. The best practice frontier is constructed 
as a locus of the scalar of weighted inputs and outputs of the best performers.  
 
According to the theoretical and empirical literature, efficiency comes in different variations 
each capturing a specific dimension. These variations include technical efficiency, pure 
technical efficiency, scale efficiency, profit efficiency, cost efficiency, revenue efficiency, 
economic efficiency, and allocative efficiency (Coelli et al, 2005; Daraio & Simar, 2007). 
Despite variations in types of efficiency, they measure the performance of a firm using the 
extent to which it deviates from the best practice frontier given a specific dimension (cost, 
inputs, output or profit). Therefore the first step is to establish the best practice frontier using 
the high performing peer group and then compare all other firms’ performance to the best 
practice. Once this is established the difference lies in whether the focus is on input 
minimization or output maximization as the way to technical efficiency. When the focus is on 
the optimal scale of operation it leads to scale efficiency, whereas cost minimization leads to 
cost efficiency, profit maximization leads to profit efficiency, and optimal resource allocation 
based on the price of inputs leads to allocative efficiency. In some instances, both allocative 
efficiency and technical efficiency are evaluated, which leads to economic efficiency. Further 
details about different types of efficiency are presented in Coelli et al. (2005) and Daraio and 
Simar (2007).  
 
The choice of the type of efficiency to be estimated is influenced by the objective of the study 
and the data availability. The existing empirical studies show a mixed application: some use 
just one variation of efficiency, some use combinations of two or more of the approaches but 
it is rare to find studies combining all the variations of efficiency dimensions. Given the fact 
that most of SACCOs are small and are managed by managers with limited experience, 
educational background and training, it is imperative to investigate the extent to which 
SACCOs are effective in transforming the assets and other inputs at their disposal into 
outputs. Thus this study focuses mainly on the technical and profitability ratio in a framework 
of an efficiency-profitability matrix (see the next section for details) to map profiles of the 
different emerging performance patterns in the SACCOs’ industry. Technical efficiency has 
been selected based on the availability of data. Also, since it is a comprehensive measure of 
both scale and pure technical efficiency, it captures both the effect of scale and management 
efficiency of the operation of each SACCO. Technical efficiency is estimated using bias 
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corrected Data Envelopment Analysis: this approach has been selected because of its 
flexibility in accommodating multiple input and multiple outputs (Coelli, 2005; Daraio & 
Simar, 2007; Zhu, 2014). More details about the estimation process of DEA are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
6.2.3 Performance evaluation based on efficiency-profitability matrix 
The literature on performance evaluation in the banking sector and other auxiliary financial 
service sectors including microfinance is divided into three strands. The first strand of 
literature focuses on the application of financial ratios in analyzing the performance of 
financial institutions (Tucker & Miles 2004; Yeh, 1996). The commonly used financial ratios 
include capital adequacy, profitability, assets utilization and liquidity (Yeh, 1996). Depending 
on the objective of the study and data availability some studies use different combinations of 
ratios among the four sub-categories or just focus on ROA and ROE. While this approach is 
useful in proving a snapshot of financial stability and profitability of financial institutions 
analyzed, it has been criticized for failing to capture the multiple dimensional natures of 
financial institutions (Athanassopoulos & Thanassoulis, 1995; Keramidou, Mimis, 
Fotinopoulou & Tassis, 2013). 
 
As a result, most of the recent studies have focused on using a weighted index performance 
measure using data envelopment analysis. This strand of literature argues that most financial 
institutions use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. Therefore, a comprehensive 
approach which accounts for the multi-dimensional nature of the inputs and outputs is 
important for a more realistic measure of performance. This has led to the increasing 
popularity of DEA in performance evaluation of the banking sector in the past three decades. 
However, most of the studies taking this route have focused on technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency (Ho & Zhu, 2004; Aikaeli, 2008; Kamau, 2011; Moffat, 2008; Eken & Kale, 2011), 
while some of them have focused on cost efficiency (Casu, 2002; Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
Another emerging strand of literature argues that standard measures of banking performance 
based on profitability ratios capture only one dimension of the performance which may be 
different from efficiency (Athanassopoulos & Thanassoulis, 1995; Kumar, 2008; Frimpong, 
2010; Keramidou et al, 2013). They further argue that, while efficiency captures the multiple 
dimensional natures of the financial institutions, it does not capture all the factors which are 
important in the performance of financial institutions.  
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A third strand of literature argues conclusively that the performance of financial institutions is 
far more complex, which makes it difficult to capture using a single approach. As a solution, 
the literature proposes using the efficiency-profitability matrix developed by Boussofiane, 
Dyson and Thanassoulius (1991) to combine efficiency and profitability. This approach offers 
a more comprehensive assessment of the performance of financial institutions. The approach 
has been applied by some empirical researchers in evaluating the performance of the banking 
sector in Portugal, Cyprus and Ghana (Camanho & Dyson, 1999; Soteriou & Zenios, 1999; 
Frimpong, 2010). The proposed efficiency-profitability matrix provides an important and 
useful tool for analyzing and categorizing the best performers as “Stars” in the efficiency-
profitability space.  
 
Furthermore, the matrix identifies potential candidates whose efficiency and/or profitability 
needs to be improved as well as candidates for divestiture. The matrix is divided into four 
quadrants as illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. The first quadrant represents firms whose 
profitability is high but efficiency is low. These firms are called “Sleepers”, implying that 
they are not exploiting their full potential: they could become even more profitable by 
increasing efficiency. The second quadrant represents the best performers – “Stars”: these 
firms are characterized by a high level of efficiency and a high level of profitability. This 
group of firms is a good candidate for performance benchmarking and developing industrial 





























Figure 6.1: Efficiency-profitability matrix 
Source: Adapted from Camanho and Dyson (1999) 
 
The third quadrant (“Question mark”) represents firms with low efficiency and low 
profitability. These are potential candidates for further growth and improvement; they may 
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wish to borrow some of the good practices from the firms located in quadrant II. It is 
important to acknowledge that the performance of an organization is complex and is 
influenced by several factors, some of which the efficiency and profitability index may not be 
able to capture. Therefore, a detailed institutional investigation might be required to uncover 
the key challenges facing a specific organization. Despite such challenges, an organization in 
quadrant III may move into quadrant I, quadrant II or quadrant IV. Any quadrant apart from 
quadrant II is economically pareto inferior. In other words, if a firm graduates into any 
quadrant other than quadrant II it is still under-utilizing its potential for improvement. 
Therefore, the managers, policy makers and regulators are supposed to help the firms in all 
other quadrants to move towards quadrant II. This requires striking a balance between 
improved efficiency and profitability.  
 
Firms in the fourth quadrant are termed “dogs”. These firms have high efficiency but a low 
profitability level. Such behaviour could be explained by an unfavourable operating 
environment, such as a high level of competition or low business potential catchment areas 
(Camanho & Dyson, 1999). These firms are good candidates for divestiture or strategic 
turnaround of their business model and operations. A long-term policy to increase business 
potential, including public investments in institutions such as schools and colleges, may also 
be possible solutions to revitalize the business potential. 
 
The major challenge of using the efficiency-profitability matrix framework for comprehensive 
evaluation of the performance of financial institutions lies in setting the boundaries 
(Athanassopoulos & Thanassoulis, 1995). The precise boundary position between quadrants 
has remained subjective. For example Frimpong (2010) and Soteriou and Zenios (1999) used 
the arithmetic average of the efficiency index and profitability index, while Camanho and 
Dyson (1999) used a subjective boundary which is more skewed towards the top 10% of the 
efficiency score and about the top 25% of the profitability score. The current studies used the 
top 25% in both efficiency and profitability indices as the cut-off point. Since our efficiency 
data were skewed to the left, the choice of the cut-off was selected to avoid over-
representation of the poor performers in the star quadrants which may have a dilution effect 
on the value of best practices to be derived from the benchmarks. 
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6.3 Methodology  
6.3.1 Efficiency and profitability matrix construction 
The profitability ratio has been estimated using the return on assets ratio (ROA). According to 
Joo, Nixon and Stoeberl (2011) ROA is the most popular profitability ratio which is used for 
relative comparison within a firm over time or across firms. It is a more comprehensive 
measure than ROE because it captures the overall performance of the institution’s 
intermediations of total loanable funds including borrowed funds. In the case of SACCOs this 
measure is useful because it captures both shareholders equity and funds borrowed from other 
sources such as pension funds. The ROA is estimated as demonstrated in Equation 6.1 below: 
                       
           
           
  .................................................................... (6.1) 
 
Using the results of bias corrected technical efficiency from Chapter 4, the efficiency-
profitability matrix was constructed using the top 25 best performers in both technical 
efficiency and profitability ratios. The TE ratio was preferred to SE because it is a more 
comprehensive measure of both PTE and SE. The resulting matrix was used to identify the 
firms in each corresponding category. The data used to compute ROA is documented in 
Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4). 
 
6.4 Results and discussions 
6.4.1 Profitability and efficiency results of all SACCOs, Top 25%  
Profitability was measured using ROA. Efficiency was estimated using TE. Further 
decomposition of TE into PTE and SE for each SACCO was done using variable return to 
scale option. The aggregate results have been categorized into two groups: all SACCOs, and 
top 25% high performing SACCOs. All SACCO results report the overall average 
performance of SACCOs with respect to profitability and efficiency measures. The top 25% 
represents the results of the top 25% SACCOs in each dimension of profitability and TE. 
 
The presence of technical inefficiency may be due to excessive utilization of inputs (too much 
wastage) or operating below or above the optimal scale of operation (PTE measures the 
former dimension while SE measures the latter). Similar results are presented for the top 25% 
high performing SACCOs in each of the four measures (ROA, TE, PTE, and SE). The 
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average estimate for ROA assets, TE, PTE and SE for all the three categories of SACCOs are 
presented in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1: Efficiency and profitability results  
Variable  Overall mean (N=103) Top 25% Mean (n=26) 
RoA 0.07 0.19 
Bias Corrected TE 0.32 0.49 
Bias Corrected PTE 0.43 0.71 
Bias Corrected SCALE 0.77 1.0 
 




Based on our data, the average ROA was 7% for all SACCOs and 19% for the top 25%. The 
reported ROA is relatively high compared to the international benchmark of 3% ROA for best 
practice in microfinance (ACCION, 2004). In fact the ROA in our study is higher than the 3% 
ROA reported in the commercial bank sector in East Africa region by EIB (2013). When 
comparing ROA figures across the sub-groups, the top 25% have the highest ROA (19%) 
compared to the overall average (7%).  
 
Another important variable is technical efficiency (TE), followed by pure technical efficiency 
(PTE). Figure 6.1 demonstrates the emerging performance partner across the three 
performance indicators between the top 25% average and overall average. When looking 
across difference performance measures, the discrepancy among the two categories (all firms 
and top 25%) is sharper in ROA and TE. The implication from these results is that TE and 
ROA may have an important role in classifying SACCOs into top performers and low 
performers. 




Figure 5.2: Return on assets, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency of all 
SACCOs and top 25%  
6.4.2 Efficiency-profitability matrix classification  
The classification results are demonstrated in Figure 6.3 and presented in detail in Table 6.2. 
Only 12 out of 103 SACCOs were found to be among the top 25% performers in both TE and 
profitability dimensions. These SACCOs are the industry leaders and can be used to develop 
the industry best practices. Figure 6.3 below presents the scatter plot of the distribution of all 
103 SACCOs across different quartiles based on their individual performance score. Based on 
the observed patterns it is clear that most of SACCOS (61%) are in the question mark 
quadrant, implying that they are struggling in both dimensions of efficiency and profitability. 
 




















































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Technical Efficiency
Non Stars Stars
 Sleepers  Stars 
 Question Mark  Dogs 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
These groups of SACCOS raises a serious concern and their management should become 
more innovative in designing workable strategies to foster their cost reduction and 
profitability potential. These could be achieved by designing effective strategies to improve 
both efficiency and profitability. Such strategies may include reducing the wastage of 
resources during the intermediation process and other profit management strategies. 
Table 6.2: Efficiency–profitability classification of SACCOs 
Quadrant Classification Frequency Percentage 
I Sleepers 14 14% 
II Stars 12 12% 
III Question Mark 63 61% 
IV Dogs 14 14% 
 
About 14 other SACCOs were classified as sleepers: they are among the top 25% in terms of 
profitability but they lag behind in the efficiency dimension. A closer look at this group 
reveals that, on average, they have high average loan portfolios compared to SACCOs in the 
other quadrants. The leverage effect might explain high profit but low efficiency. There is a 
significant potential to increase the performance of these organizations by reducing the 
wastage of resources along the intermediation process. This is demonstrated by the low TE 
scores as reported in Chapter 4. Another group of 14 SACCOs was found to have high 
efficiency but low profit. These firms might be experiencing stiff competitive pressure or they 
might be operating in a low business catchment zone. They are potential candidates for 
divestiture or merging with other firms in quadrant II. 
 
6.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The objective of this chapter was to evaluate and benchmark the performance of SACCOs in 
Tanzania based on efficiency and profitability measures. We developed a classification matrix 
based on four categories: one category comprised the best performers in both dimensions 
while the other three categories comprised underperformers in different dimensions. The 
underperformers included those firms struggling in both dimensions and those which struggle 
in either the efficiency dimension or the profitability dimension. Such a classification tool 
provides important information for monitoring, evaluating and improving the performance 
and profitability of organizations, and such evidence is useful in guiding policy makers, 
regulators and managers in steering the industry in the right direction. 
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Our results reveals curious classification patterns. About 61% of the SACCOs are classified 
as underperforming in both efficiency and profitability dimensions. These groups need an 
urgent turn around strategy which focuses on wastage reduction during the intermediation 
process and increasing profitability. Another group of firms (28%) is required to improve 
either their profitability or efficiency strategy depending on whether they are in quadrant IV 
or I respectively. Only 12% of the SACCOs were classified as best performers. These could 
be used to develop an industry best practice for struggling firms to learn from. We 
acknowledge that it may be unrealistic to expect about 25% or 26 SACCOs to be among the 
top performers based on 25% cutoff, however 12 of SACCOs out of expected 26 SACCOs is 
definately a sign of poor performance in the industry.  
 
The observed poor performance in the industry is more worrying given the fact that the 
SACCOs included in the study are likely to be among the top performers in their own region. 
This implies that an urgent turnaround strategy is required in the industry. Learning the best 
practices from the best performers in the country and elsewhere may offer some useful 
insights to the struggling SACCOs. These findings show important insights for the regulators, 
academia, and managers of the SACCOs. From the perspective of regulators, a close watch 
and monitoring of the industry is required. This should be complemented with a supporting 
enviroment in nurturing and steering the industry in the right direction. Such action is 
important given the recent surge in growth of this industry and the recorded poor performance 















 WHAT DRIVES PERFORMANCE AMONG TANZANIAN SAVINGS 





7.1 Introduction  
The Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) model (also known as credit unions in North 
America) has been widely spread around the world, especially North America and Europe. 
However, sub-Saharan Africa, and Tanzania in particular, have lagged behind in adopting and 
spreading the model except in the past three decades or so. After a significant time lag in 
adoption of the model in Tanzania, the country has witnessed a surge of SACCOs during the 
past 15 years. The industry grew by 565% in terms of membership between 2000 and 2013 
(MAFC, 2013; BOT, 2013). Such explosive growth within a short time is a concern that 
motivates this study. Thus, the question this research seeks to elucidate is “how healthy is 
this industry?” Part I of the project focused on the quantitative aspect of measuring 
performance in terms of efficiency and sustainability of these institutions. Overall, the 
performance of the institutions showed mixed results which affirm our concerns about the 
observed explosive growth. More specifically, our results in Chapter 6 revealed that there are 
few “well-performing” SACCOs (in terms of efficiency, sustainability and profitability) and 
many struggling SACCOs
12,13
. This part of the project set out to use a case study research 
approach to obtain an in-depth understanding of what drives performance among SACCOs 
and explore if there are any discernible patterns between the top performers and low 
performers. The knowledge garnered will complement our empirical findings and provide a 
more nuanced understanding of how to manage and regulate the industry in the right 
direction.  
To close the loop, this chapter completes the three quantitative essays by using multiple case studies to 
discern what the key drivers of performance among SACCOs are.  
 
7.2 A survey of literature on drivers of performance in SACCOs  
According to economic theory large firms are expected to perform better because of the 
economies of scale and scope, while small firms may suffer from high fixed costs (Nicholson 
                                                     
11
 This chapter has been submitted for review as an empirical paper to the Journal of African Economies.  
12
 The details on this can be found in Chapter 4. 
13
 The details on this can be found in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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& Sydner, 2011; Varian, 1992). Apart from general economic theory about size, empirically 
large credit unions have been documented to have a higher ability to attract diverse 
membership and a high skill pool of members. This enables them to be able to choose a 
governance team to run the organization, in contrast to small credit unions with homogeneous 
membership (McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Goddard, McKillop & Wilson, 2008) and expertise. 
However, credit unions that are too large may lead to diseconomies of scale, agency problems 
such as empire building, and dilution of cooperative values, which in turn may affect the 
performance of the organization (Nicholson & Sydner, 2011; Birchall, 2005; McKillop & 
Wilson, 2011; Goddard et al., 2008). Therefore, size is one of the key variables investigated. 
Quality of leadership and governance plays a significant role both in making and 
implementing strategic decisions and overseeing the day-to-day operations of the organization 
(CMEF, 2012; Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010; Bassem, 2009; Pearce & Helms, 2001). 
It is argued that good governance and leadership plays a critical role in organizational survival 
and prosperity (CMEF, 2012; McKillop & Wilson, 2011; Bond, Carter & Sexton, 2009; 
Mannion, Davies & Marshall, 2005). Also a good board will have high intensity of 
monitoring, diversity in the skills set and gender composition, training of the board members 
and effective research management (Strøm, D’Espallier & Mersland, 2014; Garza-Garcia 
2011; Gallego-Álvarez, García-Sánchez & Rodríguez-Dominguez, 2010; Adams & Ferreira, 
2007, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Francoeur, Labelle & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008; Farrell 
& Hersch, 2005).  
 
Another important dimension in the performance of SACCOs is cooperative principles. 
Cooperative principles and values have been developed based on international best practices 
to uniquely define the identity of cooperatives and differentiate them from other forms of 
enterprises. More important, they are supposed to be used as a guide for keeping active 
membership and control of the technocratic power of their managers as they become large 
(Rixon, 2013; Birchall, 2005). The key cooperative values and seven principles are 
summarised in Table 7.1 below. The first column lists key values, the second column lists 
principles and the third column has the proxies for how the key values and principles are 
operationalised in practice (Birchall, 2005; Beaubien & Rixon, 2012; Rixon, 2013). We 
hypothesise that better performing institutions have a higher intensity of integrating or using 
the seven cooperative principles in their governance and management practices than low 
performing SACCOs. This implies that high performing SACCOs are more democratic in 
making decisions such as choosing board members, setting interest rates for lending and 
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borrowing, active participation of members in annual general meetings, dividend payouts to 
members, and community dividends such as school contributions and hospital financing. Also 
they are more likely to have a low level of debt, more equity and active involvement in 
cooperative federation and vertical collaboration with other financial institutions and 
cooperatives. Thus questions probing implementation of the seven core principles were 
explored.  
 











    
Political values: Democracy Voluntary/open 
membership 
Member recruitment strategy 
Liberty Equity   
Equality Self-help Democratic member 
control 
Director education and 
training 
Solidarity Self-reliance   
Ethical values:  Member economic 
participation 
Members ‘Dividend’ cards 
Honesty  Autonomy and 
independence 
Internal capital raising 
Openness  Education, training and 
information 




 Co-operation among co-ops Support for federation 
Caring for others  Concern for community Community ‘dividend’ 
    
Source: Adapted from Birchall (2005) 
 
 
Other factors which have been mentioned in the literature to affect performance include 
operating environment (rural or urban), technology, regulations and macroeconomic 
conditions (Sharma, Sharma & Barua, 2012; Oteng-Abiyie, Amanor & Frimpong, 2011; 
Relampagos, Lamberte & Grahan, 1990; Sufian and Noor, 2009; Worthington, 1998). Apart 
from these factors, open-ended questions were included to probe other emerging concerns and 
opportunities from the management and governance perspectives and experiences. These 
open-ended questions helped to capture context-specific concerns which are unique or not 
widely reported in the literature, including social, ethical, economic and administrative issues. 
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7.3 Methodological approach  
We used a multiple case study research design in which a total of 19 cases were selected for 
the study. Out of the 19 cases, 17 cases were selected based on the performance index 
reported in Chapter 6. Two extra cases (not in our original sample) were included because 
they were highly recommended by the subject matter specialists during the field work. 
According to the experts in the field the two additional cases are regarded as high performing 
SACCOs countrywide. Out of the 19 SACCOs six were low performing (that is, belonged to 
the dog quadrant), two were medium performing (belonged to either question mark or 
sleepers’ quadrant) and eleven were high performing SACCOs (belonged to the star 
quadrant). In terms of a common bond 10 were workers-based SACCOs and nine were 
community-based SACCOs. Because of the ethical reasons no actual names of SACCOs have 
been used in reporting, instead we randomly assigned them name 1 through 19. 
 
The performance index which was used for classification was based on efficiency, 
sustainability and profitability based on our previous empirical work in Chapter 6 was used. 
The selection was done on a two-step approach. In the first step, a cluster of low and high 
performing SACCOs were selected based on the results from the classification matrix in 
figure 6.3 of Chapter 6. In the second step, an effort was made to control for the diversity of 
SACCOs in terms of size, membership composition or common bond (eg workers vs non-
workers) within low performing and high performing SACCOs. The high performing 
SACCOs were slightly oversampled (11 out of 19) in order to have a better knowledge of 
what makes better SACCOs.  
 
We used a combination of diverse and most different case selection strategy based on 
performance indicators. Seawright and Gerring (2008) argue that the combination of the two 
strategies could provide the strongest basis of generalization. In addition, by focusing on 
either ends of the performance spectrum (high and low performers) offers a sharper contrast 
in terms of management, governance and experiences among SACCOs which might provide 
more valuable insights and perspectives than the sample of the middle performers (Mannion 
et al., 2005). A causal process tracing case study approach was used to explore what made the 
observed performance the outcome possible as recommended by Blatter (2015). The sample 
SACCOs were drawn from three regions: Dar Es Salaam, Arusha and Mwanza. The fourth 
region, Kilimanjaro, was not included because it had few reported SACCOs and did not have 
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a diversity of high performing and low performing to choose from. All of the SACCOs in the 
region were either low performing or middling but none was identified as high performing. 
 
A multiple case study approach was chosen to enable comparative analysis of top performers 
and low performers. An instrumental case study design was used rather than intrinsic, 
meaning that we expected to collect information which might lead to some “generalization” 
(Yin, 2009; Remenyi; 2013; Harvard, 2013). Our approach was pragmatic rather than 
naturalistic, implying that it was guided by focused semi-structured questions which were 
refined iteratively through engagement with the cases (Yin, 2009). 
 
The study unit comprised SACCOs which were represented by management (board chair and 
manager). The data collection approach involved visiting the selected SACCOs where 
detailed in-depth interviews with managers and board members were conducted. Initially we 
planned to include members but it was technically not feasible given the time limitation and 
their geographical dispersion. We had a meeting which lasted between 60-120 minutes at each 
SACCO. In each SACCOs the meeting included at least a board chairman and/or a manager. 
Where possible the board chairman, manager and loan officers participated jointly in the in-
depth interview. Table 7.2 provides breakdown of the participants from each SACCO. The 
data source was triangulated by having two interviewers (the researcher and a trained master’s 
student) who was recording the research and summarizing the results independently before 
combining them. Initially we planned to collect data from archival sources and from the 
members but it were not possible practically due to the fragmented nature or non-existence of 
proper record-keeping among SACCOs. 
 
The interview was guided by a semi-structured questionnaire (see Appendix A.7.3) to ensure 
that the key themes reported in the literature are explored and provide reliable and comparable 
data across SACCOs. The research focused on the following themes: historical background 
and strategic mission; key drivers of SACCOs’ performance; seven principles of cooperatives 
and how they are being applied in running SACCOs; quality of governance; quality of 
management; incidence of mismanagement of funds; political interference; and other 
emerging concerns. Depending on availability, data from secondary sources (annual financial 
and performance reports, company policy) were also collected. The major questions to be 
answered were:  
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i. Do larger firms perform better than small firms? 
ii. Do quality of management and governance matter?  
iii. Do firms which effectively follow cooperative principles in their operation perform 
better than those which do not? 
iv. What else is affecting the performance of your SACCO? (social, political, ethical, and 
administrative)  
 
The information collected was analyzed using content analysis. The coding and grouping 
were done manually to identify the emerging common themes. Further detailed analysis was 
done to compare workers’ SACCOs and community-based SACCOs. Such comparison is 
useful in identifying unique challenges based on the type of common bonds. The emerging 
themes and concerns were discussed in relation to existing theoretical and empirical literature 
with a focus on what distinguishes high performing from low performing SACCOs. 
 
Table 7.2: The breakdown of the participants from each SACCO 
SACCO Name  Board Chair Manager Loan Officer Total Participants 
 1 X X X 3 
 2  X X 2 
 3  X X  2 
 4  X X  2 
 5   X  1 
 6  X X  2 
 7   X  1 
 8  X  1 
 9  X X  2 
 10  X X X 3 
 11  X  1 
 12   X  1 
 13  X X  2 
 14  X X X 3 
 15   X  1 
 16 X   1 
 17 X   1 
 18  X X  2 
 19   X  1 
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7.4 Results and discussion  
The SACCOs visited were diverse in terms of asset ownership, operating environment and 
type of common bond among members. Figure 7.1 illustrates the offices of some of the top 
performers in the sample. The first office and parking complex (to the left) belongs to one of 
the leading and largest SACCOs in the country. The second building is owned by a medium 
sized high performing SACCO located in the northeast of Mwanza region. The third picture 
(right) is the office rented by one of the rural SACCOs in Mwanza region. Based on the 
diversity as shown in the pictures in Figure 7.1 and in our field experience it became apparent 
that the three SACCOs are operating in distinctly different environments, and are exposed to 
different opportunities and access to resources. Yet according to our performance matrix all of 
them were categorised as high performing SACCOs. The first two SACCOs built their own 
offices while the third SACCO is renting from a local landlord. All these three SACCOs were 
categorized as high performing in terms of efficiency, sustainability and profitability.  
 
We used the three pictures for conciseness but each represents a sample cluster of the 
operating environment of SACCOs in our study population. More importantly, the key lesson 
which emerges here is that, even though size is important and urban SACCOs enjoy more 
advantages in terms of population density and other infrastructure, small and rural-based 
SACCOs can still thrive and stand on their own feet. More specifically, they can afford to 
offer superior financial services without compromising on their sustainability. 
   
SACCO 1 (Urban) SACCO 7 (Town) SACCO 9 (Rural) 
 
Figure 7.1: Offices of some of selected top performers 
After in-depth studies of the high performing and low performing SACCOs, several concerns 
emerged as setbacks of performance in SACCOs. We categorised these concerns 
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(opportunities) into four major themes: common concerns (opportunities), worker-based 
SACCOs concerns (opportunities), community-based concerns (opportunities), unique but 
pressing concerns. The common concerns cluster includes all the opportunities and challenges 
which affect the performance of SACCOs across the board. The worker-based SACCOs 
concerns focused on worker-specific challenges and opportunities. The community-based 
SACCOs concerns focused on non-workers (street/community) specific challenges and 
opportunities. The rest of the section will discuss common concerns (opportunities), workers 
concerns (opportunities), community concerns (opportunities) and unique concerns. 
 
7.4.1 Common emerging concerns (opportunities) on SACCOs performance  
i) Being closer to the community and financial exclusion from mainstream banking  
The respondents from all SACCOS visited revealed that SACCOs visited were formed to 
address the financial exclusion problem and empower their members through offering savings 
and loan products for consumption smoothing and investments. This is in line with the debate 
on financial market failure and credit rationing by mainstream banking in Tanzania, where 
more than 90% of the population is excluded from the formal financial system (FinScope, 
2009). The potential market is still huge and most of the banks are reluctant to operate in the 
lower income space, which gives SACCOs a unique advantage in terms of potential market. 
Since SACCOs are a type of community-initiated micro banking, there is a close relationship 
between SACCOs’ officers and their members. In most cases the management team also 
comes from within the community, which makes it easy to monitor borrowers. It also makes it 
easy for members to monitor the behaviour of their managers and board members in 
managing their hard-earned savings. All in all, being close to the community offers the 
members and management an information advantage over what the mainstream bank could 
not feasibly have access to. Such information advantage helps to mitigate the traditional 
problem of information asymmetry, especially the problem of adverse selection among 
borrowers. For example, it opens up room for other forms of non-traditional collateral (soft 
collateral) and screening mechanisms such as social networks and community trustworthiness 
of the borrowers. This is demonstrated by the following quotations from the manager and a 
member from SACCO 14. 
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This is a bank of the people by the people. We live with our clients which enables 
us to understand their behaviour and social economic activities which make our 
work easier. (Manager – SACCO 14) 
This is our bank, we live and work with our leaders and by the end of the year we 
receive dividends contrary to major banks which will never recognise you 
because you are too poor for them. (A member of SACCO 14) 
 
However, it is instructive to note that the information advantage and peer monitoring is 
effective for small group/communities, but it becomes less effective once the SACCOs grow 
bigger and relax their common bond. For example SACCO 18 in Mwanza region was 
supported and founded by donors with a major focus on outreach. In order to maximize the 
impact on outreach they opened up a common bond to accept any person in the middle to 
lower income bracket who lives or works in Mwanza city. Yes indeed, they grew 
exponentially in terms of membership but they lost members’ cohesion, and peer monitoring 
and cooperative identity became weak. They were seen as a safe haven for strategic defaulters 
who joined the SACCO with the intention of taking a loan and disappearing. The default rate 
increased significantly and the transaction cost of monitoring and loan recovery exploded. As 
of now the SACCO has suspended its operation for two years and is undergoing a 
resuscitation programme by Equity Bank
14
. The SACCO is bleeding financially due to 
membership dropout as demonstrated in Figure 7.2. The management is working to get a 
turnaround strategy including narrowing the open common bond to a stricter and more 
manageable common bond.  
 
                                                     
14
 Equity Bank is a Kenyan-based bank offering retail banking, microfinance and related services. Recently it has 
opened its doors to other East African countries including Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan. 




Figure 7.2: Membership growth over time for SACCO 18 
 
I think we opened up our door too wide. Many people “good” and “bad” flocked 
in, we lost internal control since we didn’t know each other well. Our business is 
mainly hinged on trust, once it is broken the business vanishes. (Manager from 
SACCO 18) 
 
We would love to serve all the women in Dar Es Salaam but some women are 
crooks and have evil intentions. Before lending, you need to know your client 
history better. But with wide geographical coverage it is very difficult to know 
your clients closely. We have resorted into use of collateral. But members are still 
letting us down. For example we have a case going on in the court where one of 
our members gave us a title deed of her house as collateral for TZS 45 million 
loan but also clandestinely borrowed using the same house from a commercial 
bank where she surrendered the initial purchase contract. By the time she 
defaulted our loan, we wanted to repossess the house just to realise that the bank 
had already sold the house due to a default of 6 million TZS she took from them. 
Untrustworthiness, lack of financial responsibility and multiple loans is a drug in 
our business. (Manager – SACCO 2) 
 
In sum, being a community-initiated micro bank, owned by the community and working for 
the community offers unique advantages to SACCOs which increase their members’ loyalty 
and patronage to services and survival. But such unique advantages are eroded once the 
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the members perceive that the management is not running the institutions responsibly. High 
performing SACCOs have a relatively well defined and “closed” common bond which helps 
to create the strong identify and “we” feeling among the members and amplify the patronage 
and responsible behaviour among members. Deviant members can be easily detected and 
dealt with collectively in contrast to flexible bond SACCOs which easily succumb to the 
standard problem of free-riding in peer monitoring and strategic defaulting. 
 
ii) Diversification of income-earning activities  
Most top-performing SACCOs have diversified income sources in contrast to those which 
depend only on fees and interest income. For example, SACCO 3 in Arusha is one of the most 
diversified SACCOs in our sample and had the highest sustainability score. It generates total 
annual revenue which is three times higher than total expenses. SACCO 3 assumed a 
conservative growth strategy and a very strict common bond. It started with 87 members 
during 2008 and by the end of 2015 had only 80 members but they were very active. Their 
capital is diversified into the milk distribution business which is the major source of income 
and they have their own shops which service their members as well as outsiders. Also they 
have a meat shop which offers services to members and general public. When combined with 
interest income and fees from SACCO’s operation, their annual net income is outstanding and 
it is one of the most sustainable SACCOs in the sample.  
 
Other top-performing SACCOs which have adopted income diversification opportunities are 
SACCO 1, SACCO 10 and SACCO 13. These SACCOs adopted different strategies of 
income diversification: some invested in real estate and land development, some invested in 
stock markets, and some invested in small business. For example SACCO 1 has invested in 
two eight storey buildings (see the picture on the left in Figure 7.1) in Dar Es Salaam central 
business district. One building is for the office complex and the other is for parking. The 
SACCOs operations use part of the office complex to run their operations, the rest of the 
building is rented out to other businesses. Apart from the buildings, they also buy large tracts 
of land in areas where there is potential for growth: they survey the land, process the title 
deeds and sell surveyed plots to their members with a profit margin. The real estate sector in 
major cities in Tanzania is booming given the high rate of rural-urban influx and population 
growth. They have also invested in different companies through the Dar Es Salaam stock 
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exchange. The narratives below demonstrate the experiences of management on 
diversification. 
 
Our diversification strategy has helped us in many ways. First of all it has 
enabled us to empower our members by selling the plots which are fully surveyed 
with title deeds albeit the bureaucracy in the land departments. Also we have 
managed to make some sizable income from stock market. For example we bought 
CRDB Bank shares @ 120 TZS about two years ago and now we sold them @ 
500 TZS which gave us a reasonable margin towards our net income. (Board 
Chairperson – SACCO 1) 
 
We bought land for development about two years ago for 45 million TZS and we 
later sold it for 75 million TZS recently. It was not a bad margin. Since we have 
excess funds we are trying to extend loans for other SACCOs, however we don’t 
know how to effectively do it. At the moment we are offering wholesale loans 
based on our previous relations with specific SACCOs. (Board Chairman – 
SACCO 13) 
 
Our core business is tomato brokering but along the way we sell products and 
services related to tomato business like new and used crates for tomato 
packaging, fee collection and other related businesses. The SACCO is there to 
offer saving facility and complementary financial and investment services. We 
have committed ourselves to religiously contribute 10% of our daily sales into our 
SACCOs. As of now we have excess funds which are more than loan demand but 
may not be enough for our future strategic investment including real estate and 
office complex. (Deputy Chairman of the BoD – SACCO 10) 
 
All in all, most well-performing SACCOs were more innovative and proactive in generating 
extra income sources beyond traditional fees and interest income. Some of them, such as 
SACCO 3, have extra management structures in place such as a business committee 
responsible for alternative investment decisions. When viewed from a broader perspective 
these SACCOs are adopting a multipurpose cooperative strategy with both investment 
services and retail services. This category of SACCO enjoys both the inherent advantages of 
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diversification and the economies of scope, especially when the projects are housed within the 
same location as the SACCOs and/or can use the same resources. However, there are other 
high-performing SACCOs, such as SACCO 7, which survive on interest and fee income, but 
their relative performance lags behind those SACCOs which adopted diversification 
strategies. Conversely, low performing SACCOs had limited or no income diversification 
strategy and relied mainly on interested income to run their operations. With low volume and 
frequency of transactions and a relatively low interest rate on loans (12-24%) compared to 
commercial lending (18-30%) it is difficult to accumulate extra revenue to run the business 
sustainably. 
 
iii) Good governance and quality management  
Corporate governance and effective leadership play a key role in high performing firms. By 
law, most SACCOs have a board of directors composed of nine members and at least two 
committees, a steering committee and an audit committee, while some SACCOs may have 
more if they so wish. What emerges as a distinguishing factor for high performing SACCOs is 
the dedication and responsiveness of the board members in carrying out their duties. Board 
members of high performing firms met regularly, at least four times a year, and have effective 
oversight on the management and financial affairs of the organization. In addition board 
members in high performing SACCOs are treated like any other member should they wish to 
use the financial services such as borrowing. They have clear procedures and rules guiding 
the loan disbursement, repayment and follow up of nonperforming loans. For example 
SACCO 2, which was the best SACCO during National Credit Union day in 2014, is strict 
and clear on its loan procedures. For them, if you are a board member and you default, your 
membership will be revoked and necessary action for recovery of the loan is taken as per 
procedure. They believe that leaders should lead by being good examples in managing their 
loans and financial affairs.  
 
At face value, an assessment of the quality of governance and management based on the 
composition and structure of the board members and manager’s education shows no 
systematic difference between low and high performing SACCOs, as demonstrated in Table 
A.7.2. This is not surprising because according to regulations imposed on them through 
cooperative acts they need to comply with minimum criteria. What really distinguishes the 
high performing from low performing SACCOS is more of organization culture on how to 
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implement and stay impartial during the oversight and intermediation process by the board 
members and management. 
 
The education of the board members was heterogeneous but at least all of them could read 
and write. By law (URT, 2013), all board members are supposed to have a minimum of 
secondary school education but for rural areas this can be relaxed into the ability to read and 
write due to the shortage of qualified people. For bigger SACCOs, having board members 
with extensive financial education and experience gave them an extra advantage. For example 
the board chair of SACCO 14 is an accountant and the accountant of SACCO 1 has an MBA 
and is a CPA holder. Some board members from small rural SACCOs argue that advanced 
financial education and experience are not essential but they need a person who is committed 
and trustworthy and who can read and interpret financial statements. A good example is 
SACCO 9, which is a well performing SACCO but is being managed and governed by the 
local villages mostly with primary education and hardly any secondary education. But they 
are very committed to cutting down expenses and increasing their revenue. They control 
expenses and are vigilant in considering alternative sources of revenue. They had a very bad 
experience with a trained accountant which is evident in their negative attitude towards the 
educated as demonstrated by the quote below.  
 
We were doing quite well but about two years ago we hired an educated 
accountant. He was extravagant and he used to play around with numbers. He 
almost pushed us to a bottomless pit. As board chair after realising this I had to 
make the difficult choice with my fellow board members of firing him. He was not 
happy with my decision and he took me to court but I am happy that at least I 
rescued our SACCO and our legacy. We are so afraid of educated elite and they 
will never be given administrative or leadership position in our SACCO. They are 
just clever evils (robbers) who can steal in daylight without being noticed but they 
are welcome to become members. (Board Chair – SACCO 9) 
 
According to the perceptions of the respondents, an effective board should have committed 
dedicated and informed members who are trustworthy, proactive, and good at conflict 
resolution and decision making. The respondents also reported that board members must be 
willing and ready to serve the community. Likewise, the manager and other staff members 
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must have relevant cooperatives and financial education, be trustworthy and willing and ready 
to serve the community. In sum, high performing SACCOs had active and responsible board 
members and relatively well-trained managers who are highly committed and dedicated to 
make a positive impact on the community. Most of the poor performing SACCOs had either 
less committed board members and/or managers who were to too busy with other activities to 
devote meaningful time to cooperative affairs. 
 
iv) Capital constraints  
Of the 19 SACCOs visited 17 complained about significant capital constraints. Members have 
high appetite for borrowing but SACCOs do not have enough money to lend. As a matter of 
practice, members are allowed to borrow up to three times their saving; this makes it difficult 
to have enough internal capital to meet the members’ demand. Borrowing money from local 
and international financial markets is prohibitively costly and leaves them with little margin. 
Most of the SACCOs visited charge interest rates between 14% and 24% Annual Percentage 
Rate (APR). However, most of the local commercial banks extend wholesale loans at an 
interest rate of 17–23% APR, and there are international players such as Oiko Credit15 which 
extends a loan with a flexible interest between 12%–23%. Given the high interest rates 
charged by the wholesale lenders it is technically difficult for a SACCO to take a loan and 
have extra margin after operation costs. This was described by a frustrated board member 
below. 
 
We took a loan of about 600m Tshs from Oiko Credit four years ago. We serviced 
the loan religiously without missing any payment dates. We finished with a clean 
record and were rated among the top performing SACCOs by Oiko Credit in East 
Africa. This year (2014) the officers from Oiko Credit were here begging us to 
take another loan but we chased them away. Our experiences in the previous loan 
taught us the best (worst) lesson. When we signed a loan contract Oiko Credit 
linked the interest with the Treasury bill but capped to 12% APR should the 
Treasury bill drop beyond that threshold. Unfortunately we could not foresee the 
upward swing and we left it open. As macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated, 
the Tanzanian government borrowed more from the local financial market, the 
                                                     
15
 Oiko Credit (Ecumenical Development Cooperative Society) is among the world’s largest financier of 
microfinance institutions. It is a Dutch-based cooperative society that offers loans or investment capital for 
microfinance institutions, cooperatives and small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries. 
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treasury bills skyrocketed to 23%. We ended up paying interest of 23% on a 
dollar denominated loan. Also our Tanzanian shillings kept depreciating and we 
lost a huge sum in exchanges rate. 
 
It was our first international finance transaction. We never knew how to hedge 
against exchange rate or interest rate. The story was further complicated by most 
of our members who borrowed the very same money and invested in pyramid 
schemes which collapsed later and led to systemic default. Overnight, a very 
successful SACCO was turned upside down. We changed from being a top leading 
SACCO in Tanzania to a futureless SACCO. We are now changing our strategy 
and start investing more on internal capital generation. We are very positive that 
we are back on track. For the first year after the crisis we have made a positive 
profit of 46 million TZS. But we are still struggling on how to raise enough capital 
to meet our demand. However at the current market interest we think external 
borrowing is a no go area. (Board Chair – SACCO 14) 
 
There are couple of wholesale lenders, mostly local commercial banks, including CRDB 
Bank, NMB Bank, Equity Bank and pension funds such as NSSF and PPF. In addition there is 
a government agency called SELF which is mandated to provide wholesale financing to 
SACCOs. Among these the most affordable player is SELF, which extends wholesale loans at 
11%. But there is a general perception that it is an extension of a political party rather than an 
independent financial institution. The clients perceive it to be more politically motivated in its 
decisions rather than based on business factors. The narration below demonstrates their 
feelings about SELF. 
 
About a year ago we applied for 100 million TZS loan from SELF. They sent their 
officer and we sat together and went through a due diligence exercise. Later we 
were invited to their headquarter office in Dar es Salaam and we gave them all 
the necessary documents they needed from us. They told us our loan will be 
approved. We gave the feedback to our members and the promised amount was 
included in our next budget. Surprisingly after some time, we were told that they 
have approved our loan to the tune of 5 million. We were very shocked to hear 
that especially after all the effort and promises we made to our members. We 
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rejected 5 million because it was too small for the purpose. We asked them to 
explain in writing as to why we did not qualify for 100 million. They have never 
replied to date. They messed up our reputation and respect we have built between 
governance team and our members for years. We hope at least one day they will 
tell us what went wrong. (Board Chair – SACCO 3) 
 
Due to prohibitive interest rates many SACCOs are realising the importance of raising capital 
internally and the need to incentivise the members to save more. However they say that 
cooperative education and financial literacy education among the members is too low and 
needs significant investment. Most of the SACCOs are struggling to survive, let alone funding 
members’ training and education. But some proactive SACCOs have started paying interest of 
about 8% APR on savings and deposit accounts to encourage savings. However, for effective 
implementation of such a strategy financial software may be required to increase precision 
and efficiency in computation of monthly interest rates, but the financial software is too 
expensive for most of them. Nevertheless, many SACCOs are starting to look for capital 
accumulation as demonstrated below. 
 
We need to do something different to raise capital. Over the years I have learned 
that banks are not a friend of the poor. Taking the money from commercial banks 
is modern form of slavery. They give you the money at a high interest rate. They 
sit in fancy offices enjoying the air conditioning. We do all the hard work of 
forcing borrowers to pay back the money with our own meagre resources. But 
during the time to harvest they take all the harvest and we are left with the reject 
loans which we are not even sure will ever be recovered. (Manager – SACCO 11) 
 
We are not planning to take external loans and we have never taken one because 
we had learned from our fellow SACCOs how disastrous is the external loan on 
SACCOs’ financial affairs. (Manager – SACCO 5) 
 
The problem of capital constraint requires action to be taken. While there might be no single 
solution, a combination of internal capital mobilization and some sort of government support 
in terms of a SACCO credit guarantee scheme may help to mitigate the problem. The 
SACCOs can adopt an aggressive strategy towards savings mobilization through members’ 
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education and paying reasonable rates on medium to long term savings accounts. To 
complement this strategy the government can create a special credit guarantee scheme in 
which commercial banks could extend an affordable credit line to SACCOs as a form of 
external finance. 
 
v) Competition with commercial banks and other microfinance and multiple loan providers 
Competition from other financial institutions has been cited as a problem, especially for the 
urban SACCOs. The major concerns are on cherry-picking of the premium clients by 
commercial banks, emergence of multiple loans, and difficulties in recruitment of new 
members. Most urban SACCOs, especially those which are capital constrained, lamented that 
premium customers are very sensitive to service quality and are less likely to tolerate service 
delay in matters such as disbursement of loans. When such clients are dissatisfied, they move 
to commercial banks and become inactive in the SACCOs. It is even trickier now because 
banks have been aggressive in downscaling and competing with SACCOs by using 
community-based bank agencies. The observed loss of premium clients due to declining 
service quality is in line with the theoretical predication of Hirschman. According to his 
theory, loyalty is the dominant factor guiding the interaction between voice and exit among 
members. He argues that when there is a service quality decline, less loyal clients will exit but 
loyal clients will stay and make effective use of their voice with an option to exit should the 
SACCO fail to rectify the service quality. Thus, the very fact that, despite the loss of the 
premium members, these organizations still thrive supports the dimension of the same theory 
which emphasises that more loyal clients will postpone their exit and use their voice more 
effectively with the possibility of an exit in the future should the voice option not work 
(Hirschman, 1970). 
 
Another concern which emerged among the urban SACCOs was multiple loans from different 
institutions. Because of the increased competition among lenders, the lack of a coordinated 
effort among lending institutions, and the lack of credit bureau institutions has created an 
avenue for opportunistic borrowers to take advantage by borrowing from more than one 
institution (double/multiple dipping) which ultimately increases the chances of default. Once 
such a client defaults, the effect becomes contagious across the exposed SACCOs. This is 
demonstrated by the field experience from one of the SACCO managers cited in the previous 
quotes.  
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We have just lost one of our clients who died from heart attack. A week before his 
death I went to visit him for debt collection purposes. I found him in bed and he 
told me he was suffering from heart attack, anxiety and stress because the 
business had collapsed and had multiple loans. While he is busy thinking how the 
family will get the next meal he receives threat of asset repossession from more 
than three financial institutions. He was immersed in a financial crisis. I am sorry 
for his life and the family he left behind. (Manager – SACCO 2) 
 
vi) Agency problem (board, managers, accountant)  
The agency problem featured in some SACCOs where the board, managers and accountant 
colluded and pursued their self-interest at the expense of the institutions they are supposed to 
protect. This behaviour has been prevalent in large SACCOs with excess funds or when the 
SACCOs receive external funding as either a loan or a government grant. In the presence of 
the external funds and weak oversight from the members the management (board and 
management) collude and allocate a large proportion of the money into their own accounts, 
crowding out the service to the members and inflating the non-performing loans and cost of 
running the SACCOs. When this happens, management becomes hostile towards inquisitive 
members, the auditing authority and other external oversight entities. By and large, however, 
high performing SACCOs are run by a committed board and management who adhere to the 
budget procedure which ensures that all expected external funding in the future is 
communicated to members and its subsequent use is approved by the members at the annual 
general meeting. A good example is demonstrated by the following narration from the one of 
the cooperative officers. 
 
Last year we visited one of the saving and credit cooperatives with the intention of 
doing auditing and performance monitoring as per usual procedures as specified 
in our job description and Tanzania cooperative act. Our initiative was probed by 
the complaints from some of the members of the cooperative that there is misuse 
of the fund by the top echelons in the SACCOs. When we arrived there, the 
management refused to grant us access into the premises and denied us the 
accounting books and financial records. We invoked the power vested onto us by 
the cooperative law and used the state power, arrested them and put them in 
police lock up. Within four hours the head of the custodian police station received 
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a phone call from one of the top politicians directing that the culprits should be 
released immediately.  
 
We made a follow up to re-arrest them but the police did not cooperate. We took 
aggressive measures to educate the minister what we are trying to do and he 
apologised for not being informed and gave us the go ahead. After a series of 
tireless efforts we managed to get access to the SACCOs. After our auditing and 
inspection, we later came to learn that they have stolen over 300 million TZS 
which was shared among the people in their geopolitical network including the 
police officers and some of the key politically connected persons who was used as 
a bridge to be granted a bail from the top politicians. 
 
Apart from the above narration from the cooperative officer, the past board of SACCO 14 and 
SACCO 18 was also cited to have engaged in financial misconduct by some sort of collusion 
among the board and management which contributed towards underperformance of their 
organizations. The observed behaviour is in line with the prediction of George Stigler’s 
(1971) theory of regulatory capture. According to this theory, the regulatory agency (in this 
case the board) eventually becomes dominated by the very industry or industries it is charged 
with regulating. In other words, it is a gamekeeper-turned-poacher situation. In doing so, 
instead of serving the interest of the members, the board and management are concentrating 
their effort on serving their own interest instead of the interest of the members, making a 
fallacy of the agency framework in corporate governance. The central concern with the 
agency theory is about the question famously coined as “But who will guard the guardians?” 
(Hurwicz,2008). The possible solution to this could be an increased level of transparency, 
frequent oversight by the external auditing agency and the need to have a random team among 
the members to do a frequent random reality check on the system. It could also be useful to 
educate the members to be more active players in overseeing the SACCO’s affairs. 
 
vii) Inadequate cooperative education, financial literacy and entrepreneurship among 
members  
The problem of the low level of cooperative education, financial literacy and entrepreneurial 
skills have featured across all SACCOs regardless of whether they are high performing or low 
performing. Surprisingly, the problem is not specific to members only, for example the 
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cooperative officers complained that high ranking government officials and politicians have a 
limited or vague understanding of cooperatives, which makes the implementation and support 
of the cooperative extension services very difficult. From management and board perspectives 
they feel frustrated due to the limited knowledge of cooperatives and limited financial 
literacy, which makes it difficult to help the members effectively. This is manifested 
especially in the management of development loans extended by SACCOs to their members. 
Normally development loans are higher in value and have a long-term repayment period. The 
major problem is that most of the time such loans are used in nonproductive assets, non-viable 
business projects or for unplanned consumption. Once any such use happens it escalates the 
risk of default and consequently affects the loan portfolio quality of the SACCOs and thus the 
performance of the respective SACCOs.  
 
Some of the high performing SACCOs, such as SACCO 1, have taken an aggressive strategy 
to educate members and staff on cooperative education, financial literacy and 
entrepreneurship. Other SACCOs, such as SACCO 14, offer compulsory entrepreneurship 
and prudential investment training prior to the disbursement of the loan. The model works 
perfectly for them because they have specific loan application cycles which mean that all the 
clients who apply for a loan facility in a specific period are approved almost at the same time 
and can attend joint training at the same time. Regardless of the individual SACCOs’ efforts 
to tackle the problem of cooperative, entrepreneurial and financial literacy education among 
members, all SACCOs complained that it is a very expensive venture and is a lifelong 
process. They are of the opinion that there is a need for the government, donor agencies and 
academic institutions to put in place a training framework to help fill the gap. Such an 
intervention could be feasible if cooperative education, entrepreneurship skills and financial 
literacy are integrated into the education curriculum. Such innovation could start by designing 
a suitable curriculum starting from primary education to higher education institutions. Also 
some short-term training and a support system for adult learners and members should be in 
place.  
 
viii) Tax burden 
The tax burden has been cited by the larger SACCOs as a major setback. According to the 
manager of SACCO 1, the SACCOs work within a very tight margin to keep up with the 
competition, improve members’ welfare and at the same time guarantee sustainability. 
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However, given its national coverage and large membership base, its annual turnover is well 
over 50 million TZS which is the minimum threshold beyond which an entity attracts 
corporate tax and so they have to pay corporate tax of 30%.  
 
This is unfair practice. I wish they could use the net profit to establish a tax 
threshold and not turnover because the turnover may look huge but the actual 
margin is quite thin. (Board Chairman – SACCO 1). 
 
The general sentiment among the SACCOs is that they should be exempted from taxes given 
the very role of helping to uplift the poor through making financial services available to them. 
Taxation adds an extra burden, reduces the lending ability and drives financial cooperatives 
from the market. Whether the argument should be maintained needs in-depth investigation 
including the international comparison and best practice in the industry, which goes beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Our opinion is that these institutions need to be exempted from 
taxation due to their social and development roles like any other development finance 
institutions. 
 
ix) Political interference  
Generally political interference in SACCO’s operation at micro level was very limited. To a 
large extent the surveyed SACCOs claimed a significant degree of independence and 
detachment from political interference, especially after the new cooperative act of 2013. 
According to this act board members and managers of SACCOs cannot be politically active 
while holding office. This decision was taken to ensure that political activities and 
interference did not become entangled with cooperative operations. This is a remarkable 
improvement of cooperative movement independence from political interference compared to 
the historical past as demonstrated in Birchall and Simmons (2010). However at the macro-
level, political interference was reported to be omnipresent. It manifests itself through two 
channels. The first channel is when the government decides to extend a loan/grant to 
SACCOs. Once this happens the politicians start influencing how the money should be 
distributed to cater for their interests. Such behaviour jeopardises the integrity of the entire 
lending process and increases the risk of default. On the members’ side, once they know that 
the money comes from government they treat the money as gift/grant from government and 
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become reluctant to pay it back, which leads to strategic default. In short, allowing 
government or politically connected money to flow into a SACCO is like mixing poison with 
the food while preparing a meal for your family. This is demonstrated by one of the narratives 
from the cooperative supervisor below. 
 
We have decided to put a moratorium on government fund/grants from flowing to 
SACCOs if any. We took this decision because government grant/loan makes more 
harm to SACCOs than helping them. They came with clear written conditions but 
behind, there is a compulsory unwritten condition which is poisonous. For 
example you get a soft loan of 10 million TZS from the government. Before it 
arrives a memo is sent to the cooperative officer to make sure that about 20% of 
the money is remitted back as a commission to the source via a private bank 
account. As if that is not enough, by the time the residual money arrive at 
SACCOs, the councillors, and other politically connected people send their 
relatives and friends with memo that they should be given a priority because they 
influenced the SACCOs to get the money. Once this happens the entire beneficiary 
will always default and you can’t have enough discretion to pursue them because 
they are politically shielded with political authority. The end result is that the 
target clients who are members of SACCOs never benefit but they end up paying 
the debt which they never enjoyed in the first place. (Cooperative Officer) 
 
Another political interference which was predominantly mentioned by the cooperatives 
officers and some board members is the tendency of the government to frustrate cooperative 
development. They perceive that this has been the trend since the time of the founding 
president who later closed the entire cooperative sector in the 1970s. The central reason 
behind the frustration from the government is hinged on a power struggle. Politicians are 
discouraging the cooperative development because it empowers the people, and once people 
are empowered they are likely to make choices which may jeopardise their political 
entrenchment. This becomes more threatening if the current regime is not delivering to the 
expectation of the citizens, which gives a wedge to position political parties to use the 
cooperative movement to their advantage. This power conflict and political influence is 
complex to deal with because it is entrenched within the political economy of power relations 
among different actors of the state. 
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x) Other emerging concerns  
Other emerging issues were as follows: high cost of financial software and lack of local 
technical support; difficulty in recruiting and retaining well-trained and talented financial 
experts due to increased competition from the formal banking sector; high transaction costs 
for collecting bad debts (chronic debt); inadequate support from Cooperative Officers (limited 
capacity and resources). These concerns were common across the board regardless of whether 
SACCOs were high performing or low performing. The rest of the section provides a detailed 
discussion of each of the concerns mentioned. 
 
As a cooperative grows in size of operation and increases the product portfolio, it becomes 
difficult to reconcile their records and accounting. The need for automated financial software 
becomes imperative. However, the current cost of financial software (15 million TZS) is 
extremely expensive relative to SACCOs’ revenue. Even when the SACCOs squeeze their 
meagre income to buy the software, the technical support is too expensive. There is no local 
qualified supply of this type of expertise; they have to rely on experts from India, Kenya and 
Uganda who inflate the cost of operations. Thus while the software might increase the 
efficiency of intermediation, the high product cost might outweigh the benefits accrued from 
efficiency gains. There is a need for the government through the Ministry of Cooperatives to 
work jointly with local and international academic institutions to build local capacity in the 
domain of financial engineering. 
 
Recruitment of well-trained financial experts with a first degree or more is very difficult 
because of the weak financial capacity of SACCOs and what they can afford to pay their 
employees. One SACCO manager shared his frustration in relation to recruitment challenges 
as follows: 
 
We have decided to focus on recruitment of people with certificate and diploma in 
cooperatives, accounting and finance. We simply can’t afford the degree 
graduates. We have burnt our hand long enough such that now we know the way 
to go. If you recruit degree graduates, you train them after six months they are 
poached by commercial banks, you try again you end up on the same pit. They 
simply make you their springboard towards greener pastures. Their expectation is 
too high and they are always on the constant move. (Board Chair – SACCO 2) 
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Among the challenges, dealing with problematic loans and chronic loans was mentioned as 
one of the painful experiences there could be in the operation of SACCOs. The major 
challenges start with the fact that most of the SACCOs are community-based, thus members 
and SACCOs management and board members mingle in different socio-economic pursuits 
ranging from work place, drinking place, residential neighbourhood and worship centres etc. 
Such close relationships build special “emotional” and “family” attachments. The resulting 
socio-emotional ties among the community make it difficult to use coercive methods in the 
process of recovery of bad loans by the internal staff. This is demonstrated by some of the 
narratives below. 
 
It is very difficult to worship with a fellow today and tomorrow you go by his 
door, declare him bankrupt, take all his belongs including the bed and leave him 
and his family in a weird situation because he defaulted. The next day you learn 
that his/her kids can’t even afford the next meal and don’t have somewhere to 
sleep and start begging and pass in your house begging. It is emotionally 
torturing and it messes up relationships and breaks social ties. It basically makes 
you the enemy of the people and subjects you to a constant emotional guilt. 
  
One of the major challenges is that we are dealing with the poorest of the poor. 
When someone defaults and you visit for asset repossession, you feel pity for 
his/her situation even before you take anything from her because her life is 
already in a big mess. Sometimes it is beyond imagination what his/her life would 
be after taking his last asset from him. Imagine taking a bed and sofa set in the 
brink of the night while he toiled to accrue them over the span of ten years of hard 
work and saving. It is real a tough situation for any human being to be. But yet we 
need to do our job and protect the money of our clients. We are not a charity 
organization. Initially I used to cry with them and become frozen. My decision to 
confiscate any valuable assets to recover the loan used to run into a comma. But I 
have had enough of these cases and now I have become immune to that. I just do 
my job. When a defaulter comes crying, begging and narrating how life has been 
unfair to him. I always tell them just cry, tell all the stories but when you are done 
just tell me one thing i.e. how do we get our money back, full stop. (Manager – 
SACCO 2) 
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The alternative solution to circumvent the emotional ties between SACCOs management and 
defaulters is to use a third party such as a court broker or private auction mart. However this 
strategy has been tried by several SACCOs but has consistently failed in almost all cases. The 
major reasons for failure are the collusion of the third party with the debtors. The debtors 
bribe the auction mart agent, thus crippling his debt recovery effort. Another reason advanced 
was that the value recovered from debtors is too small, that once the auction marts deduct 
their operation cost and fees, little is left for the SACCO. Most of the SACCOs now have 
changed to an internal strategy where they have a special committee to follow up the 
collection of bad loans. The committee is composed of members, board members and 
representatives from the management. This proved successful: although it takes time, they 
mainly use trust building and soft collection methods but it is at least better than using a third 
party. In sum, following up bad debt significantly inflates the cost of operation for SACCOs 
and adds transaction costs to financial intermediation. 
 
7.4.2 Workers based SACCOs’ concerns (opportunities) 
Apart from the general opportunities and challenges discussed in the previous subsection, 
workers SACCOs face unique opportunities and challenges. Ten worker-based SACCOs were 
included. In all ten SACCOs it emerged that unique advantage they enjoy is the lower cost of 
collection of debt and intermediations because of automatic payroll deductions. Thus the 
default rate is reduced significantly. However, the major challenge facing almost all workers’ 
SACCOs in our sample was the delayed remittance from the employers after automatic 
deduction. The employers deduct the payment at the end of each month but use the money for 
their own operations for two or more months. When they decide to remit to the respective 
SACCOs, they remit only a small fraction. This starves the SACCOs and makes their 
operation almost impossible. Many SACCOs are losing members due to this problem and it 
increases financial charges on external loans due to late servicing of their debts by SACCOs. 
The following narratives demonstrate the impact of delayed payment. 
 
Since the inception of our SACCO about 15 years ago it has consistently been 
offering premium financial services to its members. We recorded a surge in 
membership from 21 during 1999 to about 1,630 during 2006. However for the 
last seven years our success turned to be our greatest enemy. Our employer once 
realised that we have a sizable saving on monthly basis turned from being 
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gamekeeper into a poacher. Now he uses our money as he wishes without 
consulting. He deducts our money and stays with the deduction for over three 
months or more. When he remits, he does so in small bits. He has basically 
crippled down our operation. We are now experiencing the membership 
haemorrhage into commercial banks and it has been very difficult to recruit new 
members because of bad word of mouth about our ability to offer the reliable 
financial services. But the problem is really beyond our control as management. 
The government is really frustrating the cooperative operation by misusing our 
monies. Figure 7.3 demonstrates the loss of our membership due to the said 
behaviour. Unfortunately those who leave are the prime clients. (Membership 
trends in SACCO 2) 
 
 
Figure 7.3: SACCO membership numbers in SACCO 2 
Our employer deducts 75 million TZS every month which he is supposed to remit 
to SACCOs immediately. Unfortunately without any consultation with the 
SACCOs he decided to use the money for his own operation and remits only 8 
million after every other month. We have external loan of about 1.5 billion from 
pension fund. We need at least 45 million per month to service the loan. Any delay 
beyond 14 days attracts 5% late payment penalty. Our cost of operation has been 
escalated by the unacceptable behaviour of our employer. A SACCO which was 
dreaming to be the best in the industry has been sterilised to be the worst in the 
industry. We are pursuing the case in the court; hopefully we will make it. (Board 
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As an alternative solution, some SACCOs, such as SACCO 2 Women, has entered a joint 
venture with Equity Bank to resuscitate the situation and signed a contract of a special agency 
with the Ministry of Finance for invoice discounting services at the rate of 2% per month but 
they are guaranteed that they will get the money on time which will at least keep their 
members happy. 
 
Another challenge was the introduction of the new policy which requires that the employees 
should retain at least a third of their gross salary. The problem is that this was not 
communicated in advance and many members who had a loan carry-over from previous years 
cannot now service their loan due to this policy because automatic deductions cannot be made 
once the one-third threshold has been reached. This problem is aggravated by the practice of 
multiple loans from different institutions. 
 
7.4.3 Community based SACCOs’ concerns (opportunities)  
The non-workers SACCOs have serious problems of erratic and unpredictable cash flow, and 
high rates of default due to unstable and unpredictable income streams from the members. 
Out of the nine community-based SACCOs included in the study only one SACCO was not 
affected by this problem because of its very selective and tight niche of membership base and 
diversified portfolio. Other problems include high transaction costs and monitoring costs in 
debt servicing and recovery processes. This is escalated by mobile clients who make it 
difficult for their loan to be tracked on default. The narrative below demonstrates this. 
 
It is extremely difficult dealing with a mobile client who does not have a 
permanent place of domicile. You have this client who joins the SACCO and 
makes all necessary contribution and takes a loan. After some time he defaults, 
when you go to visit them the landlord informs you that he left about two months 
ago and his room has been rented out to someone else. (Loan officer – SACCO 2) 
 
This type of problem could be mitigated by adopting a mixture of strategies of using both 
borrower savings as partial guarantee and members’ co-guarantee. This will shift the lending 
model towards quasi-group guarantee rather purely individual guarantee. 
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7.5 Conclusion and recommendations 
The objective of this chapter was to explore the performance drivers (setbacks) among 
Tanzanian Saving and Credit Cooperatives using a multiple case study approach. Our results 
reveal that good governance, effective management, and income diversification plays a 
critical catalytic role in boosting performance. However, capital constraint was identified as a 
major stumbling block for performance of credit unions along with cooperative education, 
financial literacy and entrepreneurship education. These concerns seem to go beyond the 
capacity of the nascent SACCOs and might need a well-thought out government intervention 
to redress them.  
 
A possible solution to credit constraints is to develop a specialised loan guarantee scheme to 
SACCOs through a public private partnership. In this arrangement the government can enter 
into an agreement with commercial banks and private financiers to provide wholesale 
financing products at an affordable interest rate. Many SACCOs visited think they can operate 
with reasonable margins if they can secure a line of credit at 8-10% APR. The education and 
training on entrepreneurship and financial literacy is more of a long-term investment than 
something which can be dealt with immediately. However, with a well thought out plan the 
problem can be resolved. A suggestion is to create a training consortium which involves the 
private sector, academic institutions, and government support among cooperative members. In 
the long term, integrating cooperative education, financial literacy and entrepreneurship in the 
mainstream academic curriculum could help to mitigate the problem. 
 
Other important challenges were agency problems, weak governance and poor managerial 
skills. This can be addressed case by case as the need arises, but the cooperative officer of a 
district can enrich training programmes on effective governance and management skills of 
SACCOs. Some SACCOs are already doing this by including at least two hours training for 
all members during their annual general meeting and specific training sessions for board 
members and managers. Other SACCOs require a manager to have cooperative-related 
education before being hired. Once training is addressed another necessary issue that must be 
addressed is the agency problem, where board and members collude in their own self-
interests. Stringent penalties for such members and regular audits and close supervision and 
monitoring of SACCOs by government agencies can help to reduce the prevalence of this 
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problem. However the respective government agencies are underfunded and understaffed 
which this handicaps their capacity to deliver as explained in Chapter 2. 
 
The problem of multiple loans and strategic default behaviour associated with shifting the 
place of domicile after securing a loan can be addressed by implementation of a unique 
identification system such as a national identification system. Once there is a unique identifier 
and all financial transactions are linked to this identifier, including job/business history, this 
can help to mitigate the problem. The challenge is that it has taken a very long time for the 
system to be in place countrywide even though some significant effort has been made. The 
recent registration of credit bureaus may also help to some extent. The only concern about the 
credit bureaus is whether they are user-friendly and affordable for the financial institutions 
offering their service to the people at the bottom of the income pyramid.  
 
The problem of delayed payment in worker-based SACCOs needs a strong regulatory 
requirement to be implemented with immediate effect. Policy instruments to hold employers 
accountable and responsible for delayed disbursement to respective SACCOs should be 
developed and enacted with urgency.  
 
  




SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF KEY FINDINGS 
8.1 Summary  
Globally, there is an increasing interest in microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction, 
especially in developing countries. The interest is further enhanced by the success of the 
microfinance initiative of the Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, which later transformed 
into Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The growing interest in the microfinance movement is in 
response to the existing credit market failure in most of developing economies. In their 
seminal paper of 1981, Stiglitz and Weiss clearly articulated a theoretical explanation for the 
existence of such a market failure which is hinged on informational asymmetry. The main 
argument is that, due to imperfect information, banks tend to ration credit which denies the 
majority of the poor from accessing financial services (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). As a result 
88% of the adult population (CGAP, 2013) are excluded from mainstream financial services 
in sub-Saharan Africa and about 90% of the population are excluded in Tanzania (Finscope, 
2009). The existing credit market failure has created a financing gap which has opened 
opportunities for innovative microfinance. Microfinance institutions use innovative social 
collateral and peer monitoring mechanisms to circumvent the problem of information 
asymmetry. As result they can operate in the areas where banks cannot operate.  
 
Despite the growing interest in microfinance (including community-based micro-banking 
such as Saving and Credit Cooperatives) globally as a solution to redress the financing gap 
among the poor, the performance of these institutions remains mixed. Specifically, the 
question of whether these institutions can operate efficiently and sustainably in a competitive 
market given their exposure to a risky segment of the financial markets and small scale 
operations remains contentious and context-specific. Thus this research empirically explored 
the performance of SACCOs in terms of efficiency, financial sustainability and underlying 
performance drivers. Understanding the performance of these institutions plays an important 
role for the effective regulation and monitoring of these institutions to ensure their long-term 
continuity of financial services. More specifically, efficiency and sustainability measures are 
important managerial aspects for performance measurement and monitoring in the financial 
sector.  
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Apart from the question of the performance of microfinance being uncertain, most of the 
existing literature has relied on secondary data available in MIX market database. This has led 
to a systematic under-exploration of emerging community-based microfinance institutions 
which are not reported in MIX market because they are either too new or too small to be 
reported in MIX market. Taking this limitation into account, the current study used newly 
available data from SACCOs, which are fast-growing community-based microfinance 
operations in the Tanzanian context, to analyze their performance. 
 
The performance (measured using efficiency and sustainability), reflects a sound 
intermediation process of financial institutions and hence their due contribution to economic 
growth and continuity of service delivery (Aikaeli, 2008). Thus, for institutions such as 
SACCOs, which are predominantly small in their scale of operation and work mainly with 
poor and high risk clients, it is important to understand their efficiency and sustainability for 
effective management and regulation of the industry. 
 
Efficiency analysis was decomposed into three dimensions to explore possible sources of 
inefficiency. The first dimension was technical efficiency, which explored the overall 
effectiveness of transforming the productive inputs into desired outputs compared to the data-
driven frontier of best practice. The second dimension was pure technical efficiency, which 
captured managerial efficiency in the intermediation process. The third dimension was scale 
efficiency, which explored whether firms were operating in an optimal scale of operation: 
sustainability and profitability were explored using standard accounting ratios. 
 
The study employed methodological triangulation to empirically investigate the performance 
of SACCOs and what drives performance among SACCOs. Both descriptive statistics, such 
as simple ratios and averages, as well as graphical methods and econometric models were 
used to measure the level of performance among SACCOs and explore possible performance 
drivers. Bearing in mind the limitations of previous studies which used standard data 
envelopment analysis to estimate efficiency, the bias-corrected efficiency scores were 
estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis with bootstrap for Technical, Scale and Pure 
Technical efficiency scores. Financial Sustainability was measured as a ratio of total revenue 
to total cost plus loan loss provision. Return on Asset was used as a proxy for profitability. In 
addition an efficiency-profitability matrix approach was used to classify SACCOs into 
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different performance categories to account for the multifaceted nature of performance. To 
understand the drivers of the performance among SACCOs a case study approach was used to 
explore what drives performance among high and low performing SACCOs. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides a general summary of the key 
findings of this study focusing on evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Secondly, it 
highlights the policy implication of the findings. Finally, it offers some policy 
recommendations. 
 
8.2 Key findings, discussions and policy implications  
This section summarizes key findings regarding level of performance of SACCOs in Tanzania 
and factors driving performance among SACCOs. The section also discusses possible 
implications of the results. 
 
8.2.1 Efficiency among SACCOs and possible source of inefficiencies 
The evidence from efficiency analysis demonstrated that the major source of inefficiency is 
attributed to managerial inefficiency, which accounts for 57% of inefficiency, followed by 
scale inefficiency, which is estimated to be 23% after correcting for bias. The level of overall 
inefficiency, which is about 68% is relatively low, but comparable with previous empirical 
studies in developing countries. The performance is by large constrained by the managerial 
ineffectiveness in resource utilization. The high level of managerial inefficiency could be 
explained by the small nature of the SACCOs and lack of sophistication in the financial 
intermediation process. Smaller SACCOs are more likely to be constrained by the quality of 
the personnel they are able to recruit and retain. Also they are likely to be suffering from a 
limited pool of talent to recruit volunteers who are capable board members with diverse skills 
set to oversee the organization. This could be improved through dedicated efforts to upscale 
managerial competency to redress the problem of managerial inefficiency including on-the-
job training or merging with high performing SACCOs to leverage managerial competency.  
 
In terms of scale efficiency, improvements can be achieved through organic growth of the 
membership base, or through strategic growth using a mixture of aggressive marketing 
campaigns to attract and retain more net savers and attracting external capital to boost the 
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scale of operations. Another plausible option is to merge the smaller SACCOs into the nearest 
high performing SACCOs. A merger is expected to improve efficiency through the increase 
of the scale of operation while maintaining financial inclusion and visibility at the local level 
through a satellite operation using mobile phone banking technology such as M-Pesa. 
 
8.2.2 Financial sustainability and profitability of SACCOs 
When viewed from sustainability and profitability dimensions, our findings present modestly 
promising results compared to the current pessimistic view of the industry as demonstrated in 
Morduch (2000) and Adongo and Stork (2005). The overall financial sustainability results 
suggest that a financial cooperative business model may be a sustainable alternative form of 
financing the poor. However, it is instructive to note that about 49% of the sample SACCOs 
were not sustainable, which indicates that there is a sizable divide between high performing 
and poor performing SACCOs. The average profitable was above the minimum threshold of 
3% recommended by the industry’s best practice. If this level of profitability could be 
maintained over a period of time it would demonstrate that under good management the 
industry can be profitable.  
 
8.2.3 Efficiency and profitability classification  
To gain insights from both profitability and efficiency dimensions, an efficiency-profitability 
matrix was employed and found that the majority of the firms (61%) were classified in the 
low efficiency low profitability category, while only 14% of the SACCOs were identified as 
best performers in both dimensions. This demonstrates that when efficiency and profitability 
are analyzed together the emerging evidence is less optimistic than when compared to 
efficiency or sustainability alone. As argued by Boussofiane et al. (1991) and Camanho and 
Dyson (1990), the performance of financial organizations is a complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon which needs to be analyzed from several dimensions. This approach brings more 
insights into the analysis including the possibility of the existence of low efficiency but highly 
profitable firms because of the existence of a quasi-monopoly. Underperformance could also 
be a result of structural problem, for example a highly efficient firm which is operating in a 
low business catchment zone.  
 
Alternatively firms could be struggling in both dimensions which was the case for the 
majority of the SACCOs in the study. The high proportion of firms with low efficiency and 
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profitability levels could be explained by a combination of factors including the nascent 
nature of the industry, managerial inefficiency and scale of operation as demonstrated in 
Section 8.2.2. Also the level of poverty and recent trends in macroeconomic instability in the 
country, including the high level of inflation, may play a role. The findings call for continuous 
monitoring and performance improvement strategies to be implemented by the industry and 
regulators.  
 
8.2.4 Performance drivers among SACCOs 
The emerging evidence from multiple case studies suggest that income diversification, quality 
of governance, quality of management, capital availability and members’ cooperative 
education are the top drivers of performance across the industry. Delayed disbursement of 
members’ automatic payroll deduction by employers,, sporadic and unpredictable payments, 
multiple loans, tax burdens, high transaction costs, high rate of intra- and inter-regional 
mobility of members, and high default rates were cited as major setbacks among SACCOs.  
 
The high performing SACCOs were more proactive in income diversification and are 
managed by committed and strict board members, especially when it comes to the financial 
affairs of the organizations. In addition they tended to devote time and resources in educating 
their members on general principles of cooperative, effective and prudential financial 
management before loan disbursement. When categorized into workers- and community-
based SACCOs, there was a clear systematic trend that almost all workers’ SACCOs suffered 
from late disbursement of the employee automatic payroll reduction from employers. Many 
SACCOs complained that their employers are increasingly using the SACCO funds for other 
expenditures without the permission of the SACCOs, thereby crippling the operations of the 
SACCOs. The community-based SACCOs are significantly constrained by unpredictable and 
sporadic cash flow which affects their planned activities and high transaction costs for 
monitoring and debt collection. Overall, the industry is capital-constrained, suffering from 
weak governance, and exposed to a risky (lower income) segment of the population. If these 
problems, especially capital constraints, education of the members and responsibility and 
accountability among employers, are not addressed with urgency, the performance of industry 
will remain a problem.  
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8.2.5 Synthesis, implication of the findings and recommendations 
The results of this study highlight some areas that the authorities would need to focus on, to 
improve the performance of SACCOs in the country and enhance their contribution to 
economic growth. Similarly the results further highlight where performance seems to present 
challenges which those in authority will have to address to prevent further negative effects. 
The major aspects of the finding which stand out are managerial inefficiency, scale 
inefficiency, capital constraints, inadequate cooperative education, delayed remittances by 
employers, multiple loans and strategic default. The rest of this subsection discusses these 
aspects in detail.  
 
Managerial inefficiency is a complex issue to address because most of the SACCOs are run 
by volunteer managers and are too small to afford competent managers: this problem is 
normally not serious for larger SACCOs. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the smaller SACCOs 
are frustrated by high employee turnover rates due to more lucrative pay in the formal 
banking sector. This means that in current market conditions getting graduate managers to run 
the small SACCOs will remain a challenge. The policy which is geared towards development 
of short-term financial management at the community level may help to redress the problem. 
Both the government and SACCOs could contribute toward the cost of capacity-building at 
the community level. If this is carried out effectively it will help to reduce wastage in the 
intermediation process through effective resource utilization. Such intervention may include 
the design of in-service certificate courses in SACCO management and accounting to improve 
local managerial capacity and competence, constant monitoring and supervision. Also 
provision of necessary technical support is important. 
 
Scale inefficiency among SACCOs is attributed to the small scale of operations. This 
challenge could be addressed by a combination of strategies, especially scale-increasing 
strategies. Since most SACCOs suffer from an upward growth ceiling due to the localization 
of their operations, it might limit the possibility of increasing the number of members in 
certain locations in the short run, which may constrain increasing the scale of operations 
through growth of the membership base. The most plausible option is the use of a mobile 
banking platform such as M-Pesa to open satellite offices and merge inefficient SACCOs with 
more efficient SACCOs. This might help smaller SACCOs to reduce unnecessary overhead 
costs but still remain accessible to members. This could be used as both profit-increasing and 
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efficiency-increasing strategies by SACCOs’ management. The implementation of this 
strategy is feasible given the recent surge in mobile banking technological development and 
wide acceptance in Tanzania and other member countries in East Africa. 
 
Capital constraints were mentioned by almost all visited SACCOs and seem to significantly 
affect the scale of operation and client satisfaction due to loan amounts and waiting time. This 
problem could be partially addressed by focusing on internal capital growth mechanisms 
through a combination of approaches, especially income diversification and carefully 
designed saving incentives. However, the existing policy which allows each member to 
borrow up to three times his own saving adds additional capital requirements. That means that 
at any time the SACCOs should have preferably three times the total savings and deposits 
from members. The remaining balance can be mitigated by external borrowing; unfortunately 
either the current market rate is too expensive or lending conditions are very restrictive. The 
private sector extends loans to the SACCOs, however the price charged by taking risk into 
account is prohibitive. This constraint could be relaxed by the government playing an active 
role in guaranteeing part of the risk incurred by the private sector to reduce the interest 
charged on the wholesale lending to credit cooperative. Specifically, this problem could be 
addressed by careful government intervention which could be in the form of credit guarantee 
schemes on SACCOs based on their previous performance record. 
 
The problems of multiple loans and strategic default are higher order problems which need 
a nationwide policy which enforces unique identification of every resident to be implemented. 
This will facilitate traceability of defaulters and will work well if it goes in tandem with the 
development of a comprehensive credit cross-reference facility (credit bureau). 
 
Inadequate education of both cooperative and entrepreneurship has been mentioned as a 
challenge among SACCO members, board members, management and regulators. This 
problem can be addressed by aggressive education and training of members and effective 
oversight of management to be implemented by regulators and other stakeholders in the 
industry. It would help if cooperative and entrepreneurship education is incorporated in the 
standard education curriculum.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
 
8.3 Contribution of the study  
This research contributes to the research on the current debate about the role of microfinance 
and their viability in extending financial services to the poor. Specifically knowledge 
generated from the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4 through 7 make an addition to 
the extant literature and practice in three ways. First, it contributes towards the scanty 
empirical literature on the performance of saving and credit cooperatives in developing 
countries in general and in Tanzania in particular. Second, it casts provocative evidence which 
appears to modestly contradict earlier and more pessimistic accounts on the performance of 
co-operatives and other microfinance institutions in developing countries (see Mori & Olomi, 
2012; Acharya &Acharya, 2006; Adongo & Stork, 2005; Modurch, 2000). Third, the findings 
from this study also provide a better understanding of the status quo in terms of productive 
efficiency and evidence needed for making informed policies and decisions in microfinance 
sectors.  
 
While the current study has filled some gaps in the literature, it also has some limitations. One 
such limitation is that the study focused on four regions in Tanzania and only SACCOs with 
audited financial statements were included. Thus the conclusion is limited to SACCOs with 
similar characteristics. Future work might consider extending the analysis to include SACCOs 
with non-audited financial statements and to track the performance dynamics over time. The 
biggest challenges for such studies will be how to get appropriate data to implement the study. 
Another limitation was the inadequate data to track the performance dynamics over time 
which could be resolved in the future as more data are made available.  
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
In summary there is some glimmer of hope on the performance of SACCOs compared to the 
current pessimistic view of the industry. However, still there are some performance 
challenges affecting the prosperity of the industry which need to be addressed. These 
challenges call for a collective intervention by working jointly with the government, 
SACCOs’ management, members and private financiers. The study suggests close monitoring 
and continuous performance evaluation coupled with an enabling environment for 
performance improvement of the SACCO industry in Tanzania.  
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Table A.4.1: Conventional and Bias Corrected Efficiency Estimates 
DMU TExvrs TExnirs TExcrs bcTExvrs bcTExnirs bcTExcrs UBxvrs LBxvrs 
1 1.00 0.72 0.72 0.81 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.47 
2 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.87 0.52 
3 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.17 
4 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.31 
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.89 0.47 
6 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.13 
7 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.25 
8 0.47 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.16 
9 0.96 0.17 0.17 0.72 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.06 
10 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.16 
11 1.00 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.62 0.72 0.44 
12 0.70 0.16 0.16 0.56 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.08 
13 0.94 0.27 0.27 0.73 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.15 
14 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.14 
15 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.74 0.45 
16 1.00 0.15 0.15 0.74 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.09 
17 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.11 
18 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.15 
19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.07 
20 0.70 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.45 0.45 0.59 0.22 
21 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.72 0.43 
22 0.82 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.40 
23 0.63 0.63 0.20 0.47 0.44 0.17 0.19 0.12 
24 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.17 
25 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.77 0.42 
26 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.08 
27 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.11 
28 0.79 0.38 0.38 0.59 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.11 
29 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.47 0.59 0.27 
30 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.13 
31 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.09 
32 1.00 0.11 0.11 0.70 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.04 
33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.90 0.29 
34 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.09 
35 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.07 
36 0.49 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.15 
37 0.59 0.59 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.15 
38 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.15 
39 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.11 
40 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.25 
41 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.07 
42 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.81 0.38 
43 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.18 
44 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.72 0.67 0.35 0.39 0.26 
45 0.50 0.11 0.11 0.40 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.06 
46 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 
47 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.14 
48 0.69 0.69 0.61 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.57 0.35 
49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.45 0.20 
50 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.11 
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Table A.4.1: Conventional and Bias Corrected Efficiency Estimates (continued) 
DMU TExvrs TExnirs TExcrs bcTExvrs bcTExnirs bcTExcrs UBxvrs LBxvrs 
52 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.91 0.22 
53 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.60 0.36 
54 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.37 0.24 
55 0.40 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.10 
56 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.26 0.17 
57 0.96 0.96 0.49 0.69 0.64 0.35 0.91 0.26 
58 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.44 0.16 
59 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.71 0.44 
60 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.20 
61 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.07 
62 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.15 
63 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.18 
64 0.66 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.10 
65 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.37 0.14 
66 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.89 0.44 
67 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.19 
68 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.00 
69 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.38 0.23 
70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.14 0.08 
71 0.71 0.71 0.29 0.52 0.48 0.22 0.91 0.38 
72 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.62 0.57 0.59 0.28 0.13 
73 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.76 0.26 
74 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.46 0.29 
75 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.90 0.49 
76 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.34 0.22 
77 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.78 0.49 
78 1.00 1.00 0.22 0.66 0.61 0.17 0.59 0.34 
79 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.46 0.21 0.11 
80 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.61 0.21 
81 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.12 
82 1.00 0.29 0.29 0.68 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.10 
83 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.26 0.16 
84 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.12 
85 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.30 0.12 
86 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.11 
87 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.08 
88 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.10 
89 1.00 0.13 0.13 0.72 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.10 
90 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.73 0.67 0.70 0.12 0.06 
91 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.90 0.36 
92 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.09 
93 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.18 0.10 
94 0.62 0.41 0.41 0.52 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.19 
95 0.52 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.22 
96 0.85 0.85 0.30 0.64 0.59 0.24 0.34 0.20 
97 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.18 
98 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.22 
99 0.53 0.53 0.29 0.41 0.38 0.24 0.14 0.08 
100 1.00 0.81 0.81 0.74 0.65 0.66 0.28 0.19 
101 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.49 
102 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.91 0.33 
103 0.52 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.20 0.92 0.27 
 
Note: TExvrs TExnirs TExcrs stand for conventional technical efficiency under variables returns to 
scale, non-increasing returns to scal,e and constant return to scale respectively. bcTExvrs bcTExnirs 
bcTExcrs stand for bias-corrected technical efficiency under variables returns to scale, non-
increasing returns to scale, and constant return to scale respectively. UBxcrs, LBxcrs stand for upper 
bound and lower bound of technical efficiency and constant returns to scale.  
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Table A.4.2: Correlation analysis between conventional efficiency scores and bias 
corrected technical efficiency scores 
 
 TE TE* 
TE*  0.9 




Note:  TE: Conventional technical efficiency scores  
TE*: Bias corrected efficiency scores  
 
Table A.5.1: Correlation analysis 
 
FSS RoA DM TE CPL 
FSS 1 
    RoA 0.51* 1 
   DM -0.08 -0.15 1 
  TE 0.44* 0.29* -0.18 1 
 CPL -0.136 -0.39* 0.92* -0.13 1 
 
Note:  FSS: Financial Sustainability score 
   RoA: Return on Asset  
DM: Deposit Mobilization  
TE: Technical Efficiency 










Diagnostics Results for Multicollinearity   Diagnostic Results for Heteroskedasticity and Normality 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Source chi2 df p  
RoA 1.53 0.65  Heteroskedasticity 56.01 14 0.00  
Technical efficiency 1.53 0.66  Skewness 8.42 4 0.08  
Deposit mobilization 1.43 0.70  Kurtosis 9.58 1 0.00  
Cost per unit loan  1.13 0.88  Total 74.02 19 0.00  
Mean VIF 1.41 
 












Figure A.5.3: Selected Diagnostic Plots for multiple regression results  





3. Residual distribution versus normal 
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Table A.6.1: Estimates for Technical Efficiency (TE), Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE), 
Scale Efficiency and Returns to Scale 
ID Region T
E 
PTE SE RTS Rank 
 





33 DSM 1 1 1 crs 1 
 
20 DSM 0.3 0.3
4 
0.87 irs 53 
13 DSM 1 1 1 crs 2 
 
121 MWZ 0.3 0.8
6 
0.34 drs 54 
46 DSM 1 1 1 crs 3 
 
50 DSM 0.29 0.
9 
0.42 drs 55 
98 AR 1 1 1 crs 3 
 
120 MWZ 0.29 0.5
1 
0.57 drs 56 
48 DSM 1 1 1 crs 5 
 
77 KLM 0.28  0.28 irs 57 
110 MWZ 1 1 1 crs 5 
 
43 DSM 0.28 0.4 0.69 irs 58 
108 MWZ 1 1 1 irs 7 
 
64 DSM 0.28 0.2
9 
0.97 drs 59 
56 DSM 1 1 1 irs 8 
 
72 KLM 0.27 0.3
4 
0.81 irs 60 
41 DSM 1 1 1 crs 9 
 
52 DSM 0.27 0.3
4 




1 0.97 irs 10 
 
102 AR 0.26 0.3
4 




1 0.91 drs 11 
 
19 DSM 0.26 0.
9 




0.97 0.93 drs 12 
 
79 AR 0.26 0.
4 




1 0.86 irs 13 
 
117 MWZ 0.26 0.5
2 




0.83 1 irs 14 
 
69 KLM 0.25 0.3
1 




1 0.82 irs 15 
 
93 AR 0.24 0.2
6 




1 0.81 irs 16 
 
17 DSM 0.24 0.2
4 




0.83 0.95 irs 17 
 
26 DSM 0.24 0.2
6 




0.77 0.99 irs 18 
 
21 DSM 0.23 0.2
9 
0.8 irs 70 
101 AR 0.
6 
1 0.76 irs 19 
 
14 DSM 0.23 0.2
5 




0.8 0.94 irs 20 
 
76 KLM 0.22 0.3
3 
0.67 irs 72 
94 AR 0.
9 
0.99 0.69 irs 21 
 
11 DSM 0.22 0.2
2 




1 0.65 drs 22 
 
49 DSM 0.22 0.
4 




0.7 0.92 irs 23 
 




1 0.63 irs 24 
 




0.63 0.99 irs 25 
 
73 KLM 0.21 0.2
3 




0.81 0.74 irs 26 
 
68 KLM 0.21 0.2
2 




1 0.59 drs 27 
 
103 AR 0.21 0.
8 




0.65 0.89 drs 28 
 
32 DSM 0.2 0.2
1 




0.57 0.94 irs 29 
 
38 DSM 0.2 0.3
1 




0.53 0.98 drs 30 
 
35 DSM 0.2 0.6
1 




0.51 1 drs 31 
 
113 MWZ 0.19 0.3
1 




0.97 0.51 irs 32 
 
3 DSM 0.19 0.2
1 




0.53 0.91 irs 33 
 
71 KLM 0.18 0.
8 




0.48 0.99 irs 34 
 




1 0.43 irs 35 
 
106 MWZ 0.17 0.3
9 




0.64 0.67 irs 36 
 
25 DSM 0.17 0.1
7 




0.48 0.87 irs 37 
 
91 AR 0.17 0.9
6 




0.45 0.91 irs 38 
 
18 DSM 0.17 0.2
4 
0.69 irs 90 
15 DSM 0.
4 
0.4 0.99 irs 39 
 
85 AR 0.16 0.7 0.23 irs 91 
109 MWZ 0.
4 
0.41 0.98 irs 40 
 
86 AR 0.16 0.1
8 




0.78 0.5 irs 41 
 
61 DSM 0.16 0.1
6 




0.65 0.59 irs 42 
 
118 MWZ 0.15 0.1
7 




0.37 1 irs 43 
 




0.39 0.96 irs 44 
 




0.38 0.98 irs 45 
 




0.52 0.7 irs 46 
 




0.6 0.6 drs 47 
 
75 KLM 0.12 0.1
2 




0.35 0.99 irs 48 
 




0.41 0.81 irs 49 
 
7 DSM 0.1 1 0.1 irs 101 
88 AR 0.
2 
0.47 0.69 irs 50 
 
55 DSM 0.09 0.1
3 




0.32 0.96 irs 51 
 
12 DSM 0 0.0
6 




0.31 0.97 irs 52 
 
        
Note: AR (Arusha); MWZ (Mwanza); DSM (Dar Es Salaam); KLM (Kilimanjaro); ID (SACCOs’ ID); 
TE (Technical Efficiency); PTE (Pure Technical Efficiency). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
Appendix A.7.1: Selected cases and their key performance variables 
Name Region Loans 
Fixed 




TE SCALE RTS Rank Income FSS RoA Quadrant 
SACCO 19  AR 1.40E+09 2.30E+07 8.80E+08 1.50E+08 9.10E+07 0.31 0.32 0.96 irs 51 1.02E+09 0.92 0.04 3 
SACCO 12  AR 8.10E+08 5.20E+07 4.80E+08 2.20E+08 1.00E+08 0.35 0.35 0.99 irs 48 7.00E+08 1.53 0.14 1 
SACCO 4  AR 2.00E+09 5.20E+07 5.20E+08 3.00E+08 3.90E+07 0.91 1 0.91 drs 11 8.20E+08 2.14 0.13 2 
SACCO 10  AR 3.50E+06 1.70E+07 1.20E+07 2.20E+07 4.10E+06 0.79 0.83 0.95 irs 17 3.36E+07 5.14 0.86 2 
SACCO 3 AR 9.10E+06 2.40E+07 1.20E+07 1.70E+07 1.30E+06 1 1 1 crs 3 2.89E+07 9.77 0.48 2 
SACCO 13  AR 2.50E+09 5.00E+08 2.70E+09 1.70E+08 1.20E+08 0.26 0.34 0.77 drs 62 2.82E+09 0.68 0.02 3 
SACCO 6  AR 4.60E+07 4.30E+06 3.10E+07 1.20E+07 1.90E+06 0.69 0.99 0.69 irs 21 4.20E+07 2.74 0.19 2 
SACCO 14  DSM 1.00E+09 2.40E+08 6.70E+08 2.80E+08 2.90E+08 0.17 0.17 1 irs 88 9.47E+08 0.82 -0.01 3 
SACCO 5 DSM 6.00E+06 1.30E+07 5.00E+06 4.50E+07 3.30E+07 1 1 1 crs 1 5.02E+07 1.34 0.62 2 
SACCO 15  DSM 1.20E+09 3.80E+08 1.80E+09 4.90E+08 3.40E+08 0.2 0.61 0.32 irs 82 2.29E+09 1.21 0.09 3 
SACCO 16 DSM 1.10E+09 2.10E+07 3.30E+08 1.60E+07 3.30E+07 0.47 0.48 0.99 irs 34 3.42E+08 0.19 -0.01 3 
SACCO 11 DSM 2.40E+09 7.20E+07 4.40E+07 1.40E+08 6.90E+07 1 1 1 crs 2 1.87E+08 0.75 0.03 4 
SACCO 7  MWZ 2.00E+09 1.30E+07 2.30E+08 2.40E+08 2.90E+07 1 1 1 irs 7 4.66E+08 1.85 0.10 2 
SACCO 8  MWZ 1.80E+09 5.30E+07 6.00E+07 3.10E+08 6.10E+07 1 1 1 crs 5 3.71E+08 2.09 0.14 2 
SACCO 17 MWZ 1.20E+08 1.20E+07 8.90E+07 1.40E+07 8.70E+06 0.19 0.31 0.62 irs 83 1.03E+08 0.95 0.04 3 
SACCO 18 MWZ 2.50E+08 3.30E+07 2.50E+08 4.60E+07 4.00E+07 0.15 0.17 0.9 irs 94 2.95E+08 0.89 0.02 3 
SACCOS 9  MWZ 1.90E+07 5.70E+06 5.30E+06 8.80E+06 1.60E+06 0.81 1 0.81 irs 16 1.40E+07 3.50 0.29 2 
                Average (N=103) 
 
8.72E+08 1.26E+08 5.55E+08 1.16E+08 6.12E+07 0.4203 0.5757 0.763 
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Appendix A.7.2: A summary of perceived existence (nonexistence) of the key performance drivers among the visited SACCOs 
















1  High Strong Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
2 High Strong Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes NA 
3 High Strong Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
4 High Strong(*) Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Sometime 
5 High Strong Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Sometime NA 
6 High Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No No Some Time Some Time 
7 High Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
8 High Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No No Some Time Some Time 
9 High Strong Yes Some How No Yes Yes No No Some Time NA 
10 High Strong No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Some Time NA 
11 Medium Strong(*) Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
12 Medium Strong Somehow No Yes No Yes No No Some Time NA 
13 Low Strong No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
14 Low Strong Yes Some How Yes Yes Yes No No Some Time NA 
15 Low Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No No Some Time  NA 
16 Low Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
17 Low Strong Yes No Yes(**) No Yes No No No No 
18 Low Strong Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No 
19 Low Moderate Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
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Appendix A.7.3: A checklist: What drives performance of SACCOs in Tanzania?  
General Questions  
1. If you had all the capital you wanted, where would you like to see your organization in the 
next 5 years from now? 
2. Let's talk about how you measure the performance of your organization in terms of 
profitability, efficiency and sustainability with your SACCOs. How does it usually perform?  
3. What are stories you can share that illustrate the SACCOs strengths and weaknesses?  
4. What are areas in which the SACCO doesn’t seem to meet your particular expectation?  
5. When you look back in time what would like to change about your organization to improve 
performance? 
6. Is there any issue which affects your performance which we did not cover in our discussion?  
 
Follow-Up Questions  
A. SACCOs historical background and strategic mission (Manager and or Board Chair) 
a. What is the brief history of the institution?  
b. Who formed the SACCO? When and why? 
c. Do you think the current mission of the SACCO still reflects its initial objective? 
d. What are the SACCO’s main activities? 
e. What do you think about the size of your SACCO (too large, too small, about right)? Why?  
f. How does it affect the performance? 
 
B. Understanding of Seven Principles of Cooperatives and how they are applied in running 
SACCOs (Managers/Board)?  
a. How do you recruit your members? 
b. What type of training has been offered to board members, managers and members in the last 
five years? How often? 
c. How frequently do you give dividends to your members?  
d. How is the amount determined and how is it distributed? 
e. How do you raise capital? (Is it mainly internally or through external borrowing?) 
f. What type of linkage and relationship do you have with other financial institutions? Why?  
g. Which role do you play in your community? (eg. in education, environmental conservation, 
health service ?) 
h. What is your understanding of the seven principles of cooperatives? How are they 
implemented here? 
i. Which of the cooperatives principles (dis)advantage you over other financial service 
providers? Why? 
 
C. Quality of Governance (Composition, Effective Board Process)  
1. Board Composition and Diversity 
a. What is the structure and composition of your board? (Size, Skills, Education, Age, Gender, 
Experience). 
b. Can you explain the motivation behind this structure and how was it arrived at?  
c. What is the duration of the board members term of office and can they be–elected?  
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d. Who chairs the board? Is he/she different from a manager? 
e. How many committees do you have and what is their role?  
f. What are the major responsibilities and activities of the boards? 
g. How often does the board meet in a year and are the meeting information/documents 
circulated in advance?  
h. What reports and documents does the board normally receive from the committee, 
management and auditors?  
i. Which strategies do you have in place to deal with bad debt and operational risks such as 
fraud? 
j. What do you understand by the term ‘transparency’ in financial service provision and how is it 
being practiced here?  
k. What is loan approval process? Does it differ depending on the size and type of applicant?  
 
2. Decision making and handling challenges? 
a. How are key decisions being made in this SACCO and why?  
b. Which type of decision needs strictly board approval? 
c. Is a board member allowed to borrow from the credit union? 
d. Is it possible for board members to borrow more than recommended maximum? Who 
approves it? 
e. How many members have used this facility in the last year? 
f. Are there some members of the management/board who have carried over loans during the 
last year? 
 
3. Over life time what has been the major success stories? 
a. What contributed to success? 
b. Were they planned successes or did they happened by chance? 
c. How was it achieved? 
d. What are you doing to maintain success? 
 
4. What have been major challenges? 
a. What contributed to the challenges? 
b. Were they anticipated or did they come by surprise? 
c. What steps have you taken to resolve the challenges?  
 
5. Description of the SUCCESS /Failure  
a. How it all began 
b. Who were the key players?  
c. Who were the key supporters? 
d.  What lessons have you learned along the way? 
 
D. Quality of Management (Manager/Board) 
a. How were you recruited for the position?  
b. How did your education, skill set and experience help you to get the job? 
c. How often to do you receive training? 
d. What do you think about the performance of your organization in terms of efficiency and 
sustainability? 
e. What factors constrain the operation of the SACCO? 
f. Did you apply for a wholesale loan in the past 4 years? Why? 
g. How was the loan distributed among the borrowers? 
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E. Embezzlement Incidence (Board/Manager/Member) 
a. During the past five years is there any unaccounted loss which has been reported in your 
SACCOs? 
b. What do you think could have caused it?  
c. What measures have been put in place to avoid the re-occurrence? 
 
F. Political Interference (Manager/Board) 
a. How often do you receive funding from the government? 
b. Are there incidents when politicians or government technocrats have used their power to 
influence the management to take risk decisions which would not have been taken otherwise? 
G. Operating Environment (Manager/Board) 
a. What is the type of the common bond among the members? (Closed based, flexible)? 
b. What is the major composition of socioeconomic profile of your members? Does it affect the 
performance of the SACCO? 
c. Can non-members use the SACCOs? What is the procedure? 
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